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Abstract 
China’s remarkable economic growth heralds substantial improvements in 
population health for the Chinese people. While economic growth in some respects 
acts as a positive stimulus to the health sector, it also brings challenges to the health 
system, in particular, a widening inequity in healthcare across the social spectrum, 
rising healthcare costs and low efficiency in health provision. The overarching aim 
of the thesis is to investigate whether inequities and inefficiencies exist in China’s 
healthcare system. It then seeks to understand, whether and to what extent a newly 
developed social health insurance scheme—the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (NCMS)—responses to issues of inequities and inefficiencies in China’s 
healthcare system. This thesis uses a variety of analytical tools, such as the 
Concentration Index, Decomposition Analysis, Two-part Regression Analysis and 
Differences-in-Differences analysis. Data from a longitudinal individual level 
survey—the China Health and Nutrition Survey of 2004, 2006 and 2009—are used.  
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that inequalities in health and health care in China 
are ubiquitous and favouring better-off socioeconomic groups. Health status for the 
urban poor is surprisingly worse than their rural counterparts; more than two-thirds 
of the inequalities for the rural population are driven by socioeconomic factors. In 
rural areas, the NCMS was introduced to improve equity in access to healthcare and 
financial protection to rural farmers in 2003. This thesis finds that, even though the 
coverage of the NCMS reached more than 97% in 2009, the poor were still less 
likely to use formal care, such as preventive care, and were more likely to use folk 
doctor care compared with the rich. They may also have difficulty in meeting the 
costs of care that they need, and have to pay a substantial fraction of their incomes 
on healthcare. 
 
This thesis also finds that the NCMS may exacerbate the problem of inefficiency in 
healthcare provision because the scheme may lead to cost escalation in healthcare. 
Outpatient treatments for the NCMS participants incur significantly higher pre-
reimbursement per episode costs than those for the uninsured. This pre-
reimbursement inflation in costs is most noticeably observed at village clinics and 
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township health centres—the backbone of the health system for poor rural farmers—
than at county and municipal hospitals. 
This thesis urges policy makers to explore ways to improve equitable access and 
control supplier-induced demand in health care in China. In terms of the NCMS, it is 
important to improve the benefit package for both outpatient and inpatient care, and 
to offer additional benefits for the poor households. The government should also 
reform provider payment mechanism, regulate provider behavior, as well as 
implement other measures to prevent over prescribe of medicines and over supply of 
healthcare.  
 
 
  
5 
 
Acknowledgement  
First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Jian Ding and Hua Yang, for 
their selfless love and irreplaceable intellectual support, without which this Ph.D 
would have never come to fruition.  
 
My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr. Panos Kanavos for his support and 
encouragement. I am grateful to Dr. Caroline Rudisill for her guidance and wise 
advice through this PhD. I thank Dr. Xun Wu for his valuable direction and 
comments. His guidance and instruction has undoubtedly made me a more capable 
researcher. I thank Professor Athar Hussain for offering support when I needed.  
 
I am grateful for the education, friendship and encouragement I have received from 
many scholars and peers I have been privileged to know over the course of my 
academic training. In particular, I am indebted to Azusa Sato and Bo Hu who read 
earlier drafts of this thesis, provided insightful comments on several chapters. I wish 
to thank Paul Bouanchaud for offering to proofread some chapters of my thesis 
within a very tight time schedule.  
 
I would like to thank Curtis Sam for being there and supporting me through the dark 
hours and the hardest times, for his understanding, encouragement and affection.  
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents.  
  
6 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ 5 
List of tables .................................................................................................................. 8 
List of figures .............................................................................................................. 10 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................. 11 
Glossary of terms in Chinese ..................................................................................... 13 
Note on the structure of the thesis ............................................................................ 14 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.1 Motivation ..................................................................................................... 15 
1.2 The case study of China ................................................................................ 18 
1.3 Analytical framework .................................................................................... 21 
1.4 Plan of the thesis ............................................................................................ 30 
1.5 Data and general methods ............................................................................. 34 
1.6 Contributions of this thesis ............................................................................ 42 
2 Background ......................................................................................................... 45 
2.1 China’s healthcare system in a historical context.......................................... 45 
2.2 Organization and service delivery in healthcare: a brief summary ............... 50 
2.3 Financing healthcare services: Social health insurance for urban and rural 
population ................................................................................................................. 57 
3 Age and gender standardised inequities in health outcomes ......................... 64 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 65 
3.2 Methods ......................................................................................................... 66 
3.3 Empirical Results .......................................................................................... 74 
3.4 Conclusion and discussion ............................................................................ 86 
4 Horizontal inequities in health service use ...................................................... 90 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 91 
4.2 Methods ......................................................................................................... 94 
4.3 Empirical results .......................................................................................... 100 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion .......................................................................... 105 
5 Catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced poverty ........ 108 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 109 
5.2 NCMS and catastrophic outpatient service ................................................. 113 
5.3 Methods ....................................................................................................... 114 
5.4 Empirical results .......................................................................................... 122 
7 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion .......................................................................... 128 
6 Health insurance and cost escalation.............................................................. 134 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 135 
6.2 Literature review on supplier-induced demand under insurance ................ 137 
6.3 Methods ....................................................................................................... 140 
6.4 Empirical results .......................................................................................... 147 
6.5 Discussion and conclusion .......................................................................... 153 
7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 156 
7.1 Summary of the findings ............................................................................. 157 
7.2 Policy implications ...................................................................................... 159 
7.3 Limitations ................................................................................................... 169 
7.4 Future research agenda ................................................................................ 173 
Appendices ................................................................................................................ 193 
 
 
  
8 
 
List of tables 
Table 2.1 Two-week morbidity rate (‰), 1998, 2003 and 2008 ............................... 52 
Table 2.2 Recent changes in NCMS insurance coverage .......................................... 60 
Table 2.3 Features of the old CMS and the NCMS ................................................... 60 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for urban and rural populations (mean/standard 
deviation).................................................................................................................... 67 
Table 3.2 OLS results for SAH and physical activity limitation ............................... 77 
Table 3.3 Erreygers’s Concentration Indices of SAH and physical activity limitation 
(OLS) ......................................................................................................................... 79 
Table 3.4 Decomposition results (OLS) .................................................................... 84 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard deviation) 96 
Table 4.2 Determinants of health service use (Random effect probit and pooled 
probit models) .......................................................................................................... 101 
Table 4.3 Health service use by income quintiles (Linear Probability Model) ....... 102 
Table 4.4 Socioeconomic Concentration Indices by Linear Probability Model 
(Erreygers’s Concentration Index) ........................................................................... 103 
Table 5.1 Catastrophic outpatient care under the NCMS after 2007 ....................... 113 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard deviation)
 .................................................................................................................................. 115 
Table 5.3 Health payments for healthcare as a share of household income before and 
after the NCMS reimbursement ............................................................................... 122 
Table 5.4 Incidence of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% 
and 25% .................................................................................................................... 124 
Table 5.5 Severity of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% 
and 25% .................................................................................................................... 126 
Table 5.6 OOP payments and the poverty gap before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement .......................................................................................................... 128 
Table 6.1 Sample NCMS participants/non-participants covered by CHNS Survey 
years ......................................................................................................................... 140 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard deviation)
 .................................................................................................................................. 142 
Table 6.3 Sample distribution by NCMS participation for 2004 and 2009 ............. 144 
9 
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for the study population for empirical strategy 1 
(mean/standard deviation) ........................................................................................ 144 
Table 6.5 per episode outpatient costs for the insured and uninsured ..................... 147 
Table 6.6 Medical costs per treatment episode, for the insured and uninsured, at 
different levels of health facilities ............................................................................ 148 
Table 6.7 Regression results for outpatient medical costs for 2004 and 2009 ......... 150 
Table 6.8 DID results with PSM for outpatient costs before the NCMS deduction and 
after the NCMS deduction ....................................................................................... 152 
 
  
10 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1.1 Map of the participating provinces of CHNS ........................................... 35 
Figure 1.2 Ill health Concentration Curve.................................................................. 39 
Figure 2.1 Life expectancy at birth by sex in China, 1990 - 2011 ............................. 50 
Figure 2.2  Under-five mortality rate by sex in China, 1990 - 2012 .......................... 51 
Figure 2.3 Hospital beds per 1, 000 people, 2005-2010 ............................................ 53 
Figure 2.4 Revenue sources of general hospitals in China, 2002-2010 (10,000 RBM)
 .................................................................................................................................... 55 
Figure 2.5 Government and private health expenditure in China (RMB billion), 1990 
- 2010 ......................................................................................................................... 56 
Figure 2.6 Development and evolution of China’s Social Health Insurance System 58 
Figure 3.1 Standardized SAH (excellent and good health = 1, fair and poor health = 0) 
for the urban population and the rural population by income deciles in 2006 
(Standardized by Linear Probability Model).............................................................. 75 
Figure 3.2 Standardized physical activity limitation (having physical limitation = 1, 
otherwise = 0) for the urban population and the rural population by income deciles in 
2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model)..................................................... 76 
Figure 3.3 The Concentration Curves for SAH for the urban and rural population in 
2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model)..................................................... 80 
Figure 3.4 The Concentration Curves for physical activity limitation for the urban 
and rural population in 2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model) ............... 80 
Figure 3.5 Decomposition of SAH (Linear Probability Model) ................................ 83 
Figure 3.6 Decomposition of physical activity limitation (Linear Probability Model)
 .................................................................................................................................... 83 
Figure 4.1 Components of Erreygers’s Concentration Indices in the probability of 
health service use (Linear Probability Model) ......................................................... 104 
Figure 5.1 Stylise Pen’s Parade for household per capita income gross and net of 
outpatient costs under the NCMS ............................................................................ 120 
Figure 5.2 OOP share before and after the NCMS .................................................. 127 
 
11 
 
List of abbreviations 
ATP Ability to Pay 
CDC Chronic Disease Card 
CHNS China Health and Nutrition Survey 
CHARLS China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey 
CI Concentration Indices 
CMS Cooperative Medical Scheme 
CSMBS Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (Thailand) 
DID Difference-in-differences 
DRG Diagnosis-related group 
FFS Fee-for-Service 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIS Government Insurance Health Scheme 
GSCF Gansu Survey of Children and Family 
HCFP Health Care Fund for the Poor (Vietnam) 
HI Horizontal Inequity 
HSM Heckman Selection Model 
LIS Labour Insurance Health Scheme 
LPM Linear Probability Model 
MAR Missing at Random 
MASN Medical Assistance Safety Net (China) 
MCAR Missing Completely at Random 
MNAR Missing Not at Random 
NCMS New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (China) 
NPL National Poverty Line 
OLS Ordinary Least Square 
OOP Out-of-pocket  
PSM Propensity Score Matching 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
RII Relative Inequity Index 
RSBY Rashtriya Swasthya Beema Yojna (India) 
SHI Social health insurance 
SISBEN 
Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas 
Sociales (System to Identify Potential Social Program Beneficiaries) 
(Spain) 
UC scheme Universal Coverage Health Care Scheme (Thailand) 
12 
 
UEI Urban Employee Insurance (China) 
URI Urban Resident Insurance (China) 
VIF Variance inflation factors 
WHO World Health Organization 
2PM Two-part Model 
  
13 
 
Glossary of terms in Chinese 
Chi jiao yi sheng Grass-root doctors 
Di bao The impoverished 
Hukou Personal register 
Min jian yi sheng Folk doctor 
Min gong Migrant workers 
14 
 
Note on the structure of the thesis  
This thesis conforms to the requirements of a doctoral thesis from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. Guidelines state a minimum of three 
papers of publishable standard—in addition to introduction and conclusion 
chapters—not exceeding 100,000 words. Accordingly, this thesis presents an 
introduction chapter, where motivation, background and an overview of research 
questions were given. In order to facilitate the understanding of the papers, the 
second chapter provided a detailed background discussion of China’s healthcare 
system. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 were presented in the style of journal articles and are 
thus termed ‘papers’—form the main body of the thesis. Three of these four papers 
have been published or accepted in peer-reviewed journals. Paper1/Chapter 3 is 
published in BMC Public Health (Yang and Panos, 2012). Paper2/Chapter 4 is a 
published paper in International Journal for Equity in Health (Yang, 2013). Paper 
3/Chapter 5 is under review by Applied Economic Perspectives & Policy. Paper 
4/Chapter 6 is published by Health Policy and Planning. Chapter 7 presents policy 
recommendations, future research agenda as well as limitations of the study.   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation  
Health outcomes are invariably and markedly worse among the poor (World Health 
Organization, 2008, World Health Organization, 1996). Efforts to reduce health 
inequity, together with improving the average level of population health, form a 
large part of health policies in both developed and developing world, and these 
largely focus on reducing socioeconomic inequalities/disparities in health outcomes 
and access, as well as inequities relating to fairness in health financing, which cause 
access problems. 
 
In China, the issue of inequities in health and healthcare has engendered great 
interest in recent years. China has experienced remarkable economic growth since its 
sweeping market reforms in 1978. The economic development has heralded 
substantial improvements in population health for the Chinese people, but the 
increase in prosperity has been uneven, resulting in widening healthcare disparities. 
A growing body of research confirms a persistent and widening health inequity 
between the rich and poor (Akin et al., 2004, Gao et al., 2002, Liu et al., 2012b, Luo 
et al., 2009, Meng et al., 2012, Yip and Hsiao, 2009a). According to the official 
statistics, from the 1980s to the early 2000s, the poor Chinese suffered higher rates 
of mortality and morbidity compared with the rich; they also used fewer health 
services despite having greater needs (Centre for Health Statistics and Information, 
2008). Insurance coverage was far from sufficient, and the majority of the rural 
Chinese farmers lacked insurance. Healthcare finance was dominated by out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments, which were unaffordable for most Chinese households 
generally and for poor households specifically (Gu 2008).  
 
In China, the regional disparities have been widening since the market-oriented 
reform in the early 1980s. The rapid economic growth and dramatic social and 
political system transitions have assumed different magnitudes in different regions, 
being deeper and more comprehensive in the urban areas (Sun et al., 2011). 
Empirical evidence also suggests a widening gap in health status between urban and 
16 
 
rural residents in the transitional period, correlated with increasing gaps in income 
and health care utilization. It is noted that life expectancy is 74.2 years in urban areas 
compared with 69.6 years in rural areas (Zimmer et al., 2010, Sun et al., 2011). 
China also has substantial disparities across a range of child-health indicators. Rural 
infant mortality rates are nearly five times higher in the poorest rural counties than in 
the wealthiest counties—123 versus 26 per 1000 livebirths in 2006, respectively. 
Further, there are substantial urban-rural differences in terms of healthcare systems 
and insurance schemes, which are believed as common factors leading to inequalities 
in health. These trends are associated with changes in health care financing and 
organization, including dramatic reduction of insurance cover for the rural 
population and relaxed public health.   
 
Parallel concern began to surface in other areas of China’s health system, in 
particular regarding inefficiency in health provision. In the early 1980s, China’s 
Ministry of Health initiated a series of national health reforms, the aim of which was 
to decentralize responsibilities in health management, and to improve productivity 
through financial incentives to medical staff. Hospitals were encouraged to follow 
the policy of “financial autonomy” to use drug and service revenues to compensate 
for the losses from the government subsidies. By the early 1990s, most of these 
hospitals were fully responsible for their own profits and losses. State-owned 
hospitals in aggregate were expected to cover 85% or more of their costs from fees 
(World Bank, 1997). These hospitals had responded by prescribing expensive drugs 
and providing high technology medical procedures for patients to generate profits. 
This, unsurprisingly, resulted in an increase in prices of health services, and became 
a serious problem for the rural population, who at that time were not covered by any 
social health insurance (SHI). In 2008, 45.8% of pinkun (poor) households in rural 
areas reported financial difficulty or high medical costs as the main reasons for 
forgoing care (Centre for health and information, 2008).  
 
China entered the new millennium facing great challenges in the health sector, but 
the 2000s was marked a significant break of two decades in which the Chinese 
government’s attention was predominately occupied by economic development. A 
series of health policies were enacted based on the government’s new approach of 
building a “balanced and harmonious society”(Xinhua, 2012b). In 2003, the New 
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Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance Scheme (NCMS) was introduced to improve 
equity in access to healthcare and financial protection to rural farmers regardless of 
individual characteristics such as gender, job status, education, pre-existing 
conditions, and level of wealth. The scheme was first implemented as a pilot project, 
and was then scaled up quickly and dramatically to a national level. Despite the fact 
that the NCMS had shown some encouraging impacts such as improving insurance 
coverage, problems associated with inadequate financial protection and high health 
co-payments, especially for the rural poor, persist (Akin et al., 2004). Scholars 
argued that reimbursement rates were still low among NCMS participants, especially 
for outpatient care (Sun et al., 2009a). This may lead to high co-payments and 
substantial contributions through private financing from individual patients. Such 
costs may pose obvious threats to households. Further, while there exists a wide gap 
in health needs as well as financial status among the NCMS participants, the scheme 
requires  the  same premium to be paid, and offers the same benefit package to all 
participants. The effects of the NCMS on reducing inequity in catastrophic payments 
and health payment-induced poverty will therefore be limited. Scholars also argued 
that this newly-developed social health insurance scheme may be associated with 
inefficiency in health provision, such as supplier-induced demand of healthcare 
(Eggleston and Yip, 2004, Yip and Hsiao, 2008b).  
 
The overarching research question of this thesis is to investigate whether inequities 
and inefficiencies exist in China’s healthcare system, and to what extent the rural 
insurance scheme responses to these issues. Specifically, inequity in healthcare are 
evaluated through three main health variables, i.e. health outcome, health service use 
and health finance. These variables are frequently used and cited in policy 
documents and the literature as key dimensions to evaluate a health system (Roberts, 
2004, O'Donnell et al., 2008b). For health outcomes, age and gender standardised 
health inequality is measured. This measurement refers the proportion of health 
differentials attributable to socioeconomic variation, such as lack of resources, a less 
nutritious diet, poor living standards, etc. For health use, horizontal inequity is 
measured. It refers to inequity in health use between people with the same healthcare 
needs. For health financing, catastrophic health payment and health payment-
induced poverty are measured. 
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This thesis pays particular attention to one issue that has received very little attention 
in empirical health research in China—cost escalation problem under NCMS. It 
offers an empirical investigation to demonstrate that insurance may induce health 
costs.  
 
Based on the above discussion, this thesis seeks to test a set of hypotheses as follows: 
1) The degree of inequalities in health outcomes is more pronounced in rural 
areas compared with the urban areas. This may be correlated with widening 
inequalities in income and socioeconomic status between urban and rural 
residents in China. 
2) The expansion of the NCMS does not necessarily lead to equitable access to 
care, because the reimbursement rates set for formal care is relatively low, 
co-payments is likely to become one of the barriers to impede access to 
formal care, especially for the rural poor. 
3) The NCMS may have limited impact on reducing catastrophic health-
payments and health payment related poverty for outpatient care, because the 
reimbursement rate for outpatient care is relatively low, and premium 
contribution and benefit package are the same for all participants irrespective 
of their incomes.  
4) The inclusion of outpatient care in the NCMS benefit package may not lead 
to a reduction of health cost; on the contrary, this may lead to an increase of 
costs. This is because that the current provider payment mechanism is based 
on a fee-for-service (FFS) system, which may give perverse incentives to 
providers and is not conducive to cost containment.  
 
1.2 The case study of China 
The geographical focus of this thesis is China. China is chosen for various reasons. 
Theoretically, being the first and only country in East Asia to adopt Socialism as the 
governing ideology, the Chinese government has used the term: “serve the people” 
and “eliminate social classes” as its governing principals, and considered equity as 
an important goal in China’s social sector.  
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The history and development of China’s healthcare system offers an interesting 
background to the investigation of equity and efficiency in health provision. When 
the new republic was founded in 1949, health provision was largely based on an 
egalitarian approach. However, following the market-oriented reform in 1978, China 
started to adopt a liberal approach to govern its health sector. The old commune-
based rural health insurance started to collapse in the 1980s. By the early 2000s, 
except the urban residents who were formally employed in private or public sectors, 
the majority of the Chinese population lacked insurance coverage. Healthcare 
became extremely unaffordable for the majority of the population. Scholars argued 
that China’s healthcare system was bedeviled by “a defective pricing system, 
increasing budget constraint, and widened inequality in healthcare” (Huang, 2000).  
 
The nature and scale of the health equity challenges the Chinese policy makers faced 
at the start of the 2000s offers a particularly rich context to allow for evaluations of 
the new initiatives. The health disparities between the rich and poor have been 
amplified for the past few decades. The poor Chinese tend to suffer high rates of 
mortality and morbidity, and use fewer health services compared to the poor (Centre 
for Health Statistics and Information, 2008) These inequalities may reflect 
differences in constraints between the poor and the rich, such as lower incomes, lack 
of insurance coverage, and poorer health related knowledge, etc. Many rural villages 
lack access to clean water and adequate sanitation; in urban areas, city slums are 
often unable to provide basic necessities, leaving people at risk for water, sanitation, 
and hygiene-related diseases (Hussain, 2003). It is worrisome that the poor in China, 
no matter whether they live in urban or rural areas, are systematically experiencing 
worse health and insufficient resources to maintain good health compared with their 
rich counterparts (O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
 
A number of policies were introduced in the 2000s in response to the health equity 
challenges. Among these initiatives, the launch of the NCMS was a phenomenal. 
The scheme was first piloted in a few provinces, and expanded rapidly throughout 
the whole country. Within less than five years, the NCMS reached more than 90% of 
the rural population (Babiarz et al., 2012, Hao et al., 2010, Lei and Lin, 2009). The 
NCMS had a very clear equity goal. It was envisaged to achieve universal health 
access by providing services to the rural population—accounting for approximately 
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70% of the total population.  The insurance policy document, published in 2003, 
defined the NCMS as a mechanism through which the state should guarantee 
equitable access to healthcare for all the rural population irrespective of individual 
characteristics such as gender, job status, education, pre-existing conditions, and 
level of wealth. Covered services included inpatient care, some catastrophic 
outpatient care and preventive care (Ministry of Health China, 2002). When the 
scheme was first launched in 2003, the intention of the NCMS was to provide 
financial protection against catastrophic inpatient care for rural farmers, and many 
cost-effective outpatient interventions were not covered. In 2007, the scheme 
extended its benefit package to some outpatient services (Ministry of Health 
P.R.China et al., 2007) . This extension was designed specifically to improve equity 
in access to basic healthcare.  
 
Although the equity goals are clearly stated in the policy documents, these goals 
have not yet been sufficiently addressed by the design of the insurance. The NCMS 
is intended to provide equitable and affordable healthcare for all rural populations, 
but in reality, all the participants receive the same benefit package. This is 
particularly problematic because the poor usually have greater health needs, and are 
likely to spend a larger fraction of their income on health compared to the rich. 
Further, the NCMS patients can reimburse approximately 10% to 40% of their 
medical bills depending on what drugs and services they use (Barber and Yao, 2011). 
This means that a large fraction of health bills is payable out-of-pocket by the 
patients, and these costs may be unaffordable and create access barriers for the 
poorer patients.  
 
Aside from the equity issue of the NCMS, the scheme may also encourage 
inefficiency. The current Chinese healthcare system is operated mainly on a fee-for-
service (FFS) basis, which is one of the major changes resulting from the profound 
market-oriented health reform in the 1980s. This FFS system allows health facilities 
to supplement their budgets by making profits from drug sales and health service 
provision; it also encourages the provider to supply sophisticated care wherever 
possible. Such a problem may become even more accentuated when a third party—
health insurance—reimburses part of the health costs as incurred by the patients 
(Wagstaff, 2007b, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). Hospitals are motivated to 
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prescribe expensive medicines and sophisticated diagnosis procedures to insured 
patients because part of their health bills are covered through insurance claims. It is 
argued that the NCMS, designed to protect patients from health shocks, may actually 
lead to unnecessary provision of care under the current Chinese healthcare system, 
hence leading to affordability problems (Meng et al., 2005). 
 
The analysis of the NCMS provides useful insights and valuable knowledge for 
Chinese policy makers, who are concerned with issues of health inequity, and are 
interested in improving the design of their health equity programmes. Accomplishing 
nearly universal insurance coverage is a commendable achievement, but it is 
debatable whether the goals of improving equitable access and fairness in finance 
can be achieved solely by implementing a SHI programme. It is also important to 
look at the design of the insurance, as well as to consider various structural problems 
embedded in the healthcare system, which may lead to inefficient provision of care 
and poor quality of services.  
 
China’s experience with health equity reforms in the 2000s is expected to offer 
lessons for similar reforms in Latin America, Southeast Asia and other middle-
income countries around the world (Knaul and Frenk, 2005, Li et al., 2011), and 
contribute to the debate of health equity and social health insurance in the literature 
of health policy analysis. The following section discusses the analytical framework 
used in this thesis.  
 
1.3 Analytical framework 
1.3.1 Inequity in healthcare 
As one of the objectives of this thesis is to study inequity in health and healthcare, it 
is important to define which equity perspective is employed in this thesis to guide 
the analysis.  
 
Health inequality is a generic term used to designate differences, variances, and 
disparities in the health achievements of individuals and groups (Murray et al., 
1999), while health inequity usually refers to “the distribution of resources and other 
processes that drive a particular kind of health inequalities between more and less 
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advantaged social groups”, in other words, a health inequality that is “unjust or 
unfair” (Braveman and Gruskin, 2003). Health equity is an ethical concept of social 
justice or fairness, which is grounded in principles of distributive justice and 
consonant with human rights principles (Braveman and Gruskin, 2003, Sen, 2002, 
Whitehead, 1991). Two different ideological perspectives concerning ensuring 
individuals’ right to healthcare prevail in the current debate on equity in health and 
healthcare. Libertarians think that government involvement in securing healthcare 
resources and ensuring healthcare access should be minimal. Healthcare ought to be 
provided according to willingness or Ability to Pay (ATP), and people should be able 
to use their own income and other resources to get more or better healthcare 
(Williams, 1993, Masseria et al., 2010) The egalitarian viewpoint, by contrast, is 
concerned about equal distribution in healthcare, and suggests a public-dominated 
approach in funding healthcare. This approach points out that everyone in the society 
has the right to have the same access to care, and healthcare should be financed and 
allocated on the basis of need and not the ATP (Allin and Hurley, 2009) . In a widely 
cited paper, Whiteheads (1991) suggested that “health inequities as differences in 
health that are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust”. Mooney (1983) defines 
seven different definitions of equity of healthcare, including “equality of expenditure 
per capita; equality of inputs per capita; equality of input for equal need; equality of 
access for equal need; equality of utilization for equal need; equality of marginal met 
need; and equality of health”, among which “equity of access for equal need” and 
“equality of utilization for equal need” are two most commonly used definitions in 
the healthcare literature. These definitions have also been suggested as working 
definitions for policy makers. In the domain of health policy making, although the 
debate between libertarian and egalitarian ideologies has not been resolved in 
practice, studies showed that policy makers are more likely to favor an egalitarian 
approach in equity of healthcare (Allin et al., 2009) . In OECD countries, there 
appears to be broad agreement among policy makers that healthcare arrangement 
should be based on health need rather than the distribution of income (Wagstaff et 
al., 1999). 
 
China’s health reforms of the 2000s reflected many key elements in the egalitarian 
approach. In 2002, the Central government and the State Council published the 
“Rural Healthcare Act” (Ministry of Health China, 2002). It indicated that the 
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NCMS should cover catastrophic illness and ensure equitable access to healthcare 
for Chinese farmers. From 2004 to 2012, the equity goal of the NCMS and was 
emphasised in all annual Government Reports published by the central government 
(Xinhua, 2012b). In the National People’s Congress in 2007, the Chinese 
government publicly acknowledged that the market-oriented healthcare reforms in 
the 1980s and the 1990s were considered “unsuccessful”, and that the reforms failed 
to improve access and reduce health costs for the Chinese people. The Congress 
emphasised that one of the key principles of the new health reforms in the 2000s was 
to improve health equity. Specifically, this included “universal health insurance 
coverage”, “equal access to healthcare for equal needs”, and “affordable health for 
all” (Xinhua, 2007). In May 2013, the State Council of China re-stated that the 
objectives of the health reforms in China. These included “improve equitable access 
to healthcare for equal needs”, “provide financial protection for the Chinese people 
against catastrophic illness”, “ensure equitable access to healthcare for the rural and 
urban population” and “enhance universal coverage of health insurance and high 
quality of care for all”(Xinhua, 2013). 
  
Based on the discussion above, the egalitarian approach is clearly reflected in the 
health initiatives in the 2000s, and this approach is also adopted in this thesis to 
guide the analysis. In addition, this thesis builds upon the framework and 
methodology of health equity measures developed by O’Donnell, Wagstaff, Van 
Doorslaer, and Erreygers (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Erreygers, 2009, Wagstaff, 
2009a). I identify three key health variables for the analysis: health outcomes, health 
service uses, and health finance. By inequity in health outcomes, I mean age and 
gender standardised health inequities. By inequity in health use, I measure horizontal 
inequities. By inequity in health finance, I measure catastrophic health payments and 
health payment-induced poverty.  
 
Age and gender standardised inequities in health outcomes 
It is noted that a proportion of health differentials attributable to natural biological 
variation, such as age and gender, is inevitable. However, much of the differential 
between different groups in society cannot be solely attributed to biological 
variations. For instance, because of a lack of resources, the poor may have less 
nutritious diets, live in unsafe and overcrowded housing, or take dangerous and dirty 
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work. Thus, equity in health outcomes can be defined as “the absence of systematic 
disparities in health (or in the major social determinants of health) between social 
groups who have different levels of underlying social advantage/disadvantage—that 
is, different positions in a social hierarchy”(Braveman, 2010).  
 
Inequity in health has been discussed by many international organizations and 
scholars. A WHO report clearly stated that “individual’s needs, rather than their 
social privileges, should guide the distribution of opportunities for well-being…the 
pursuit of equity in health is to avoid gaps in health status between groups with 
different levels of social privileges”(World Health Organization, 1996). Murray et al. 
(1999) considered health inequalities as “any avoidable differences in health among 
any individuals, who should be grouped a priori according to their socioeconomic 
status”. Braveman (2006) also stated that: “Equity in health should be operationally 
defined as narrowing avoidable disparities in health and its social determinants 
between groups of people who have different levels of underlying social advantage”.  
 
Using the above definition to guide the analysis, health can be defined as any state of 
physical and mental wellbeing. Inequity in health can be explained by (i) 
demographic factors that are related to biological variations in people’s health status, 
such as gender and age, (ii) socioeconomic factors that are related to unfair and 
unjust variation in health, including household living conditions, income, workplaces 
and healthcare, and interventions and programmes that may affect the distribution of 
health. It is noted that policy may be less concerned with inequalities arising from 
demographic factors, because these are usually reasonable and acceptable. When 
measuring age and gender standardised health inequities, we are only concerned with 
the degrees of inequities that are associated with socioeconomic factors. These are 
the health inequities that policy makers would like to avoid.  
 
Horizontal inequities in health use 
Horizontal equity is often interpreted as the principle of equal access to healthcare 
for equal need. In other words, the distribution of medical care should be 
“independent of the distribution of income, wealth or any other form relating to an 
individuals’ socioeconomic status” (LeGrand, 1991). People with same health need 
should be entitled with the same treatment, regardless of their socioeconomic status, 
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age, ethnicity and other characteristics. This also implies an equal distribution of the 
available health services across the socioeconomic spectrum based on healthcare 
needs.  Violation of the horizontal equity principle means that health use is 
systematically associated with differences in ATP rather than health needs. 
Therefore, if two persons are in equal need of healthcare, it would be considered as 
unjust and unfair if the rich one were to receive treatment (Wagstaff et al., 1991b).  
 
It is also essential to look at two concepts concerning horizontal equity, namely 
access and need. While a consensus on the definition of access to healthcare is yet to 
be found, utilization, is often (though inappropriately) used as a proxy for measuring 
access (Allin et al., 2009, Mossialos and Oliver, 2005). In empirical research, 
utilization can refer to any kind of health use (e.g., outpatient care, inpatient care, 
bed days, etc.). Need is a rather elusive concept, because defining and measuring the 
needs that are related to individual’s health problems will be a difficult and highly 
complex tasks (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004).  
 
Despite much ensuing debate regarding health need, it is clear that understanding, 
defining, measuring and comparing the needs that are related to individual health 
problems/illnesses is an important task. Much work needs to be undertaken to 
develop a generally accepted working definition of need, but two components stand 
out as important: (1) The pre-treatment health condition of an individual (with 
greater illness  equating to greater need), and (2) the capacity to benefit from health 
care of an individual (with the amount of healthcare resources required to exhaust an 
individual’s capacity to benefit from health care determining the size of their need).  
 
These two aspects of need can sometimes conflict with one another. For instance, 
there may be no effective treatments (that is, little or no capacity to benefit) for some 
highly debilitating illnesses (that is, high levels of pre-treatment ill health); for 
example, permanent physical disability. For the second component of needs, it is 
assumed that there can be a need for healthcare only if there are grounds for 
believing that healthcare will enhance health, prevent its deterioration, or postpone 
death. These are the benefits sought from healthcare, and it follows that healthcare is 
only needed when there is a capacity to benefit. However, it is worth noticing that 
there may not have a fixed or unique treatment. Thus, of the various choices of 
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treatments available, the treatment needed is considered “to be the most appropriate 
in the particular circumstances of the case, which is that which is the most cost-
effective. The amount needed is that sufficient to exhaust capacity to benefit” (Culyer, 
2001).  Nevertheless, it is important to notice that both aspects are potentially 
important, and a clear operational definition that combines them in a manner that 
generates general acceptance is an important area for future research and consensus. 
 
In practice, health economists rely on demographics and health status variables (e.g., 
self-assessed health, morbidity indicators, activity limitations, etc.) to act as proxies 
for health need (O'Donnell et al., 2008b). Horizontal inequities will then be 
measured  by the degree to which utilization is still related to income after 
differences in health needs across the income group have been standardized for 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
 
Catastrophic health payment and health payment-induced poverty 
A sound financing system should ensure a fair distribution of the burden of health 
costs, protect households against health shocks, and improve access to health 
services by promoting an equitable distribution of public expenditures (Abel-Smith, 
1994, Doorslaer et al., 1993). However, in many developing countries, health 
finance is still dominated by OOP payments. Households without full health 
insurance coverage usually face a risk of incurring large medical care expenditures 
when a household member falls ill. If the healthcare expenses are large relative to the 
resources available to the household, these expenses may disrupt the living standards 
of the household.  Households may have to reduce expenses on necessities such as 
food as a result of such large health expenditures (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Yi et al., 
2009). In some extreme cases, health expenses may lead to poverty. A household at a 
time of illness may divert expenditures to healthcare to an extent that its spending on 
basic necessities falls below the poverty line. For those who are already below the 
poverty threshold, they may sink further into poverty because of the adverse effects 
of illness and related expenses on their income and other welfare (O'Donnell et al., 
2008b).  
 
One concept in fairness in health finance is to avoid catastrophic health payments 
and health payment-induced poverty. World Health Organisation (WHO) (2005) has 
27 
 
suggested catastrophic payment is likely to occur when co-payments for service 
requiring substantial OOP payments or when the household has a low ATP. It is 
noted that when healthcare costs had to be met by OOP payments, households of low 
income, with elderly, disabled, or chronically ill members are more likely to be 
confronted with catastrophic health payments compared with others (World Health 
Organization, 2005). Prepayment mechanisms, such as social health insurance, are 
designed to reduce the chances of catastrophic payment. However, in many cases, 
prepayment mechanisms are not sufficient to cover all health needs, for instance, 
when the insurance benefit package is incomprehensive, or when only a certain 
range of services are covered, etc (Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). In the absence of 
comprehensive and effective prepayment mechanisms, the poor and the 
disadvantaged may face high risks of both financial hardship and ill health.  
 
1.3.2 Inefficiency in a FFS health system 
In healthcare, efficiency measures whether resources are being used to obtain the 
best value for money (Palmer and Torgerson, 1999). In many developing countries 
(China included), healthcare is financed through a FFS system, where inefficiency in 
healthcare is considered a problem. A WHO 2010 report identifies three levels of 
inefficiencies that were commonly seen in FFS systems (World Health Organization, 
2010). The first level is through health technologies and pharmaceuticals. Unlike 
systems where the budget is fixed, a FFS health system usually has no strong 
incentive to constrain the use of drugs or medical devices. One area that attracts 
growing policy concern is the irrational use of medicines, which may take many 
forms, such as poly-pharmacy, failure to prescribe in accordance with clinical 
guidelines, or inappropriate self-medication. Another form of inefficiency in the use 
of medicines concerns the under-utilization of generic medicines, which have 
equivalent efficacy yet are substantially cheaper compared with branded medicines. 
The second level of inefficiency in healthcare is through hospital care. It is noted that 
some important sources of inefficiency may emerge at the institutional level. 
Excessive inpatient admissions and length of stay and unnecessary use of 
examinations that occur on an outpatient basis are considered as inefficiency in 
hospital management (World Health Organization, 2010). Such over-use may also 
lead to problems of equity, particularly among people with health needs who are 
unable to pay, which is also considered as inefficiency in the long term as 
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individuals’ health status can persist or worsen and they would have to access 
hospital services as a more severe case than if they had presented earlier. Moreover, 
corruption and fraud are also considered as forms of inefficiency in healthcare 
(World Health Organization, 2010). These may include corruption in the payment 
system and in the pharmaceutical supply chain, embezzlement and theft from health 
budgets or user-fee revenues, etc.  
 
 
1.3.3 SHI and equity and efficiency in health provision 
For the past few decades, efforts have been made to improve equitable and 
affordable access to healthcare in the developing world. In particular, SHI is a 
potential instrument for protecting the participant from health risks, because it is 
effective in reaching a large number of poor people. Countries with SHI are making 
vigorous efforts to extend coverage to the informal sector, usually (rural) farmers 
and their families (Wagstaff, 2007b). In 2003, Mexico introduced the Seguro 
Popular Scheme, a voluntary health insurance program providing health coverage to 
a previously excluded population (Blanco-Mancilla, 2011). Within the PhiHealth 
SHI scheme, the Philippines launched a tax-financed scheme for the poor. Also in 
2003, Vietnam introduced the Healthcare Fund for the Poor (HCFP), a SHI 
programme where poor and disadvantaged groups were enrolled at the taxpayers’ 
expense in the SHI for formal sector workers (Wagstaff, 2007a). China also 
implemented a government subsidized rural SHI in 2003 to offer financial protection 
to rural farmers.  
 
In the literature, it is argued that in areas where most people are deprived of access to 
healthcare, introducing SHI can make a substantial difference (Wagstaff, 2007b). 
The risk of hospitalization can be shared by the larger community, while low-cost 
high frequency care can be provided within the extended family. However, studies 
also argue that many SHI schemes may not be able to fully reflect the interests of the 
poorest. Under SHI, risk pooling is often small, adverse selection is commonplace, 
and the schemes are often heavily reliant on government subsidies, meaning that 
financial and managerial difficulties arise, and the overall effects seem not to be 
assured (Jutting, 2004).  
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One of the most important functions for SHI is that it reduces health costs and 
provides financial protection to households. Individuals may face a certain level of 
probability of being sick and they may also be aware of the potential reduction in 
wealth caused by the health payments from being sick. In order avoid such risk, 
individuals may choose to pay a corresponding premium to secure a certain level of 
wealth equal to the expected wealth in the absence of insurance (Wagstaff and 
Lindelow, 2008). However, in reality, it is not certain that health insurance always 
reduces health expenses. It may reduce the expenses for healthcare, but at the same 
time increase utilisation. In other words, when patients are aware of the types and the 
extent of health services they could receive, they may derive utility from health 
status and financial wealth, and additional medicines and interventions that may 
possibly increase their chance of a recovery. In this case, the more generous the 
insurance coverage is, the higher might be the individual’s demand for health 
services because the price is reduced through insurance. This is known as ex post 
moral hazard (Dusansky and Koc, 2010, Feldman and Dowd, 1991, Arrow, 2001). 
Further, health insurance may cause the providers to shift the patients’ demand curve 
to the right. It raises an incentive for doctors to provide more care because payment 
is dependent on the quantity of care, rather than quality of care. Consequently, out-
of-pocket (OOP) payments would increase because of having insurance. These are 
usually common under a FFS system in which health providers have financial 
incentives to prescribe expensive medicines and diagnostic procedures, or in 
transitional low- and middle-income countries where regulations are either absent or 
barely enforced and the health sector is often under-funded (Chen, 2006, Latker, 
1998, Eggleston et al., 2008, Zhan et al., 1998). In a recent WHO report (2010), 
irrational use of drugs and over-use of medical procedures, investigations and 
equipment are listed among the leading sources of inefficiency relating to health 
system inputs in developing countries.  
 
Drawing from the above perspectives, two main themes of this thesis are identified: 
inequity and inefficiency. I use the aforementioned health equity measurements, i.e. 
age and gender standardised inequity, horizontal equity, catastrophic health 
payments and health payment-induced poverty, to unpack the key dimensions of 
health inequities. The above measurements are based on the egalitarian definition of 
measuring health equity, which is suitable for this thesis because many of the health 
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initiatives in the 2000s, including the NCMS, are based on the egalitarian concept.  
Inefficiency in healthcare is also discussed. This thesis provides suggestive evidence 
that SHI may encourage supplier-inducement in health provision. This thesis finds 
that NCMS is associated with increases in total costs in covered services, and may 
encourage inefficiency in healthcare.  
 
The following section discusses the plan of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Plan of the thesis  
The objectives of this thesis are to investigate whether health inequities and 
inefficiencies exist in China’s healthcare system, and to what extent the rural 
insurance scheme addresses or relates to issues of inequity in healthcare and 
inefficiency in health provision in the rural China. Paper 1/Chapter 3 provides an 
empirical investigation of income-related health inequalities in urban and rural 
China.  Paper 2/Chapter 4 looks at the effects of the NCMS on equitable access to 
healthcare. Paper 3/Chapter 5 examines the incidence and severity of catastrophic 
payments and health payment-induced poverty under the NCMS. Paper 4/Chapter 6 
explores the issue of cost escalation under the NCMS.  An introduction of the 
empirical chapters/papers is presented below, 
 
Paper 1/Chapter 3: income-related health inequalities in rural and urban China  
In China, the regional disparities have been widening since the market-oriented 
reform in the early 1980s. The rapid economic growth and dramatic social and 
political system transitions have assumed different magnitudes in different regions, 
being deeper and more comprehensive in the costal and urban areas (Sun et al., 
2011). Studies have shown that life expectancy is 74.2 years in urban areas compared 
with 69.6 years in rural areas (Zimmer et al., 2010, Sun et al., 2011). Further, China 
has substantial urban-rural differences in healthcare systems and insurance schemes. 
These have also been considered as common factors leading to inequalities in health.  
 
Paper 1 provides an empirical investigation of income-related health inequalities in 
urban and rural China. It seeks to understand the degree of income-related health 
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inequality between the rural and the urban populations, and the major factors 
contributing to that inequality. Specifically, the objectives of Chapter 3 are: 
 To quantify income-related health inequalities in rural and urban China; 
 To identify demographic and socioeconomic factors that influence health 
inequalities; 
 To discuss the policy implications that can be drawn from the findings. 
 
Paper 2/Chapter 4:  The NCMS and equity in access to healthcare  
Health services and health interventions are a means to either detect signs for health 
deterioration, maintain health, or return people to prior states of health. In many 
cases, equity in health service use is often seen as closely aligned with “access”, and 
“equal utilization to equal need” is commonly used to measure access (Allin et al., 
2009, Mossialos and Oliver, 2005). SHI has the potential to lower financial barriers 
of access to healthcare, since the financial risks of healthcare are shared among 
insurance participants and health cost will be reduced at the point of healthcare use 
(Yip and Berman, 2001). In particular, SHI might influence utilisation by reducing 
the expenses for healthcare at the time of purchase to increase utilisation. 
 
As aforementioned, one recent change in the rural China is the introduction of the 
NCMS – a government-subsidized health insurance scheme. The main objective to 
launch NCMS is to provide universal coverage and to improve equity and access to 
healthcare for the rural population. However, it is difficult to say whether the 
implementation of the NCMS is adequate to improve equal access to healthcare and 
existing literatures have demonstrated both positive and negative findings in terms of 
the impacts of the NCMS on health (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a, Yip et al., 2009, Yip et 
al., 2012, Babiarz et al., 2012, Babiarz et al., 2010, Dai et al., 2011).  
 
Paper 2 measures the extent to which the NCMS affects healthcare utilisation on the 
rural population in China. It also investigates the determinants of the distribution of 
healthcare use and the characteristics of the users for different services, taking into 
account the effects of the NCMS on reducing inequity in health use. Specifically, the 
objectives of this paper are: 
32 
 
 To compare the magnitude of inequities in health use in 2004 (before the 
national rollout of NCMS) and 2009 (after the expansion of NCMS across 
the rural China), considering two types formal healthcare (outpatient care and 
prevention care) and one type of informal healthcare (folk doctor care); 
 To investigate the determinants of patterns of healthcare use and the 
characteristics of the users for different services by taking into account the 
contribution of the NCMS to the level of inequity in health use; 
 To provide policy implications on the design and arrangement of the NCMS. 
 
Paper 3/Chapter 4: The NCMS, catastrophic payments for outpatient care, and 
health payment-induced poverty  
The form of financing of healthcare has a tremendous effect on the distribution of 
burden of payments. In most low- and middle-income countries with relatively 
limited prepayment mechanisms for healthcare, e.g. health insurance, healthcare 
financing still largely relies on direct payments, often known as OOP payments. 
These payments may impede people from receiving the care they need or encourage 
them to postpone the use of care; when the payments increase to a level, they may 
become a source of financial hardship that forces individuals or households to cut 
back their daily expenses and consumption, sell assets, or, worst of all, trap them in 
long-term debts or drive them into poverty (Kavosi et al., 2012, Van Doorslaer et al., 
2007).  
 
The NCMS was originally designed to cover catastrophic inpatient care when it was 
first launched in 2003. However, by 2007, most counties had expanded the insurance 
benefit package beyond inpatient care to outpatient services, especially catastrophic 
outpatient care (Babiarz et al., 2010). Outpatient care is considered the most 
frequently used and accessible form of healthcare in rural China. An investigation of 
the impacts of the NCMS on catastrophic outpatient costs and health payment-
induced poverty is of significant importance in the context of China where ill health 
has already become one of the leading causes of household impoverishment 
(Whitehead et al., 2001). The objectives of Paper 3 are: 
 To measures outpatient OOP payments by using two threshold approaches, 
one requiring that the payments do not exceed a pre-specified proportion of 
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income, the other requiring that the payments do not drive households into 
poverty; 
 To compare the differences of the incidence and severity of catastrophic 
health payments and health cost-induced impoverishment in outpatient care 
before and after the NCMS reimbursement; 
 To measure and compare the distribution of catastrophic payments across 
income groups before and after the NCMS reimbursement; 
 To discuss the role of the NCMS in achieving fairness in health financing in 
rural China. 
 
Paper 4/Chapter 6:  The NCMS and cost escalation for outpatient care  
Although the most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces health costs and 
provides financial protections to the households (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008), it is 
yet not obvious that health insurance always reduces health expenses or how far 
health insurance helps to reduce health expenses. Scholars argued a generous 
insurance scheme may induce the individual’s demand for health services because 
the price is reduced through insurance. As for the providers, health insurance may 
cause the providers to provide more services; OOP payments may also increase 
because of increased insurance levels (Chen, 2006, Latker, 1998, Eggleston et al., 
2008, Zhan et al., 1998).  
 
In terms of the NCMS, despite this impressive performance, serious questions 
remain regarding the impacts of NCMS on the rise of healthcare expenditures and in 
particular on whether the program has actually led to a reduction in patients’ OOP 
payments.  Participants would like to see a reduction in OOP payments for health 
services used; but the availability of reimbursement for costs through insurance 
claims may have induced healthcare facilities and doctors to prescribe more 
expensive drugs or provide unnecessary treatments, thus actually increasing overall 
healthcare costs. Specifically, the objectives of Paper 4 are: 
 To investigate whether outpatient costs has increased since 2004;  
 To measure the impacts of the NCMS on outpatient costs; 
 To investigate how patterns of costs for outpatient care differ among different 
types of healthcare facilities under the NCMS. 
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1.5 Data and general methods  
1.5.1 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
Survey design 
This thesis draws on data from a longitudinal household survey dataset, the CHNS 
(North Carolina Population Center, 2009). CHNS is an ongoing, publicly available, 
international collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition 
and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The 
survey was designed to investigate the impacts of the health, nutrition, and family 
planning policies that were implemented nationally and locally, as well as to see how 
the changes in China’s economic and social development are affecting the health and 
nutrition status of its population. Specifically, CHNS contains four sub surveys, i.e., 
the household survey, individual survey, nutrition and physical examination survey, 
and community survey. This thesis uses data from the household survey and 
individual survey. These two surveys contain questions on socioeconomic status, i.e., 
gender, age, region, education, marital status, occupation, region, and ethnicity. They 
also contain a set of questions on health outcomes and health services utilization, 
data on insurance coverage, medical providers, and health facilities that the 
household might use under selected circumstances. Questions about accessibility, 
time and travel costs, and perceived quality of care along with questions on 
immunizations, use of preventive health services, and use of family planning 
services are also asked. 
 
The surveying provinces were included in the survey: Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou (Figure 1.1). A 
multistage, random cluster process was adopted as the sample strategy in the 
surveyed provinces. Stratified by income level (low, middle, and high), a weighted 
sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in each province. The 
provincial capital and a lower income city were selected when feasible. Villages and 
townships within the counties and urban and suburban neighborhoods within the 
cities were selected randomly. From 1989 to 1993 there were approximately 190 
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primary sampling units, and a new province and its sampling units were added in 
1997. The survey included about 4,400 households covering 19,000 individuals.   
 
Published work using CHNS 
CHNS has been used extensively in studying health and nutrition in China (Akin et 
al., 2004, Chen et al., 2007, Chen and Meltzer, 2008). More recently it has been used 
in studying the effects of NCMS on health payment-induced poverty and on 
spending related to catastrophic illness (Wagstaff, 2009b, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 
2008). The survey data are ideal for our purposes because the last three rounds of the 
survey (2004, 2006, and 2009) cover the entire period from the inception of NCMS 
in 2003 through the early years after its expansion in coverage in 2009 and also 
contain important questions regarding utilisation and costs of outpatient care. This 
information is particularly important for Paper 2, 3 and 4, which investigate the 
impacts of the NCMS on access and finance in healthcare.  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of the participating provinces of CHNS 
 
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (2009) 
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1.5.2 Methods 
One question central to health equity analysis is how should health inequity be 
measured? Early health research focused on medicine and the life sciences, which 
provide clinical solutions as a main objective (Östlin et al., 2011). Although such 
research still remains important and fundamental, the understanding of the 
socioeconomic origins of disease, ill health and its distribution, generally and almost 
always fall outside the domain of biomedical research (Marmot and Commission 
Social Determinants, 2007). The emergence of medical sociology and critical 
anthropology in the late 1990s started to address the issue of the unequal 
distributions of societal resources, e.g. economic and social resources, power and 
prestige, and how these impacted on population health and health use in a society 
(Marmot and Commission Social Determinants, 2007, Singer, 1995, Baer et al., 
2012); however, these approaches generally lacked an interest in providing the 
evidence-based research for interventions/policies directed at improving population 
health and alleviating inequity.  
 
The past few decades have seen an emergence of interests of health research for 
health economics (Masseria et al., 2010, Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003, Wagstaff et 
al., 1991a, Watanabe and Hashimoto, 2012, Wagstaff et al., 2000, Kakwani et al., 
1997, O'Donnell et al., 2006). The increased popularity of health equity in 
economics can be explained by a number of factors, such as an increase of interest in 
health equity from policy makers, donors, international organisations, and others 
(World Health Organization, 2004a).  As more focus has been placed on policies and 
interventions to reduce inequities, researchers in this field have begun to receive 
more attention. In terms of technical aspects, the availability of household data, the 
development of computer power and the analytical tools to quantify inequities, have 
all contributed to the growth of health equity research (Asada, 2007, van Doorslaer 
et al., 2000, Wagstaff et al., 2001b, Kakwani et al., 1997). Kakwani (1980) first 
introduced and discussed the measurement of income distribution and poverty with 
application to policy evaluation in the book "Income inequality and poverty: methods 
of estimation and policy applications". In a  paper published by Journal of 
Econometrics in 1997, Kakwani et al. (1997) extended the discussion to the use of 
Concentration Indices (CI) and the Relative Index of Inequality (RII) and why these 
two indices are superior to others used in health equity literature. O’ Donnel et al. 
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(2008b) introduced various aspects on how inequalities in health and healthcare can 
be measured. These methods, which were based on CI, are widely used by 
international organisations, government bodies, and academic institutions to measure 
equity in health and healthcare (Watanabe and Hashimoto, 2012, Wagstaff, 2005b, 
Somkotra and Lagrada, 2008, Allin et al., 2010). It has been used, for example, to 
measure socioeconomic related inequality in health status and healthcare utilization 
in Spain (Hernandez-Quevedo and Jimenez-Rubio, 2009) and child malnutrition in 
Vietnam (Wagstaff et al., 2003). The Concentration Curve gives a straightforward 
visual presentation of the distribution of a health variable across income groups. 
 
This thesis uses Concentration indices and Decomposition Analysis to measure 
health inequities. This method has the advantage of measuring income or 
socioeconomic related health inequity across the income groups. It provides a 
holistic assessment of inequality rather than calculating mean health for each income 
quintile as is common in existing literature (Qian, 2010, Deaton and Paxson, 1998, 
Feng and Milcent, 2009, Sato, 2012). Moreover, this method also allows further 
analysis of the contributing factors that generate inequities, such as Decomposition 
Analysis.  
 
In this thesis, Papers 1, 2, and part of Paper 3 use the methods of Concentration 
Indices and Decomposition Analysis (Wagstaff et al., 1993, Kakwani et al., 1997). 
The analysis of Paper 4 is based on various health econometric methods. The 
following provides an overview of basic concepts and steps to construct a 
Concentration Index, and Decomposition Analysis. It also discusses other health 
econometric methods used in this thesis. Detailed methods will be discussed 
separately in each chapter. 
 
Concentration Indices and Decomposition Analysis 
The methods to calculate and construct a Concentration Curve and Index involves 
five basic steps: (1) estimate a model of the determinants of a health variable, using a 
set of demographic and socioeconomic variables; (2) predict (indirectly) age- and 
sex-standardized health for each health variable or need-standardized health use for 
each health use variable; (3) calculate the Concentration Indices for the populations; 
(4) calculate the non-demographic/socioeconomic-related inequalities/inequities of 
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health; (5) decompose health inequalities/inequities. 
 
Standardization of health variables 
Standardization of the health variables was the first step, so as to enable a reasonable 
estimation of health inequality. It is noted that variations in health are associated 
with a number of factors. In the literature, these factors are usually categorized as 
demographic inequalities, e.g. age and sex factors, and inequalities/inequities arising 
from circumstances beyond the individual’s control, e.g. economic resources and 
access to healthcare. Policy may be less concerned with inequalities arising from 
demographic factors, e.g. demographic variation, because these are usually 
reasonable and acceptable. Therefore, a measurement of socioeconomic-related 
health inequality, to control for demographic differences or identify only non-
demographic differences, would be desirable for policy formation. In order to 
measure socioeconomic-related health inequalities that reflect only non-demographic 
health differences, indirect standardization of health variables is used. The aim of 
indirect standardization is to subtract the variation in  health which is driven by 
demographic factors or demographic variation, and capture only the health inequality 
driven by non-demographic factors (O'Donnell et al., 2008b). Papers 1 and 2 will 
discuss in detail how this standardization is carried out.  
 
Concentration Curve and Concentration Index 
Concentration Curves show the share of health accounted for by cumulative 
proportions of individuals in the population, ranked from poorest to richest. Figure 
1.2 illustrates an example of ill health Concentration Curve. The Y-axis shows the 
variable for the cumulative percentage of ill health, while the x-axis shows the 
cumulative percentage of population ranked by economic status. The curve plots 
shares of the health variable against economic status. In Figure 1.2, if ill health were 
to take higher values among poorer people, the curve would lie above the line of 
equality (45-degree line). If, by contrast, ill health were to take a higher value among 
richer people, the curve would lie below the line of equality (Wagstaff et al., 2001b, 
O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
 
Related directly to the Concentration Curve, the Concentration Index gives a 
measure of the magnitude of inequality in a health variable. It is defined as twice the 
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area between the concentration curve and the line of equality. A negative value 
indicates a disproportionate concentration of the health variable among the poor, and 
a positive value indicates the opposite (O'Donnell et al., 2008b). As health 
economists have found that the traditional Concentration Indices may not be the best 
estimation of income-related inequities for binary/categorical health variables, the 
Erreygers’s Concentration Index is proposed and has proven to provide more 
accurate estimation for binary dependent variables (Erreygers, 2009, Wagstaff, 
2009a). These methods will be discussed in detail in relevant papers/chapters in this 
thesis.  
 
Figure 1.2 Ill health Concentration Curve 
 
Source: Wagstaff (2001b) 
 
Decomposition Analysis 
Decomposition Analysis is used in order to understand the factors that drive health 
inequalities. These factors may reflect differences in constraints between the poor 
and the rich – lower incomes, less access to health insurance, living conditions that 
may promote the spread of disease, etc. Using a regression-based decomposition 
method, the Concentration Index can be decomposed into the contribution that 
individual factors make to health inequality (O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  In terms of 
decomposing Erreygers’s Concentration Index, it is necessary to transform the health 
variables. The empirical chapters will discuss how the decomposition analyses are 
carried out under different scenarios.  
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Other econometrics methods  
Many of the health variables in this thesis are not continuous or fully observed, for 
example, discrete variables (e.g. health use variables in Papers 1 and 2) and censored 
variables (e.g. health cost variables in Paper 4).  Analyses of these dependent 
variables require nonlinear estimation. In this thesis, a number of parametric 
nonlinear estimations are considered. The following section discusses various 
models used to analyse these variables.  
 
Probit Model 
Paper 2 models health utilization variables. The nature of the variable calls for a non-
linear estimation. An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model is typically interpreted as 
the increase in the value of a dependent variable given a single unit increase in the 
associated explanatory variable. This interpretation does not hold when the 
dependent variable is binary. In statistics, a Probit model is a regression model where 
the dependent variable only takes two values, 1 or 0. The model is often used to 
estimate the probability that an observation with particular characteristics will fall 
into a specific one of the categories (Wooldridge, 2012). The Probit Model is 
estimated using the standard maximum likelihood procedure.  
 
Two-Part Model (2PM) and Heckman Selection Model (HSM) 
2PM and HSM are used to model health costs variables (limited dependent 
variables), which are continuous over most of their distribution but have a mass of 
observations at one or more specific values, such as zero (Jones, 2007, Wooldridge, 
2012). Specifically, the 2PM comprises a Probit or Logit Model for the probability 
that an individual reports any cost data on healthcare and a Linear Probability 
Model/OLS that applies only to the subsample with nonzero observations, to 
estimate correlations of the positive level of expenditure (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, 
Jones, 2007).  
 
The Heckman Selection model also includes two parts. The first is a Probit Model 
that predicts the probability that an individual reports any health costs. The second is 
a linear regression model conditional on the nonzero observations. It is assumed that 
the error terms of the two models come from a bivariate normal distribution, and this 
will then allow for a correlation between the two error terms to correct sample 
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selection bias. The HSM can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (Jones, 
2007, O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
 
Difference-in-differences (DID) Analysis 
DID analysis is a quasi-experimental technique used in econometrics that measures 
the effect of a treatment or an intervention at a given period in time (Stock and 
Watson, 2011, Wooldridge, 2012). In this thesis, DID is used to measure the effects 
of the NCMS on health costs. Health costs are observed for two groups for two time 
periods. One of the groups, the treatment group, is covered to the NCMS in the 
second period but not in the first period. The second group, the control group, is not 
covered by the NCMS during either period. The DID estimator shows the difference 
between the pre-post, within-subjects differences of the treatment and control 
groups. This method can apply to repeated cross sections or panel data (Stock and 
Watson, 2011). 
 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Combining DID methods together with PSM has been increasingly used in impact 
evaluation (Wang et al., 2009b, Blundell et al., 2005, Ravallion, 2008, Wagstaff, 
2007a). One of the most important premises of using DID to imply causal 
relationships is that treatment should be randomly assigned to the population. 
However, it is evident that, for observational data, the estimate of a causal effect 
obtained by comparing a treatment group with a non-experimental comparison group 
can lead to bias because of problems such as self-selection or some methods used by 
the researcher in choosing the assigned treatment units (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). PSM is used in this thesis to correct for this problem. 
This method involves pairing observations in treatment and control groups that are 
similar in terms of their observable characteristics. When the relevant differences 
between any two observations are captured in the observable characteristics, which 
occurs when outcomes are independent of the treatment conditional on these 
observed characteristics, PSM can yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983).  
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Dealing with missing data 
As common to most individual level survey data, CHNS has missing values. There 
are several types of missing data. The first type is missing completely at random 
(MCAR), which means that an observation (Xi) is missing is unrelated to the value of 
Xi or to the value of any other variables. However, the estimated parameters will not 
be biased by the absence of the data. The second type of missing data is that the 
missingness does not depend on the value of Xi after controlling for another variable, 
which we call missing at random (MAR). We can still produce unbiased parameter 
estimates without needing to provide a model to explain missingness. The third type 
is classed as Missing Not at Random (MNAR) (Drettakis, 1971, Enders, 2010). 
Traditional ways of dealing with missing values include listwise deletion, pairwise 
deletion, mean substitution, etc. The most commonly used methods to deal with 
missing data nowadays are through Maximum Likelihood or Multiple Imputation. 
The calculation of CI is based on the distribution of a health variable in relation to 
income variable. Income data are comprehensive for CHNS. These data were gross 
annual household income aggregated from all sources including: gardening, farming, 
livestock/poultry, fishing, handicraft and small commercial household business 
inflated to 2009 (the latest available wave of the survey at the time of writing). There 
was no missing value for income data. 
It is noted that imputation can only be carried out when the missing values can be 
predicted by a set of variables with complete values. However, for CHNS, missing 
values are observed for demographic and socioeconomic variables that are 
commonly use to carry out imputation. This makes the imputation difficult. In these 
cases, deletion methods are used in this thesis. 
In the empirical chapters, ways of dealing with missing values are discussed 
depending on the nature of the missing data. 
 
1.6 Contributions of this thesis 
This thesis presents empirical investigations for understanding equity and efficiency 
in China’s healthcare system in the 2000s. As mentioned in the beginning of this 
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chapter, China’s new emphasis on a harmonious and balanced society reflects a 
concern regarding inequities in the health sector, particularly the association between 
income inequalities and health. Although a number of initiatives for reducing health 
inequity have been developed within the past few decades, it is technically difficult 
to set out a variety of analytic tools to quantify those inequities. Even less is known 
about whether inequities are widened or narrowed through the years, and what the 
causes or factors are that may generate these health inequities— in other words, the 
contributions of inequities from different sources. This thesis moves beyond the 
general statements of health inequity to monitor inequities over time, and to  
examine the factors that influencing inequities in China in the 2000s. It does so by 
adopting econometric methods to measure inequities in health and healthcare in 
China, particularly to use Concentration Indices and Decomposition Analysis to 
quantify the degree of inequities.  
 
In this thesis, inequalities in health outcomes between the rural and the urban China 
are discussed. Trends in the distribution of health outcomes provide some useful 
clues as to how the health system is working, and what the factors are that influence 
the unequal distribution of health outcomes in different regions of China. Income 
inequalities have grown considerably in the past few decades in China. If health and 
healthcare are negatively associated with income, this may suggest ways to improve 
the health of the population through the implementation of redistributive policies 
such as SHI.  
 
The Chinese government is looking into SHI as a means of ensuring access to 
healthcare and protecting patients from financial risks (Yip and Berman, 2001, 
Babiarz et al., 2010), one empirical contribution of this thesis is to offer an 
investigation into the impacts of the NCMS on equity in access to healthcare and 
fairness in health financing. The impacts of the NCMS on equity in access to 
healthcare and fairness in health finance have not been well-assessed in the existing 
literatures, even though there is a clear public interest case for taking an equity 
perspective in investigating the form of access and financing. It is important to 
understand what the factors are that influence access to health care, whether and to 
what extent the NCMS affects the patterns of utilisation for different socioeconomic 
groups. This thesis also examines the impacts of the NCMS on OOP payments, 
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which is proven to have reached to a catastrophic level for many rural farmers. 
Based on the study results, this thesis makes a few policy recommendations on 
improving the design of the scheme, including improving benefit package and 
providing the poor with additional benefits.  
 
This thesis is among the first to provide empirical evidence that SHI may be 
associated with cost escalation in China. It demonstrates that the NCMS may 
actually induce over-consumption of drugs and over-use of health services, in turn 
creating affordability problems. It is noted that the current Chinese healthcare system 
is financed through a FFS system. State-owned hospitals derive most of their 
revenues by over-prescription of expensive drugs and over-utilization of health 
services that are billed to the SHI. Examining this practice presents policy makers 
with evidence of the association between the NCMS and cost escalation, and reveals 
the endogenous problems of the unregulated healthcare system in China. The study 
results are expected to feed back into the policy process in thinking of future reform 
options on reforming provider payment mechanism, implementing price regulations, 
etc.  
 
The following chapter provides a background discussion of China’s healthcare 
system, the insurance reform, with a focus on equity and efficiency issues in China’s 
healthcare system. 
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2 Background  
 
Healthcare in China 
 
 
China’s healthcare system poses substantive problems in terms of equity and 
efficiency within its healthcare system (Akin et al., 2004, Gao et al., 2002, Gao et al., 
2001, Li and Yu, 2011, Liu et al., 2012a, Lu et al., 2007, Meng et al., 2012), but it is 
difficult to assess these issues without a good understanding of the history and the 
reforms of China’s healthcare sector. This section provides an overview of China’s 
healthcare sector as well as a detailed discussion of the social health insurance 
reform. It first discusses the evolution of China’s healthcare system from the 1950s 
to 2000s. It then moves to provide some basic knowledge of China’s healthcare 
system as well as challenges policy makers faced in the 2000s, followed by a 
discussion of the SHI system in China.  This chapter provides essential knowledge to 
facilitate the understanding of the papers for the rest of the thesis. 
 
2.1 China’s healthcare system in a historical context 
2.1.1 State-centred period: from 1949 to 1978 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949. After centuries of 
feudalism, colonialism, wars with Japan, and civil war, the country was troubled 
with many problems such as poverty, inadequate sanitation and housing problems in 
the 1950s. The health status of the population was extremely low and healthcare 
resources were very scarce. Health facilities and professionals were few, and basic 
sanitation and public health provision was limited. Life expectancy at birth was 37 
years, infant mortality approximately 250 per 1,000 live births, and maternal 
mortality was at 150 per 100,000 in 1949 (Anson and Shifang, 2005).  
 
After the founding of the PRC, former Chairman Mao Zedong established socialist 
rule, the basis of which was originally from Marx, Engels and Stalin’s communist 
ideology. As improving the health of the population was a critical priority of the 
country’s new leaders, Mao made concerted efforts to reduce inequalities and to 
achieve universal welfare by enacting a welfare social security system. A set of 
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revolutionary health policies, as defined by the Ministry of Health in 1959, were 
initiated. These policies were based on four guiding principles, one of which 
explicitly stated that the provision of healthcare should be based on an egalitarian 
approach, with the most resources channeled to the lower socioeconomic class—
“workers, farmers and soldiers” (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998). Mao also 
invented China’s industrial and agricultural ‘work units’ and created a rural co-
operative health insurance, which was operated on the basis of the People’s 
Commune,1 to cover the healthcare provision at these ‘work units’. During that time, 
510,000 physicians, 1.46 million Barefoot Doctors2 (Chi Jiao Yi Sheng) and 2.36 
million health workers were trained (Wang, Zhang and Wang 2007:11). Basic health 
standards improved almost immediately and continued to improve throughout the 
Maoist period. From 1952 to 1982, infant mortality fell dramatically, and live births 
and life expectancy increased approximately twofold. The most remarkable features 
of these achievements were that they were accomplished without a corresponding 
growth in the economy, and were based on the fair distribution of extremely limited 
health resources and prioritisation of preventive public health. The Maoist health 
system became a model emulated in various ways across the developing countries 
(World Bank, 1997). 
 
2.1.2 Transformation of the healthcare system in China: from 1978 to 1996 
The opening-up policy initiated by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, 3  led 
China’s economy into a new era. Over the past 30 years, the annual increase of GDP 
in China is, on average, by more than 8%, but China has paid a heavy price for it in 
terms of ballooning inequalities (South China Morning Post, 2013). The market-
based economic reform had an enormous influence over China’s social, economic 
and political life, including the healthcare sector. Inequalities were no longer 
considered negative so long as the country sustained economic growth. As urged by 
the former Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping, who was an enthusiastic 
                                                 
1 The people's commune (Chinese: 人民公社) was the highest of three administrative levels in rural areas of the 
People's Republic of China during the period of 1958 to 1982-85 until they were replaced by townships. The 
communes had governmental, political, and economic functions. 
2 Barefoot doctors (Chi Jiao Yi Sheng) are farmers who received minimal basic medical and paramedical training 
and worked in rural villages in the People's Republic of China. Their purpose was to bring health care to rural 
areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic hygiene, preventive health care, and 
family planning and treated common illnesses. 
3 Deng Xiaoping (22 August 1904 – 19 February 1997) was a politician and reformist leader of the Communist 
Party of China who led China towards a market economy. 
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advocate of the market economy, "let some people get rich first" was considered 
legitimate and should be encouraged.  
 
The economic reforms pushed the country towards a market economy and altered the 
country’s healthcare in ways that affected the population’s health. In 1985, China’s 
Ministry of Health initiated a series of national healthcare reforms, the aim of which 
was to gradually decentralise responsibilities in health management and regional 
development, to expand existing facilities and to improve productivity through 
financial incentives to medical staff as well as to encourage individual responsibility 
towards healthcare (Wang, Zhang and Wang 2007:138). According to Dong (2003), 
the reform resulted in three major changes:  
 First, it limited the public funds for healthcare by covering only basic personnel 
wages and new capital investments; therefore, allowed the private market to play 
a role in the healthcare sector.  
 Second, the government gave hospitals and other health providers a large degree 
of financial independence and autonomy; hospitals were allowed to make profits 
through the provision of medical service, and sales of pharmaceutical products.  
 Third, the government allowed private ownership of health facilities and private 
medical care practices.  
 
In the 1980s, the central government started to withdraw direct funding to state-
owned hospitals, and by the early 1990s, most of these hospitals were fully 
responsible for their own profits and losses. State-owned hospitals in aggregate were 
expected to cover 85% or more of their costs from fees (World Bank, 1997). These 
hospitals responded by billing the insurance system for prescription drugs and high-
technology medical procedures. Hospital corruption, including over-prescribing and 
over-providing medical services and demanding illicit profits from medical 
instrument purchases, was pervasive (Anson and Shifang, 2005, Wagstaff et al., 
2009d, Eggleston and Yip, 2004). In order to generate enough revenue, most 
hospitals established complex systems of incentives to encourage prescribing 
expensive medicines on the part of medical doctors and the use of medical services 
beyond what was required on medical grounds (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998, 
Yang, 2009). 
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In terms of health insurance, the old commune-based rural health insurance started to 
collapse in the 1980s. By the early 2000s, except for the urban residents who were 
formally employed in the private or public sector, the majority of the Chinese 
population lacked insurance. The provision of services was purely based on ATP 
rather than health need. Private spending accounted for a large proportion of total 
health spending, and most private spending was from OOP payments (Gu, 2008).  At 
that time, health insurance coverage was far from sufficient, and healthcare financing 
was dominated by OOP payments. The increasing healthcare costs have engendered 
great discontent among ordinary people (Gu 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Market-oriented health system: from 1996 to the early 2000s 
From 1996 to the early 2000s, China’s healthcare reform has been deepened and 
extended, with the introduction of more radical mechanisms and policies. At the 
patients’ level, the government continued to appeal to the general public to “stand up” 
and to take “individual responsibility” for their well-being (Latker, 1998). Insurance 
coverage was extremely low. Except the urban employed, the majority of the 
Chinese people, including the urban unemployed and the whole rural population, 
were not covered by any SHIs. Personal payment for healthcare increased from 
21.65% in 1982 to 39.81% in 1992 and to 57.72% in 2002. Private spending 
accounts for a large proportion of total health spending, and most private spending is 
from OOP payments (Gu, 2008). According to Gu (2008) an increasing the Chinese 
population cannot afford healthcare services. In 1993, only 5.2% of people could not 
afford outpatient care when they were sick; however, the number increased to 13.8% 
in 1998 and 18.7% in 2008. Increasing healthcare costs have engendered great 
discontent among the ordinary people, and has become one of the “top” social issues 
in China (Gu, 2008).  
 
2.1.4 The paradigm shift: from the early 2000s to present 
The unprecedented rate of marketisation has brought notable problems in China’s 
healthcare sector. In 2006, the government officially acknowledged that the market 
oriented healthcare system was the “wrong concept”(Centre for Health Statistics and 
Information, 2008).  In the meantime, a series of health initiatives was announced.  
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In 2006, the central government announced that a total of RMB83.2 billion 
(US$13.31 billion) were to be allocated to support the healthcare sector, and this 
money was subjected to an annual increase of 20% (Blomqvist and Qian, 2008). A 
more extended network of SHI was established. In 2003, the NCMS was launched to 
respond directly to the lack of insurance coverage in rural areas. In 2007, the 
government introduced an urban insurance scheme to cover urban residents without 
employment in the formal sector. These insurance schemes were designed to 
improve access and to provide assistance to poor households when facing unusually 
large health bills or catastrophic health payments.  
 
At the provider’s side, the Supreme People's Court explicitly stipulated that 
accepting drug commissions and medical instrument commissions was considered as 
a violation of the law in 2008 (China Daily, 2008). A set of new regulations were 
introduced to regulate provider behaviours and to correct the problems of over-
prescription. In order to spin-off the commercial drug interests, the government 
launched a new round of reforms to combat “improper” behaviour in the healthcare 
sector and to build a corruption-proof system. Drug profits were set below 15% 
whereas before they were 30% more. Another important initiative was to de-couple 
hospital revenue from the sale of drugs to patients, meaning that the proportion of 
drug revenue had to be below a certain percentage of hospital general revenues 
(Yang, 2009). Other strategies included capitation or salary payments for outpatient 
services. Some SHI schemes, such as the NCMS, started to use alternative methods 
to regulate provider incentives, such as using case-based compensation methods to 
incentivise better performance of the providers (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a, Yip and 
Hsiao, 2008a, Yip et al., 2010, Yip et al., 2012).  
 
The Chinese government seemed quite ambitious about changing the current 
healthcare delivery system and providing a more equitable and efficient healthcare 
system backed by more budgetary resources. However, it seemed unrealistic to 
expect immediate effects of these reforms. The successful implementation of the 
reforms depended on many other factors in China’s health care system. In order to 
appreciate the need for the healthcare initiatives of the 2000s or to offer critical 
assessment, it is important to have a good understanding of China’s healthcare 
system, such as the health of the population, organisation and health service delivery 
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as well as issues relating to health financing, which will be presented in the 
following section. 
 
2.2 Organisation and service delivery in healthcare: a brief summary 
The previous section offers a detailed discussion of the history of China’s health 
system. This section provides basic information of China’s healthcare. It discusses 
trends in health outcomes, service delivery, provider payment mechanisms, with a 
focus on inequity and inefficiency in the system.  
 
2.2.1 Trends in health outcome indicators 
One of the main functions of a health system is to improve population health.  
Trends in health outcomes may offer some useful information on the performance of 
the health system. For the past few decades, China has made significant progress in 
improving population health. Figure 2.1 shows that life expectancy increased by an 
average of four years from 1990 to 2011. In 1970, China’s under-five mortality rate 
for female was around 108.8 to 113.2 per 1,000 live births. By 2012, this had been 
reduced to just 51.6 to 56.2 per l,000 live births, which is a remarkable achievement. 
During the 1980s to the 1990s, under-five mortality continued to decrease. By 2012,  
the ratio was 13.1 to 15.0 per 1,000 live births (Figure 2.2), which is similar to many 
Middle East and Latin American countries (The World Bank, 2012b).   
 
Figure 2.1 Life expectancy at birth by sex in China, 1990 - 2011 
 
Source: Derived from the World Bank data at http://data.worldbank.org/.  
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Figure 2.2  Under-five mortality rate by sex in China, 1990 - 2012 
 
Source: Derived from the World Bank data at http://data.worldbank.org/.  
 
Patterns of disease in China have followed those typically found in rapidly 
developing countries, with a decline in morbidity related to infectious diseases, and a 
steep rise in chronic diseases such as heart diseases, hypertension, cerebrovascular 
disease, and cancer (Table 2.1) (Anson and Shifang, 2005). According to the Centre 
of Health and Information, chronic disease, such as malignant tumour, heart and 
cerebrovascular disease, are the major common diseases and have surpassed 
infectious diseases as the major causes of death (Centre for Health Statistics and 
Information, 2008). It is noted that urban people have higher two-week morbidity 
rates in terms of chronic diseases, whereas trauma and toxicities and digestive 
disease are more pervasive in rural areas (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 Two-week morbidity rate (‰), 1998, 2003 and 2008 
  1998 2003 2008 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Infectious disease 3.2 3.7 1.8 2.7 1.7 2.7 
Malignant tumour 1.0 0.4 1.3 0.8 2.2 0.8 
Internal system, nutrition, metabolite and 
immunity disease 
5.4 1.0 7.7 1.6 17.8 1.6 
Mental disease 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.7 0.8 
Neuropathy 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.5 
Heart diseases 14.1 3.7 14.6 4.6 20.4 4.6 
Hypertension 15.6 3.6 21.9 8.4 60.8 8.4 
Cerebrovascular disease 5.9 1.7 6.4 2.7 7.7 2.7 
Digestive disease 25.8 21.5 17.7 22.3 20.6 22.3 
Urinary disease 4.7 4.0 4.4 5.5 5.7 5.5 
Trauma and toxicities 4.5 4.6 4.0 6.3 4.4 6.3 
Source: Centre for health statistics and information, China (2008) 
 
2.2.2 Service delivery and provider payment mechanism  
China has an extensive network of public health facilities. In 2010, China had 
937,000 public health facilities (including public hospitals, township health centres, 
village health clinics) staffed by 8.2 million health professionals, of which nearly 2 
million were doctors. The country had more than 4.78 million hospital beds, or an 
average of 3.56 beds per 1,000 people; a ratio higher than most Asian countries and 
similar to many OECD countries (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011, The 
World Bank, 2012a).  
Figure 2.3 shows that the percentage of hospitals beds per 1,000 people is 
considerably higher in urban areas compared with rural areas. This indicates the 
trend that health resources are more concentrated among urban and more developed 
areas. 
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Figure 2.3 Hospital beds per 1, 000 people, 2005-2010 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2012) 
 
Virtually all of the hospitals in China are owned by the state, and they adopt a three-
tiered healthcare delivery system. They are categorised by size, but the levels are 
often perceived as de facto rankings of quality, with larger being better. A hospital’s 
ranking determines government subsidies, staff salaries, and other allowances (such 
as funding for research projects and medical equipment) (Latker, 1998).  
 
At the bottom of the healthcare hierarchy are the village and township health centres, 
which are effectively clinics offering basic inpatient and outpatient care. In 2006, the 
government initiated a community-based health system, which required that a 
community with a population between 30,000 to 100,000 people have a health centre 
established following national standards (Li and Yu, 2011). This community-based 
health system is an extension to the existing network of village and township health 
centres. Most revenue generated at village, township and community health centres 
come from drug sales, but their pharmacies are usually small and only offer a basic 
selection of drugs.  
 
Although the village, township and community health centres act somewhat like 
primary care providers, China does not have a national system for primary care or 
general practice. The majority of Chinese people think they have a right to use the 
provider of their choice; they also hold a strong belief that specialists are more 
skilled than general practitioners, even for treating minor ailments (Li et al., 2005) . 
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It is noted that the government introduces a few strategies to improve efficient use of 
medical resources and to avoid patients seeking unnecessary care at tertiary hospitals, 
for instance, by offering patients higher reimbursement rates from their social health 
insurance schemes if care is sought at the village and township level health facilities 
(Babiarz et al., 2012, Babiarz et al., 2010). However, these strategies were barely 
effective, and acceptance of care provided at village, township and community 
health centres remains low (Li et al., 2005). 
 
The second level of the healthcare hierarchy is district/county hospitals, which are 
middle tertiary-level hospitals offering a wider range of inpatient and outpatient 
services. Although most services offered at these hospitals are competing with 
provincial/city hospitals (one level above district/county hospitals), these hospitals 
do not have the latest diagnostic and therapeutic medical equipment, such as 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), neither are they able to perform sophisticated 
treatment, such as organ transplantation.  
 
Provincial and city hospitals are the largest and most sophisticated tertiary healthcare 
facilities in China. They are well-equipped with the latest medical equipment, and 
are able to offer a full range of outpatient, inpatient and specialist care (Suo, 2010, 
Jia, 2009). Both district and provincial hospitals have large pharmacies and drug 
sales constitute a major part of hospital revenues (Yang, 2009, Economic 
Intelligence Unit, 1998).  
 
In terms of the provider payment mechanism, China’s healthcare providers are 
mainly financed through service fees, and there is no provider and purchaser split. 
Health providers receive their incomes from three sources—government subsidies, 
insurance claims and co-payments. Government subsidies are only able to cover 
operational costs, but health professionals charge user-fees to generate their own 
salaries (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998). From the early 1980s, the government 
started to withdraw subsidies to state-owned hospitals. Hospitals are encouraged to 
make profits by providing medical services and selling drugs, and deregulating price 
control over some high-technology services not covered by the government 
insurance healthcare schemes. Pharmacies owned and run by the hospitals and 
healthcare centres are allowed to have a non-taxable income in selling drugs and 
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medical devices at a mark-up of 15% of the purchase prices (Yang, 2009). Hospitals 
also survive by billing the SHI system for expensive pharmaceuticals and medical 
procedures using high-technology equipment, even where cheaper options are 
available (Yang, 2009).  
 
Moreover, most hospitals establish complex systems of incentives to encourage the 
sales of drugs and use of services. Doctors’ salaries are tightly linked to the 
performance of their individual medical departments. The more revenue the 
department generates, the larger the bonuses received by doctors (Yang, 2009). It is 
also common to see pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies offer medical 
doctors commission on each prescription to motivate prescription sales. These 
companies have seen those cash-starved hospitals and poorly-paid doctors as 
lucrative clients (Eggleston and Yip, 2004, Yang, 2009).  
 
Figure 2.4 shows revenue sources of general hospitals in China from 2002 to 2010. 
Although government subsidies had increased over the years, fees from services, 
drugs, and medical devices still constituted a significant share of hospital revenues. 
These revenues continued to climb through the years, and became the major source 
of hospitals revenues.  
 
Figure 2.4 Revenue sources of general hospitals in China, 2002-2010 (10,000 
RBM) 
Source: China statistical yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). 
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2.2.3 The importance of OOP payments—a barrier to access 
In terms of health expenditure, China’s total healthcare expenditure comprises three 
parts: government health expenditure, social health expenditure, and personal health 
expenditure (Ministry of Health China, 2012). In 1980, government expenditure 
accounted for 36.2% of total health expenditures, the percentage decreased to 25.1% 
in 1990, and 15.7% in 2002. In the meantime, personal health expenditure increased 
from 21.2% in 1980, to 35.7% in 1990, and reached to 60.0% in 2001 (Figure 2.5). 
Starting from 2002, with the launch of a few health initiatives and a massive 
injection of government subsidies, a steady increase on government subsidies was 
observed. The share of private health expenditure also decreased from 52.2% in 2005 
to 37.5% in 2012.  
 
Figure 2.5 Government and private health expenditure in China (RMB billion), 
1990 - 2010 
 
Source: China statistical yearbook (2011). 
Note: LA indicates left-hand axis. RA indicates right-hand axis. 
It has to be noted that even though the share of private expenditure has decreased 
over the years, the absolute health costs are still considered high for the majority of 
the Chinese. In the National Health Services Survey of 2008, 37.3% of the urban 
respondents and 37.8% of the rural respondents did not seek care when 
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recommended. Among these respondents, 24.4% reported financial difficulty or high 
medical costs as the main reasons for forgoing care (Centre for health and 
information, 2008). Some inpatient care data can be used as good examples to 
understand the situation. On average, an inpatient per episode involved OOP 
payments was around RMB3,463 (US$498.62) in 2008, which was equivalent to 
52.69% of annual per capita household expenditure (Centre for health and 
information, 2008). High OOP payments not only created a barrier to access, but also 
became a source of financial hardship, especially for the poor. Although China 
claims to achieve universal health insurance coverage, by 2008, 39.8% of the urban 
poor and 9.0% of the rural poor had not been covered by any SHI (Centre for Health 
Statistics and Information, 2008). From 2003 to 2008, per episode inpatient costs for 
the urban poor and the rural poor increased 34.1% and 16.8% respectively. OOP 
payments accounted for an average of 65% of a single inpatient per episode visit. 
The fraction of the population experiencing catastrophic health payments in China 
was higher than elsewhere in Asia (O'Donnell et al., 2008a, O'Donnell et al., 2007). 
Access to affordable healthcare is one of the biggest challenges that the policy 
makers faced in the 2000s. The government was determined to tackle this issue. In 
the 2000s, two new SHI schemes, the NCMS and the URI, were launched to improve 
access to healthcare and to provide financial protection for the urban unemployed 
and the rural population. As this thesis offers impact evaluations of the NCMS on 
access and finance in healthcare, it is important to have a good understanding of 
China’s SHI system, how much population it covers, what kind of benefit it offers, 
and how it is financed. The following section discusses SHI system in China, with a 
focus on the NCMS.  
 
2.3 Financing healthcare services: social health insurance for urban and rural 
populations 
Just like in many other developing countries, SHI in China is the countrywide 
public-subsidised insurance system that serves as the primary third-party payer and 
the backbone for health financing. The current basic social health insurance consists 
of three schemes, i.e., the Urban Employ Insurance (UEI) for urban residents with 
formal employment initiated in 1998, the NCMS for rural residents imitated in 2003, 
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and the Urban Resident Insurance (URI) for urban residents mainly covering the 
elderly, students and children, the urban unemployed, of which has still been under 
trial (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6 Development and evolution of China’s Social Health Insurance 
System 
Source: Author’s own 
 
2.3.1 Health financing in rural China 
Before the economic reforms in 1978, healthcare for the majority of rural residents in 
China was covered by the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), under which rural 
residents paid a small sum annually to help finance basic services from Barefoot 
Doctors, most of whom worked for little or no pay in the service at that time. The 
scheme played an important role in ensuring access to basic health services and 
essential medicine for rural residents at a relatively low cost, and was a critical piece 
in China's healthcare system which was heralded as a successful model in the 
developing world (Zhang et al., 2010b, Ma et al., 2012). However, following the 
disbanding of the People’s Collective Communes, which was tied to the rural health 
system, during the late 1970s and early 1980s,  China’s rural health system, in 
particular the CMS, could no longer be sustained (Ma et al., 2012, Yan et al., 2011). 
In the 1970s, 90 % of rural farmers had access to basic health services and some 
financial protection against catastrophic illness (Ooi, 2005), but within a decade the 
proportion had shrunk to 5%. The rural residents were left almost completely on 
their own in terms of paying for health services.  
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Although the Chinese government tried to revive the CMS during the 1980s and the 
1990s, these efforts were futile as the situation continued to deteriorate.  The reforms 
towards the marketisation of health facilities have been carried out in full stream 
since the 1990s.  The number of village health personnel decreased by 18% to as 
much as 23%, and the number of health facilities in towns and villages likewise 
decreased significantly. More importantly, due to the lack of government support in 
financing and support for healthcare, a FFS payment arrangement was introduced in 
the rural healthcare system (Yip and Eggleston, 2004). As a result, the average per 
episode inpatient cost in rural areas, payable out of pocket, increased from 613RMB 
(US$76.43) in 1993 to 2,649RMB (US$320) in 2003, while the proportion of rural 
residents who did not seek care when recommended reached 75.4% (Chen et al., 
2011, You and Kobayashi, 2009). Due to the fact that the majority of the country’s 
population resided in rural areas, it became clear that a lack of access to healthcare, 
if left unaddressed, could seriously undermine the political legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
 
The NCMS was launched in 2003 in response to a dire need for people to access 
affordable healthcare among the rural population. Although bearing its name from 
the past, the NCMS differs from the old CMS in several key dimensions. First of all, 
the scheme is largely subsidised by the government, and an individual’s contribution 
to the premium is kept relatively low.  It is a government-subsidised and voluntary 
scheme, which makes it attractive to low-risk households. In many regions, the 
participants are expected to contribute only about 10RMB (US$1.21) per person per 
month, while the rest is paid for by central and local governments. Second, 
participation in the NCMS provides rural residents access to a range of health 
facilities, from village clinics to municipal hospitals, although the reimbursement 
rates for health services received differ from one facility to another. Third, the 
NCMS is administered at a county level, while it offers the benefits of pooling across 
participants compared to the old CMS, there are significant disparities across 
different counties. For example, in the more affluent eastern and coastal regions, 
local governments are able to upsize the government subsidies to offer more 
comprehensive coverage to their residents.  
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As a voluntary insurance scheme, the take-up rate for NCMS was quite low during 
the initial period after its inception. With low level government subsidies, NCMS 
initially was primarily an insurance scheme covering catastrophic illness with high 
levels of deduction, providing little incentives for rural residents with low risks 
(World Health Organization, 2004b). The scheme, however, has become more 
comprehensive over time with a massive injection of government subsidies: the 
government contribution to insurance premiums increased from 10RMB (US$1.21) 
in 2003 to 240RMB (US$ 38.01) in 2012. Since 2007, the coverage of the scheme 
has expanded from mainly catastrophic illnesses to outpatient and preventive care 
(Xinhua, 2012b). In addition, the coverage of the NCMS has become a key 
performance indicator for key government officials, and administrative means have 
been employed to expand the coverage. The progress since then has been quite 
remarkable. According to official statistics published by the Chinese government, the 
coverage of NCMS reached 97.5% of China's 857 million rural Chinese (Table 2.2). 
Key features of the NCMS and the old CMS are summarised in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.2 Recent changes in NCMS insurance coverage 
Year 
Counties 
participating 
Enrolment  
(100 million) 
Enrolment  
as % of  
total population 
Average government 
subsidy   
per participant 
(RMB) 
2005 678 1.79 75.66 42.10 
2006 1451 4.1 80.66 52.10 
2007 2451 7.26 86.20 58.90 
2008 2729 8.15 91.53 96.30 
2009 2716 8.33 94.19 113.36 
2010 2678 8.36 96.00  156.57 
2011 2637 8.32 97.5 246.2 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011) 
 
Table 2.3 Features of the old CMS and the NCMS 
 NCMS Old CMS 
Date started 2003 (Pilot scheme was initiated in 
four provinces). 
From 1950s onwards. 
Enrollment  Voluntary at household level. Mandatory at individual level 
(You and Kobayashi, 2009). 
Coverage 94.3 % in 2009. Less than 10 % in the 1990s (Sun 
et al., 2010). 
Guideline General guidelines are issued by 
the central government, local 
No guidelines from central 
government. 
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governments retain considerable 
discretion over the details.  
Administration County government sets the 
reimbursement rate, ceilings, 
medical saving account, etc.  
Village levels (People’s 
Collective Communes). 
Risk pooling County level. Township or village level. 
Target population Rural residents (840 million) Rural residents. 
Financing mechanism In western and central China, the 
central government assisted the 
local government in providing 
finance for the scheme. In the 
more affluent eastern and coastal 
regions, financing the premium 
was mainly through local 
government. 
Supported entirely by state 
funding. Care was provided by 
barefoot doctors, including basic 
outpatient services, emergency 
first aid, immunizations, public 
health surveillance (Babiarz et 
al., 2010).  
Designated health facilities  All levels of health facilities. Barefoot doctors affiliated with 
the People’s Collective 
Communes. 
Covered services Inpatient series, catastrophic 
outpatient services, some 
prevention care services. 
Focus on preventive care and 
outpatient  care (You and 
Kobayashi, 2009). 
Source: (Barber and Yao, 2011), (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011), (Sun et al., 2010), 
various reports from the website of the Ministry of Health, China. 
 
The launch of the NCMS in 2003 responded directly to the lack of insurance 
coverage in rural China. In order to understand how the scheme was working, the 
Chinese Ministry of Health and the World Bank collaborated on a study of the early 
adopters of the NCMS in 2005. The study surveyed officials in more than 200 
NCMS counties. The facility level data indicated that the NCMS had some positive 
effects on inpatient utilisation at the township health centres. However, the study 
also showed that the scheme did not affect the unit costs at township health centres 
or county hospitals; neither did it affect outpatient OOP payments per visit or per 
inpatient episode. It seemed that the scheme had benefited its participants by 
reducing the proportion of people forgoing care when needed, but the effects on 
overall OOP payments was negligible.  
 
The report suggests that several features of the NCMS may limit its success. First, 
the NCMS over-emphasised inpatient care over outpatient care. This may 
inadvertently give providers powerful incentives to shift away from "basic" cost-
effective outpatient interventions towards less cost-effective inpatient interventions. 
As the current healthcare system in China is financed through a FFS basis, emphasis 
on covering inpatient over outpatient care may encourage and induce the oversupply 
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of expensive inpatient treatment. Second, there is an equity issue in terms of how the 
scheme is financed. Counties paid similar contributions regardless of their capacity 
to pay. The NCMS households paid the same contribution irrespective of their 
income. Although offering financial protection is the goal of the NCMS, the scheme 
does not subsidise the poor, even though demand for them is usually price sensitive. 
Moreover, the reimbursement system is complicated. Patients have to pay the costs 
of care upfront and then wait for reimbursement, while the net co-payment is usually 
based on complex formulas for deductibles, ceiling and different reimbursement 
rates, and these issues are often more confusing for outpatient services. Farmers feel 
perplexed about how much they should pay for the care they received.  
 
2.3.2 Health financing in urban China 
When China’s urban social medical scheme was first established in the 1950s, it 
mainly consisted of two programmes: Government Insurance Scheme (GIS) and 
Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS). These two schemes were targeted at urban residents. 
GIS, which was financed by the central and local governments, was mainly targeted 
at civil servants. Those who were covered by GIS needed to visit designated 
hospitals to obtain prescription medicine. Outpatient and inpatient services were 
provided free of charge. LIS, which was founded in 1951, was targeted at urban 
employees. This scheme was financed by employers, and it reimbursed part of the 
health expenses of a participant’s family. In urban areas, universal coverage was 
achieved under these two schemes (Dong, 2009).  
 
In 1994, the State Council carried out a pilot health insurance scheme targeting urban 
employees in Jiangsu province and Jiangxi province. This scheme transferred 
China’s social insurance system to a payroll related SHI in the later years. After a 
four-year trial, this scheme—the URI—replaced the GIS and LIS, and the scheme 
was launched throughout the country in 1998. Participation for all urban employers 
and employees was mandatory, and both of the employees and the employers were to 
share the responsibility of paying the premium contributions. A total of 8% of 
employees’ monthly payroll contributed to the scheme, with the employee paying 2% 
and the employer paying the remaining 6%. The UEI has played an important role in 
healthcare financing for urban employees. The participation increased from 5% of 
the total urban population in 1998 to 64.6% in 2007(Xu et al., 2007b). 
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Although this scheme has covered a large number of urban residents, more than 420 
million urban residents without formal employment have been left uninsured since 
the abolition of free urban medical services in the early 1990s. In 2007, a new social 
health insurance scheme—the URI—was piloted in 79 cities. The implementation of 
this scheme was a crucial step in closing the insurance coverage gap. This scheme 
targeted primary and secondary school students, young children and unemployed 
urban residents. Enrolment in this scheme is on a voluntary basis at the household 
level. The financing mechanism of this scheme is complicated and varies across the 
country. In general, an annul premium provided by the government should be no less 
than 40RMB (US$4.48) per participant per year. Insured urban residents who live in 
affluent provinces are likely to receive better benefit packages compared with those 
who live in less affluent provinces. By the end of 2007, the URI covered 42.91 
million people. In 2008, another 229 cities participated in the scheme (Dong, 2009).  
 
This chapter offers a contextual background to China’s healthcare system and recent 
reform efforts, which sets the scene for the empirical chapters of this thesis. The 
following chapters comprise of four empirical chapters and a concluding chapter. 
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of income-related health inequalities between urban 
and rural areas in China. It is important to have a good understanding of the 
distribution of health across income groups in urban and rural areas, and to know 
who the people are that generally have the worst health and why. The study results 
are expected to feed back into the policy process for future reform options to then 
improve population health and to efficiently identify target populations in both urban 
and rural areas.  
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3 Age and gender standardised inequity in health outcome 
 
Income-related health inequalities in urban and rural 
China4 
 
 
Abstract 
In China, the poor usually have less access to healthcare than the better-off, despite 
having higher levels of need. Since the proportion of the Chinese population living 
in urban areas increased tremendously with the urbanization movements, attention 
has been paid to the association between urban/rural residence and population health. 
It is important to understand the variation in health across income groups, and in 
particular to take into account the effects of urban/rural residence on the degree of 
income-related health inequalities. This paper empirically assesses the magnitude of 
rural/urban disparities in income-related adult health status, i.e., self-assessed health 
(SAH) and physical activity limitation, using Concentration Indices. It then uses 
decomposition methods to examine the factors associated with inequalities and their 
variations across urban and rural populations. Data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 2006 are used. The study finds that the poor is less likely 
to report their health status as “excellent or good” and are more likely to have 
physical activity limitation. Such inequality is more pronounced for the urban 
population than for the rural population. Results from the decomposition analysis 
suggest that, for the urban population, 76.47% to 79.07% of inequalities are 
associated with social economic factors, among which income, job status and 
educational level are the most important. For the rural population, 48.19% to 77.78% 
of inequalities are socioeconomic related factors. Income and educational attainment 
appear to have a prominent influence on inequality. The findings suggest that policy 
targeting the poor, especially the urban poor, is needed in order to reduce health 
inequality.   
                                                 
4 This chapter is based upon a published co-authored paper (with Panos Kanavos) at BMC Public 
Health (Yang and Kanavos, 2012). 
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3.1 Introduction 
Health inequality has been recognized as a problem all over the world. A large and 
growing body of research has examined the hypothesis that the individual’s health is 
shaped not just by the absolute level of resources available to them, but also by the 
level of resources available to them relative to others in their cohort or 
community(Wagstaff, 2005c, Wagstaff et al., 1993, Liu et al., 1999, Costa-Font et 
al., 2010).  Inequality in income has grown at a startling pace in the last 25 years in 
China and scholars generally agree that disparities in income are considered to be 
one important factor leading to inequality in health (Chen, 2010, Zhao, 2006, Zhang 
and Eriksson, Zhang and Eriksson, 2010). In China, studies show that the poor 
usually have less access to healthcare than the better-off, despite having higher levels 
of need. Notwithstanding their lower levels of utilization, the poor often spend more 
on healthcare as a share of their income than the better-off (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, 
Fang et al., 2010, Li and Zhu, 2006).  
 
As the proportion of the Chinese population living in urban areas has grown 
tremendously with the urbanization movements in China, some attention has been 
paid to the association between urban/rural residence and the health of the population. 
Earlier studies found that, in general, health outcomes were better in urban China. 
For instance, the prevalence of child stunting was much lower in urban than in rural 
China (Chen et al., 2007). The rural elderly were more likely to experience 
functional limitation than the urban elderly, and were less likely to survive a two-
year follow-up period (Zimmer et al., 2010). However, findings were not always 
consistent. Chen et al. (2007) examined the issue of regional disparity in child 
malnutrition in China, and found that rural children were more likely to be stunting 
than their urban counterparts. Although the studies mentioned above began to show 
some interesting findings on urban/rural disparities in health, these studies mainly 
focused on comparisons between average health of urban and rural populations, and 
most were descriptive. Reports on income-related differences in health between 
urban and rural populations are relatively rare (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Fang et al., 
2010, Li and Zhu, 2006).  Only two studies to date have examined income-related 
inequalities in health between the rural and urban populations in China. Van de Poel 
et al. (2007, 2009) explored some aspects of the relationship between the distribution 
of diseases and urbanization in China. One of his studies found that urban residents 
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were more likely to suffer from non-communicable diseases, and that urbanization 
had been proven to impose a penalty on perceived health in China (2009). In another 
of his studies examining child health in 47 developing countries, Van de Poel et al. 
(2007) found that the urban poor had higher rates of stunting and mortality than their 
rural counterparts. The findings implied that there was a need for programs that 
target the urban poor, and this was becoming more necessary as the size of the urban 
population grew. However, since both studies used earlier versions of the CHNS, 
more updated analyses are needed in order to understand income-related inequalities 
in health in urban and rural areas in China. 
 
This paper seeks to understand the differing degrees of income-related health 
inequality in rural and in urban populations and the major factors contributing to that 
inequality. The study of health inequality in China is timely and important. To our 
knowledge, it is the first to measure and decompose the income-related differences 
in adult health in urban and rural Chinese populations. The chapter follows Erreygers, 
Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and O'Donnell in using Concentration Indices and 
decomposition analysis as a measure of income-related health inequality (Erreygers, 
2009, Wagstaff, 2005c, Wagstaff, 2009a, Wagstaff, 2005a, van Doorslaer et al., 
2000, O'Donnell et al., 2008b). It estimates two major health outcome measures: (1) 
a subjective model assessing self-assessed health (SAH); and (2) a functional model 
assessing physical activity limitation. Income-related inequalities in health outcomes 
are calculated by Concentration Indices and presented as Concentration Curves. The 
contribution of socioeconomic determinants to health inequality is decomposed and 
quantified. Data from CHNS 2006 are used. Subsequent sections discuss the policy 
implications that can be drawn from this study.  
 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1. Data source and variable specifications 
CHNS is used, and please refer to Chapter 1 Section 1.5.1 for a detailed description 
of the dataset. Although data for 2009 were available at the time of this study, health 
status data for that year had not yet been released at the point of writing. Hence, this 
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study uses data from 2006. Table 3.1 provides a summary statistics of the sample. 
The population was 50.21% male and 49.79% female, 29.36% urban and 70.64% 
rural in 2006. The total number of individuals surveyed was 10,182.  
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for urban and rural populations (mean/standard 
deviation) 
Variable Definition 
Rural (N=7193) Urban(N=2989) 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Health variables      
SAH 
Dummy variable: 1, excellent and good 
health; 0 otherwise 
0.593 0.491 0.594 0.491 
Physical 
Limitation 
Dummy variable: 1, having limitation 
coded as 1. 0 otherwise 
0.072 0.259 0.081 0.272 
Demographic variables     
Female 18-24 
Dummy variable: 1, female aged between 
18-24; 0 otherwise. 
0.026 0.160 0.020 0.141 
Female 25-34 
Dummy variable: 1, female aged between 
25-34; 0 otherwise. 
0.076 0.265 0.065 0.246 
Female 35-44 
Dummy variable: 1 female aged between 
35-44; 0 otherwise. 
0.136 0.342 0.127 0.333 
Female 45-54 
Dummy variable: 1 female aged between 
45-54; 0 otherwise. 
0.130 0.336 0.123 0.329 
Female 55-64 
Dummy variable: 1 female aged between 
55-64; 0 otherwise. 
0.101 0.301 0.093 0.290 
Female 65+ 
Dummy variable: 1 female aged above 
65; 0 otherwise. 
0.076 0.264 0.136 0.342 
Male 18-24* 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged between 
18-24; 0 otherwise. 
0.031 0.174 0.028 0.164 
Male 25-34 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged between 
25-34; 0 otherwise. 
0.079 0.269 0.052 0.222 
Male 35-44 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged between 
35-44; 0 otherwise. 
0.136 0.343 0.120 0.325 
Male 45-54 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged between 
45-54; 0 otherwise. 
0.127 0.333 0.123 0.328 
Male 55-64 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged between 
55-64; 0 otherwise. 
0.108 0.310 0.093 0.290 
Male 65+ 
Dummy variable: 1 male aged 65 and 
above; 0 otherwise. 
0.067 0.249 0.108 0.310 
Socioeconomic variables     
Marital status Dummy variable: 1 married, 0 otherwise 0.856 0.351 0.808 0.394 
Job status 
Dummy variable: 1 having a job, 0 
otherwise 
0.687 0.464 0.465 0.499 
Income 
Gross annual household per capita 
income inflated to 2009 
31,115 44,736 32,089 39,130 
No education 
Dummy variable: 1 no education; 0 
otherwise 
0.273 0.446 0.157 0.364 
Pri and Sec 
education 
Dummy variable: 1 primary and 
secondary education; 0 otherwise 
0.554 0.497 0.371 0.483 
High school 
education 
Dummy variable: 1 high school and 
technical school education; 0 otherwise 
0.151 0.358 0.342 0.474 
University 
education and 
above* 
Dummy variable: 1 university education 
and above; 0 otherwise 
0.022 0.145 0.130 0.336 
Province Liaoning Dummy variable: 1 Liaoning, 0 otherwise 0.113 0.316 0.091 0.288 
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Province 
Heilongjiang 
Dummy variable: 1 Heilongjiang, 0 
otherwise 
0.099 0.299 0.107 0.310 
Province Jiangsu Dummy variable: 1 Jiangsu, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 0.117 0.321 
Province 
Shandong 
Dummy variable: 1 Shandong, 0 
otherwise 
0.106 0.308 0.112 0.316 
Province Henan Dummy variable: 1 Henan, 0 otherwise 0.116 0.320 0.114 0.318 
Province Hubei Dummy variable: 1 Hubei, 0 otherwise 0.095 0.293 0.106 0.308 
Province Hunan Dummy variable: 1 Hunan, 0 otherwise 0.107 0.309 0.132 0.339 
Province Guangxi Dummy variable: 1 Guangxi, 0 otherwise 0.132 0.338 0.107 0.310 
Province 
Guizhou* 
Dummy variable: 1 Guizhou, 0 otherwise 0.115 0.319 0.112 0.316 
Note: *reference groups. Gross household income is inflated to year 2009 using consumer price index. 
 
Dependent variables: health variables 
This paper uses self-assessed health (SAH) as the dependent variable. Although SAH 
is a subjective measure of individual health, previous studies show that SAH is 
highly correlated with subsequent mortality, even when controlling for more 
objective health measurements (Li and Zhu, 2006, van Doorslaer et al., 2000, Idler 
and Kasl, 1995). In order to measure an individual’s self-assessed health status, 
individuals are asked: “Right now, how would you describe your health compared to 
that of other people of your age: excellent, good, fair, or poor?” Following a standard 
method, a new variable is constructed with two categories, collapsing the two lowest 
categories (fair and poor) (Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez Rubio, 2009, Li and 
Zhu, 2006). The new SAH variable has a value of 1 if SAH is excellent or good, and 
otherwise of 0.  
 
This paper also uses a functional measurement, that of physical activity limitation, as 
another indicator. As with SAH, this is defined as a binary variable that equals 1 if 
the respondent has been physically restricted and unable to perform daily activities 
for the past three months, and otherwise equals 0. Respondents are asked: “During 
the past three months have you been unable to carry out normal activities and work 
or studies due to illness?”  
 
Independent variables 
Age and gender interaction are allowed in this study as demographic variables. I 
categorized 12 groups: females aged 18-25, 25-34, 35-44, 55-64, and 65 and above; 
males aged 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and above. 18-24year-old 
males are the reference group.  
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Socioeconomic variables used in this paper are as follows. Per capita income data are 
used as the measurement of living standard (based on household income inflated to 
2009 using consumer price index). Although using household expenditure as a 
measurement of living standard are suggested in a number of studies on health equity 
in developing countries (Wagstaff et al., 2003, Wagstaff, 2009b). Scholars argue that 
household expenditure may not be a reliable indicator for living standard 
measurement in the context of China (Sun et al., 2010). China has the highest saving 
rate in the world; expenditure data are distorted by the propensity to save for 
emergencies and thus may not be a good proxy as living standard indicators (Qian, 
1988, Kraay, 2000, Wu, 2001). Therefore, this study uses an income variable instead 
of expenditure variable as an indicator for living standard measurements. Household 
income data are measured as gross annual household income aggregated from all 
sources including: gardening, farming, livestock/poultry, fishing, handicraft and 
small commercial household business inflated to 2009 (the last wave of the survey). 
As this paper examines individual level of healthcare use, it is important to adjust 
household estimates of aggregate income to reflect household size and composition. 
This is done by using Equivalence Scale, which is constructed as some function of 
the household size and demographic composition provided estimates are available 
for household economies of scale and the cost of children: 
 )( KAAE  (Citro et 
al., 1995). A represents the number of adults in the household, K represents the 
number of children,  is the “costs of children”, and   is the degree of economies of 
scale. The value of should be high when most goods are private and low when most 
of the household expenditure is on shared goods. A value of 0.75 to 1.0 is suggested 
when food expenditures account for a large proportion of total household income, 
which means that the economies of scale are limited (O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  In 
this paper,  is set as 0.3, and is set as 0.75. 
 
Education is categorized by four groups: no education, primary and secondary 
education, high school and technical school education, and university education and 
above. University education and above is used as the reference group. Job status, 
marital status, insurance status, urban and rural residence, and province of residence 
are also included among the socioeconomic variables. For the province variable, the 
province of Guizhou is set as the reference group. Whether the respondent is treated 
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as an urban resident or a rural respondent depends on his/her registration status as on 
his/her ID booklet (Hukou5). Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for these 
variables.  
 
3.2.2 Statistical analysis 
Income-related inequality in health is estimated using well established methods 
based on Concentration Curves and Concentration Indices. The method involves five 
basic steps: (1) estimate a model of the determinants of health outcomes, using a set 
of demographic and socioeconomic variables; (2) predict (indirectly) age- and sex-
standardized health for each health variable, and for urban and rural respectively; (3) 
calculate the Concentration Indices for the actual health variables and for the 
standardized health variable for urban and rural populations; (4) calculate the non-
demographic/socioeconomic-related inequality of health, and compare the non-
demographic inequality in the rural population with that in the urban population; (5) 
decompose the socioeconomic factors from total health inequalities for urban and 
rural population respectively. 
 
The multivariate regressions models for steps (1) and (2) above are central to the 
methods. The health variables, i.e. SAH health and physical limitation, are binary 
variables. The nature of the dependent variables formally calls for a non-linear 
estimation. However, the disadvantage of this procedure is that certain components 
of the equity analysis, such as decomposition analysis, are difficult to implement and 
interpret when using non-linear models. Further, studies have shown that equity 
measurements calculated by OLS regression do not differ importantly from the non-
linear estimation (Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez Rubio, 2009, Allin and Hurley, 
2009). Therefore, this paper will use OLS regression instead of non-linear regression 
to standardize the health variables and to decompose the Concentration Indices. 
Results from the Probit model are nonetheless presented in Appendix 1 in order to 
enable a comparison. Further, instead of  using the Concentration Indices, the 
Erreygers Concentration Index, which has recently been developed and has proved a 
                                                 
5 Hukou is a common name used in mainland China for the household registration system. It is issued on 
household basis. Every household have a Hukou booklet that records information on the family members, 
including name, birth date, relationship with each other, marriage status (and with whom if married), address, etc. 
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better estimation of binary variables, will be used (Erreygers, 2009, Wagstaff, 2009a, 
Costa-Font and Gil, 2008, Van de Poel et al., 2007).   
 
The following sections will discuss the statistical analysis used for each step.  
 
Standardization of health variables  
Standardization of the health variables was the first step, so as to enable a reasonable 
estimation of health inequality. It is noted that variations in health are associated 
with a number of factors. In the literature, these factors are usually categorized as 
demographic inequalities, e.g. age and sex factors, and non-demographic inequalities 
arising from circumstances beyond the individual’s control, e.g. economic resources 
and access to healthcare. Policy may be less concerned with inequalities arising from 
demographic factors, e.g. demographic variation, because these are usually 
reasonable and acceptable. Therefore, a measurement of socioeconomic-related 
health inequality, to control for demographic differences or identify only non-
demographic differences, would be desirable for policy formation. In order to 
measure socioeconomic-related health inequalities that reflect only non-demographic 
health differences, indirect standardization of health variables is used. The aim of 
indirect standardization is to subtract the variation in  health which is driven by 
demographic factors or demographic variation, and capture only the health inequality 
driven by non-demographic factors(O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
 
As suggested by O’Donnell et al.(2008b), standardized health variables (ŷiX) is 
obtained by a regression of actual health variables (ŷi) as follows,  
(1) izi
k
kji
j
ji zxy     
Where
jx are the demographic variables, i.e., age and sex; kz are non-demographic 
variables, i.e., (the logarithm of) income, education, job status, province of 
residence, urban/rural residence, marital status; ,, and are the parameter vectors, 
and is the error term. 
 
The coefficients from OLS estimations are obtained from actual values of the
jx
variables, i.e. age and sex, which are to be standardized for, and from the sample 
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mean for kz variables, which are not to be standardized, but to be controlled for. The 
predicted values of health indicator X
iyˆ  are then obtained.  
(2) 
zi
k
kji
j
j
X
i zxy    ˆˆˆˆ  
 
Assuming a linear model, estimates of indirectly standardized health ŷi IS can be 
obtained by calculating the difference between actual health ( iy ) and standardized 
health (ŷiX), plus the sample mean ( y ) 
(3) yyyy
X
ii
IS
i  ˆˆ  
Rearranging the equation (3),  
(4)  )(ˆˆ jji
j
ji
IS
i xxyy    
Equation (4) shows that standardization will subtract the variation in health driven by 
demographic factors from actual health. Therefore, the distribution of 
ISyˆ across 
income can be interpreted as the health status we expect to observe in an individual, 
irrespective of differences in the distribution of demographic characteristics.  
 
 
Measuring income-related health inequality using Concentration Curves 
The Concentration Index has been used in many studies to quantify the degree of 
socioeconomic-related inequality in health variables (Wagstaff et al., 1993, Kakwani 
et al., 1997, O'Donnell et al., 2008b). It quantifies the degree of socioeconomic-
related inequality in a health variable. There are many ways to express the 
Concentration Index. The most convenient for the purpose of this research is 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008b): 
(5)  ),cov(
2
)(21
1
0
t
iitn RhdppLCI

  
Where i represents the individual, hi is the health variable, R is the individual’s living 
standard ranking, μ is the mean of the health variable in the population, and t is the 
year. If there is no socioeconomic-related inequality, the index is zero. A positive 
value indicates a pro-rich inequality, and a negative value indicates a pro-poor 
inequality.  
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However, recent studies have suggested that there are some limitations on the 
Concentration Index. Wagstaff (2005a) has found that if the health variable of 
interest is binary, taking the value of 0 or the value of 1, then the bounds of the 
Concentration Index depend on the mean of the health variable. Therefore, this paper 
uses the recently introduced Erreygers’s Concentration Index, which is more suitable 
for the binary nature of the variables and the purpose of this study (Erreygers, 2009).  
Erreygers proposed a revised calculation of the Concentration Index for health. 
(6)   
)(
)(
4
)( hC
ab
hE
nn 


 
Where bn and an represent the max and min of the health variable (h), μ is the mean 
of the health variable in the population, and C(h) represents the Concentration Index 
specified in (5).  
 
The range of the Erreygers’s Concentration Index is from -1 to 1. A positive value 
indicates a pro-rich inequality, meaning that ill/good health is more concentrated 
among the better-off. A negative value indicates a pro-poor inequality, meaning that 
ill/good health is more concentrated among the poor. The magnitude of the 
concentration index reflects the strength of the relationship between income and 
health variable. For example, an index of -0.7 indicates that the health variable is 
concentrated among the poor, and the health variable demonstrates a pro-poor 
inequality. Compared with an index of -0.1, an index of -0.7 indicates a more 
pronounced pro-poor inequality for the health variable.  
 
Regression-based decomposition analysis helps to capture the contribution of each 
individual factor to income-related health inequality (O'Donnell et al., 2008b:159, 
Wagstaff et al., 2003). The Erreygers’s Concentration Index can be decomposed by 
transforming the health variable
)()( hhhii abahh  . Therefore, the Erreygers’s 
Concentration Index differs from the decomposition of C by the multiplication by 4 
and h

. The equation is as follows.  
(7) 






  
j k
xkxkkzjzjjyy CCCE 4
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Where µ is the mean, j represents a vector of a set of variables zj, k represents a 
vector of variables xk, γ represents the coefficient of the variable z, δ represents the 
coefficient of the variable x, C is the Concentration Index for x.  
 
Another critical problem arises from calculation of the Concentration Index is the 
ranking indicator of the livings standard measurements. Studies have found that 
repetitive values of the ranking variables, i.e. two of more observations have the 
same values of the living standard variables, may bring instability for the calculation 
(Chen and Roy, 2009, Van Ourti, 2004). With random sorting, when a number of 
observations have a same value of the living standard variable, they are assigned 
different values of living standard-related fractional rank. Using this approach for a 
dataset with multiple repetitive values of the living standard variable may lead to a 
fictitious ranking of individuals, hence affecting the results of the Concentration 
Index. Specifically, Chen and Roy (2009) have found that sorting observations with 
ascending order in the health outcome produces the upper boundary of the 
Concentration Index; and sorting the observations with a descending order in the 
health outcome produces the lower boundary of the Concentration Index. In this 
paper, we have sorted the data both in ascending and descending order to test the 
accuracy of the Erreygers’s Index, and to obtain the boundaries of Erreygers’s Index. 
The results suggest that no change is observed in terms of the value of the indices. A 
possible explanation of the results may be that individuals whose health outcomes do 
not deviate substantially from those with same values of the living standard variable. 
Hence, the estimations of Erreygers’s Indices in this paper are close or same to the 
true value of the Erreygers’s Index.  
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive analysis by urban and rural populations  
Table 3.1 presents descriptive results for the urban and rural populations in the total 
sample. Urban respondents have similar self-assessed health, but more physical 
limitations compared with rural respondents. In terms of the demographic structure 
of the sample, the urban population has a much higher proportion of respondents 
who are above 65 years old, while the rural population has a higher proportion of 
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respondents in other age groups. Moreover, urban respondents are more likely to 
have received high school and university education and are wealthier compared with 
the rural population. In terms of other factors, the average rates of those reporting 
themselves as “married” and “employed” are higher for rural than for urban 
respondents.  
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the reporting rates for SAH and physical activity 
limitation (standardized by age and gender) by income deciles for urban and rural 
populations respectively. The rich are more likely to report their health status as 
excellent/good, and are less likely to report physical activity limitation. Such 
inequality is more pronounced for the urban population compared with the rural 
population.  
 
Figure 3.1 Standardized SAH (excellent and good health = 1, fair and poor 
health = 0) for the urban population and the rural population by income deciles 
in 2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model) 
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Figure 3.2 Standardized physical activity limitation (having physical limitation 
= 1, otherwise = 0) for the urban population and the rural population by income 
deciles in 2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model) 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Determinants of health outcomes  
Table 3.2 presents the OLS coefficients of the linear probability model. These 
estimates are used to calculate and decompose the Concentration Indices of the SAH 
and of physical activity limitation. The F test confirms the joint significance of the 
coefficients of all independent variables. Regarding the supposed association 
between income, education, and occupation types, a very low degree of correlation is 
found. Computation of the variance inflation factors (VIF) indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a problem (VIF = 2.01). A Ramsy RESET test is performed, 
indicating that the models showed no specification problems. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the nature of the variables calls formally for a non-linear estimation. 
Previous studies have shown that equity measurements calculated by OLS regression 
do not differ significantly from the non-linear estimation, and the results from this 
study have also confirmed this (Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez Rubio, 2009, Allin 
and Hurley, 2009). To be succinct, only OLS coefficients are calculated and 
presented in the paper, while results from Probit models are presented in Appendix 1 
in order to enable a comparison. 
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Table 3.2 shows that an increase in age is associated with a decrease in SAH. In 
particular, the rural population aged 65 and above has a lower probability of 
reporting excellent/good health compared with their urban counterparts. The impact 
of income on SAH is higher for the urban population than for the rural population. 
Having a job also increases the likelihood of reporting excellent/good health. 
Interestingly, the rural residents of the provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong and Hunan showed an increased likelihood of reporting excellent/good 
health compared with rural residents of other provinces.  
 
Age is positively associated with reporting physical activity limitation. The impact 
of educational attainment on health is also significant. Those with no education are 
more likely to be physically restricted; such an impact is higher for the urban 
population than for the rural population. Further, those who have a job are less likely 
to report physical activity limitation.   
 
Table 3.2 OLS results for SAH and physical activity limitation 
  
SAH (1=excellent or good, 
0=fair or poor) 
Physical Limitation(having 
limitation = 1, no limitation 
= 0) 
  Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Age and gender (ref  = m18-24)         
f18-24 0.1825*** 0.2293*** 0.0013 -0.0384 
f25-34 0.1174*** 0.1714*** -0.0067 -0.0238 
f35-44 0.1174*** 0.1259*** -0.0022 -0.0171 
f45-54 0.0305 0.0135 -0.0084 -0.0097 
f55-64 -0.0753*** -0.0968** 0.0093 0.0301 
f65+ -0.2258*** -0.1685*** 0.0326** 0.08*** 
m25-34 0.1598*** 0.0652 -0.0196 -0.0216 
m35-44 0.0391 0.0661* -0.0122 -0.0212 
m45-54 -0.0393 -0.0513 -0.002 -0.0394* 
m55-64 -0.2*** -0.1497*** 0.0184 0.0184 
m65+ -0.255*** -0.1968*** 0.0583*** 0.0538** 
Income(lg) 0.014** 0.0376*** -0.0077** -0.0048 
Marital Status (1 = married) -0.0165 0.0019 0.0067 -0.0187 
Job status ( 1 = having a job) 0.038*** 0.0418* -0.0374*** -0.0306** 
Education level (ref = uni edu and 
above)         
No edu -0.132*** -0.0301 0.0471** 0.0902*** 
Pri and sec edu -0.0633 -0.0313 0.0202 0.0224 
High school -0.0131 -0.0042 0.003 0.0088 
78 
 
Regions (ref= Province Guizhou)         
Province Liaoning 0.0555** 0.0049 0.0042 0.0279 
Province Heilongjiang 0.0869*** 0.002 -0.0032 0.0569*** 
Province Jiangsu 0.0524** 0.1146*** 0.0058 0.0082 
Province Shandong 0.0974*** 0.0904** -0.0222* -0.0032 
Province Henan -0.006 0.0072 -0.011 0.0004 
Province Hubei 0.0064 0.0152 0.0325** 0.0073 
Province Hunan 0.006 0.0406 0.0128 0.038* 
Province Guangxi -0.1207*** -0.1098*** 0.0303** 0.0316 
         
Constant 0.511*** 0.2233** 0.1342*** 0.1073* 
          
Number of obs 7062 2923 7062 2923 
F( 25,  7036) 42.36 15.04 8.47 7.96 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.1308 0.1149 0.0292 0.0643 
Adj R-squared 0.1277 0.1073 0.0258 0.0562 
p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.1* 
 
3.3.3 Income-related inequality in health outcomes 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the concentration curves for the standardized health 
variables, which illustrate the share of health by cumulative proportions of 
individuals in the population ranked from the poorest to the richest. The two key 
health variables are standardized by the interaction of age and gender using the 
indirect standardization method specified in earlier sections. Table 3.3 shows the 
Erreygers’s Concentration Index (EI), non-demographic inequality, and the 
percentage of non-demographic inequality contributing to the total EI for urban and 
rural populations respectively.  
 
As shown in Table 4, the EI indicated that the rich were more likely to report 
excellent/good health and less likely to report physical activity limitation. Some 
interesting findings come from the inequality levels between urban and rural 
populations. Although one might assume that the urban population would have a 
more equal distribution of health across wealth than the rural, given some evidence 
demonstrated by the existing literature, the empirical results show different findings. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of income-related inequality indices using the 
Erreygers’s method (EI) for the urban and rural populations respectively. The EIs for 
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the rural population and the urban population for SAH were 0.135 and 0.182 
respectively. The indices suggest that the urban poor have a higher risk of suffering 
from poor health than the rural poor, as reported by their own perceptions of their 
health status. The EI for physical activity limitation is -0.043 for the rural population 
and -0.060 for the urban population, which indicates that the degree to which poverty 
equates with physical activity limitation is higher for the urban population compared 
with the rural population. Indices calculated using Probit Modelling were presented 
in Appendix 2.  
 
Table 3.3 Erreygers’s Concentration Indices of SAH and physical activity 
limitation (OLS) 
 Good Health Physical Limitation 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban 
EI 0.135 0.182 -0.043 -0.060 
SE (EI)  0.017 0.024 0.008 0.013 
Socioeconomic related  inequality  0.065 0.139 -0.034 -0.047 
Percentage of Socioeconomic related  
inequality  48.19% 76.47% 77.78% 79.07% 
Note: all indices are significant at 0.01 significance level. 
 
The indices are verified by the presentation of Concentration Curves in Figure 3.3 
and Figure 3.4. The blue curves represent the rural population and the red curves the 
urban population. If the curves coincide with the 45-degree line of equality, all 
respondents, irrespective of their economic status, have the same health outcomes. If, 
as is more likely in this case, the curves lie above/below the 45-degree line, 
inequalities in health variables favour the poor/rich; such inequalities are pro-
poor/pro-rich. The further the curve lies from the 45-degree line, the greater the 
degree of inequality in the health variable across quintiles of economic status. In 
Figure 3.3, the urban curve lies below the line of equality and below the rural curve, 
indicating that the urban population has a higher level of inequality favouring the 
rich than the rural population. In Figure 3.4, the urban curve lies above the line of 
equality and above the rural curve, indicating a more pronounced inequality in 
favour of the poor for the urban population compared with the rural population. 
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Figure 3.3 The Concentration Curves for SAH for the urban and rural 
population in 2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The Concentration Curves for physical activity limitation for the 
urban and rural population in 2006 (Standardized by Linear Probability Model) 
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Table 3.3 also reports for the estimates of inequality indices that are driven mainly 
by non-demographic/socioeconomic factors. Results show that, for the urban 
population 76.47% of the inequality for SAH and 79.07% of the inequality for 
physical activity limitation is socioeconomic-related inequality. This suggests that, 
for the urban population, age and gender accounted for a relatively low share of 
income-related inequality. For the rural population, 48.19% of income-related 
inequality in SAH and 77.78% of inequality in physical activity limitation are driven 
by socioeconomic-related factors such as economic resources and education levels. 
These results indicate that a large percentage of existing income-related inequalities 
in SAH and physical activity limitation are potentially driven by non-
demographic/socioeconomic-related factors.  
 
 
3.3.4 Explaining health inequalities  
The concentration indices results suggest that the level of inequality in terms of 
health status is higher for the urban population compared with the rural population. 
In order to investigate this issue further, decomposition analysis is used to estimate 
the contribution of individual factors to total inequality. Table 3.4 presents the 
results of the decomposition analysis based on OLS regressions, indicating the 
contribution of individual factors to total income-related inequalities (EI). Figure 3.5 
and Figure 3.6 present the individual factors. A decomposition analysis based on the 
Probit model is presented in Appendix 3.  
 
The first and second columns in Table 3.4 show the Concentration Indices for the 
distribution of the independent variables, e.g. income, age and sex, marital status, 
etc., across income for rural and urban respondents respectively. The other columns 
show the contribution and percentage contribution of the individual factors to the 
total inequality indices for each variable and separately for the urban and the rural 
populations. For the rural population, the elderly, i.e. respondents above 55 years old, 
and those with no education are more likely to be in the low-income group. For the 
urban population, those with no education or with primary and secondary education 
only are more likely to be among the low-income groups. The better-off are more 
likely to have high school education and above.  
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The decomposition analysis, which explains the contribution of individual factors to 
income-related inequality, reveals some interesting findings in the comparison 
between rural and urban. Income, demographic features and education are the major 
factors contributing to inequalities. For the rural population, in terms of SAH, 
demographic factors contribute 50.06% to total inequality, while income contributes 
22.77%, and education contributes 17.58%. This indicates that approximately half of 
income-related health inequalities for the rural population are driven by demographic 
factors, i.e., age and gender. Further, the contribution of age and gender effects to 
total inequality is higher for the rural population compared to the urban population.  
 
The physical activity limitation variable indicates similar results. Demographic 
factors contribute 22.45% to total inequality for the rural population and 21.01% for 
the urban population. This suggests that, for the rural population, a high degree of 
inequality is driven by demographic factors, while such factors only account for a 
small share of inequality for the urban population.  
 
It is interesting to discuss the contribution of socioeconomic-related inequalities. 
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the decomposition results for SAH and physical 
activity limitation. Unlike the developed countries, where the percentage 
contribution of income to total inequalities is relatively smaller compared to other 
factors, a large proportion of inequalities in China are still driven by income (Costa-
Font and Gil, 2008). The results suggest that higher-income earners are both more 
likely to have higher levels of education and are more likely to report excellent/good 
health. Further, the influence of educational attainment on pro-rich inequality is 
higher for the rural population compared with the urban population.  
 
The physical activity limitation variable also reveals some interesting findings. The 
most important factors relating to inequality are demographic factors, income, job 
status and educational attainment. Results suggest that high-income earners are both 
well-educated and less likely to have physical activity limitation. It is worth pointing 
out that, for the urban population, education is the most salient contributor to 
inequality, at approximately 40%. Job status and income are the other two important 
factors contributing to the urban inequality indices.  
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Figure 3.5 Decomposition of SAH (Linear Probability Model) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Decomposition of physical activity limitation (Linear Probability 
Model) 
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00%
Rural
Urban
SA
H
Demographic factors
Income
Job status
Education
Others
Residuals
-20.00% 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00%
Rural
Urban
P
h
ys
ic
al
 li
m
it
at
io
n Demographic factors
Income
Job status
Education
Others
Residuals
84 
 
Table 3.4 Decomposition results (OLS) 
  CI   SAH (1=excellent or good, 0=fair or poor)   Physical Activity Limitation     
      Rural   Urban   Rural   Urban   
  Rural Urban Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution 
EI     0.135    0.182    -0.043    -0.060    
Residual     0.001  0.40% 0.004  1.98% -0.001  1.46% -0.001  2.22% 
                      
Age and gender (ref  = m18-24)                     
f18-24 0.198  -0.045  0.005  3.34% -0.001  -0.61% 0.000  -0.07% 0.000  -0.33% 
f25-34 0.153  0.155  0.005  3.49% 0.005  2.59% 0.000  0.70% -0.001  1.17% 
f35-44 0.099  0.114  0.006  4.38% 0.006  3.36% 0.000  0.23% -0.001  1.33% 
f45-54 0.035  0.021  0.001  0.37% 0.000  0.06% 0.000  0.23% 0.000  0.17% 
f55-64 -0.053  -0.019  0.001  1.04% 0.001  0.28% 0.000  0.46% 0.000  0.33% 
f65+ -0.286  -0.072  0.015  11.42% 0.005  2.70% -0.002  5.10% -0.002  3.84% 
m25-34 0.109  0.120  0.005  3.41% 0.002  0.99% -0.001  1.39% -0.001  1.00% 
m35-44 0.076  0.064  0.002  1.11% 0.002  1.10% -0.001  1.16% -0.001  1.00% 
m45-54 0.020  0.070  0.000  -0.22% -0.002  -0.83% 0.000  0.05% -0.001  1.83% 
m55-64 -0.114  -0.087  0.007  5.49% 0.004  2.09% -0.001  1.62% -0.001  0.83% 
m65+ -0.309  -0.221  0.022  16.24% 0.021  11.78% -0.005  11.58% -0.006  9.84% 
ln(income) 0.056  0.058  0.031  22.77% 0.086  47.27% -0.017  38.92% -0.011  18.35% 
Marital Status 0.013  0.044  -0.001  -0.59% 0.000  0.17% 0.000  -0.70% -0.003  4.50% 
Job status 0.064  0.161  0.007  4.97% 0.013  6.88% -0.007  15.29% -0.009  15.18% 
Education level (ref = uni edu and 
above)                     
No edu -0.181  -0.356  0.026  19.36% 0.007  3.69% -0.009  21.55% -0.020  33.36% 
Pri and sec edu 0.004  -0.113  -0.001  -0.44% 0.005  2.92% 0.000  -0.46% -0.004  6.34% 
High school 0.229  0.141  -0.002  -1.33% -0.001  -0.44% 0.000  -0.93% 0.002  -2.84% 
Regions (ref= Province Guizhou)                     
Province Liaoning 0.043  0.180  0.001  0.82% 0.000  0.17% 0.000  -0.23% 0.002  -3.17% 
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Province Heilongjiang -0.073  0.133  -0.003  -1.85% 0.000  0.06% 0.000  -0.23% 0.003  -5.34% 
Province Jiangsu 0.232  0.240  0.006  4.30% 0.013  7.04% 0.001  -1.39% 0.001  -1.50% 
Province Shandong -0.009  -0.120  0.000  -0.30% -0.005  -2.70% 0.000  -0.23% 0.000  -0.33% 
Province Henan -0.071  -0.071  0.000  0.15% 0.000  -0.11% 0.000  -0.93% 0.000  0.00% 
Province Hubei -0.030  -0.189  0.000  -0.07% -0.001  -0.66% 0.000  0.93% -0.001  1.00% 
Province Hunan 0.018  -0.023  0.000  0.00% -0.001  -0.28% 0.000  -0.23% -0.001  0.83% 
Province Guangxi -0.011  -0.186  0.001  0.52% 0.008  4.57% 0.000  0.46% -0.002  4.00% 
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3.4 Conclusion and discussion 
A by-product of China’s rapid development is the growing differentiation of the 
social and economic life in urban and rural areas. The link between social inequality 
and health disparity provides a particularly useful line of inquiry into the issue of 
urban/rural disparity. It is critically important to understand the variation in health 
across income groups, and in particular to take into account the effects of urban/rural 
residence on the degree of income-related health inequalities. This paper first 
compares the average health status of rural and urban populations. It then measures 
and compares the degree of income-related health inequalities of urban and rural 
populations. Factors associated with inequalities are quantified in order to illuminate 
the dynamic of individuals’ health and socioeconomic status for urban and rural 
populations respectively.  
 
Specifically, this paper reveals some compelling new findings. The study shows that 
urban respondents have similar self-assessed health, but more physical limitations 
compared with rural respondents. Income-related health inequalities are more 
pronounced for urban populations as compared with rural populations. These results 
contradict some earlier studies, but are consistent with others. A number of the 
earlier studies found that living in a rural area increased the possibility of reporting 
poor health and that the urban population were healthier compared with the rural 
population (Chen et al., 2010, Anson and Sun, 2004). There are a few studies 
demonstrated different findings. For instance, Van de Poel et al. (2012a) found that 
urban residents were more likely to have a higher incidence  of chronic diseases and 
that obesity and hypertension rates were more prevalent in urban China than in rural 
China. A possible explanation suggested by the authors was that the rapid 
environmental, economic and social changes that followed urbanization increased 
the prevalence of major risk factors for chronic disease. The increasing urbanization 
and development may change the geographical distribution of non-communicable 
diseases. Further, urban areas in low- and middle-income countries, such as China, 
were moving through a rapid nutritional transition towards western-style diets 
dominated by more processed foods and a higher fat content. Increasing urbanization 
also led to equally rapid shifts towards more sedentary occupations through the 
acquisition of new technology and transitions away from an agricultural economy, 
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which may also cause health problems (Van de Poel et al., 2007, Van de Poel et al., 
2009, Van de Poel et al., 2012a).  
 
The total differential decomposition allows us to examine the factors associated with 
inequality. Possible policy implications can be drawn from these results. The 
empirical results suggest that, for the rural population, the young, the better-off, and 
the educated are less likely to suffer from ill health. Similarly, for the urban 
population, income contributes strongly to inequality. Apart from income, 
educational attainment and job status also make a positive contribution to total 
inequalities. The study also finds that, for the urban population, 76.47% to 79.07% 
of inequalities are driven by socioeconomic-related factors. Income, job status and 
educational attainment each appear to have a prominent influence on inequality. For 
the rural population, 48.19% to 77.78% of inequality can be explained by 
socioeconomic-related factors, among which income and educational level are the 
most important factors. These findings are consistent with some of the previous 
studies. The role of income is notable. Wagstaff et al.(2005c)  found that income 
played an important role in child malnutrition in the 1990s in Vietnam. They 
suggested that, although rising incomes reduced malnutrition and hence reduced 
average malnutrition, rising incomes also directly increased relative inequality in 
malnutrition, magnifying the inequality in malnutrition attributable to income 
inequality. As also indicated by the 2008 National Health Service Survey (Centre for 
Health Statistics and Information, 2008), income level was a major determinant of 
health outcomes. Being poor and lacking healthcare coverage often prevented people 
from seeking care (Zhao, 2006). Hence, promoting health equality and providing 
support for the poor and for those with special health needs are important strategies 
for maintaining sustainable development and alleviating poverty. As the present 
study has indicated an urban disadvantage with respect to health inequalities, there is 
certainly a need, if equality in health is to be realized, for better facilities in urban 
areas and to provide the urban poor with support.  
 
The contribution of education is also important. Previous studies found that 
educational level made an important contribution to total inequality, and that its 
effect was even more important in some cases than the “pure income effect”. Anson 
and Sun (2004) suggested that the association between education and income in 
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China resembled the patterns documented in industrial societies. Level of education, 
higher income and occupational status were all significantly related to health. Similar 
results were reported by Costa-i-Font et al.(2008), who examined socioeconomic 
inequalities in obesity and found that education was an important determinant in 
explaining obesity. The possible explanation given by Costa-i-font et al. was that 
education helped to convey unobserved effects such as knowledge transfer, which 
enabled people to be more health-conscious. Meanwhile, the translation of income 
into better living environment and healthy food may be as efficient as other effects 
such as knowledge transfer, presumably identified by the education treatment 
variable(Costa-Font and Gil, 2008). Hence, they suggested that government should 
coordinate a number of policies including promoting or subsidizing knowledge 
communication on healthy life styles. These implications are relevant and applicable 
in the Chinese context. Since physical exercise, healthy diet and sleeping habits may 
have an influence on the behaviour of certain low-income groups that are more 
oriented to unhealthy lifestyles, the prevention of certain unhealthy habits through 
knowledge-related activities directed especially at low-income individuals is likely 
to have desirable effects in reducing income-related inequalities in health (Costa-
Font and Gil, 2008, Zhou et al., 2011).  
 
It is worth pointing out that the healthcare systems in rural and urban areas may also 
affect the inequalities in health outcomes. The gap in distribution of health resources 
between urban and rural areas has been narrowed in the past a few decades, and 
substantial progress has been made in rural areas (World Bank, 1997). For the past 
decade, the Chinese government has been making concerted efforts to build new 
primary and secondary health facilities in rural areas in order to improve access to 
basic medical care (Eggleston et al., 2008). The New Operative Medical Insurance 
Scheme was initiated in 2003 to protect the rural population from disease and ill 
health (Wagstaff et al., 2009b). While in the urban areas, the majority of the urban 
unemployed were not covered by any SHI before 2007. The urban health system, 
despite absorbing a disproportionately large share of total health subsidies, has been 
criticized as plagued by inefficiency and low quality, by an overly concentrated use 
of services on tertiary care and by over-prescribing and over-use of health service, all 
of which may lead to health inequality and other health problems (World Bank, 1997, 
Gu, 2008, Eggleston and Yip, 2004, Yip and Hsiao, 2008a, Yip and Hanson, 2009). 
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These problems may give rise to access and affordability issues, thus influencing the 
population’s health, particularly that of low-income groups. The Chinese 
government has apparently noticed these issues and is in the process of improving its 
healthcare sector in order to tackle inequalities. More primary healthcare facilities 
have been built. New health insurance schemes, such as the New Cooperative 
Medical Insurance Scheme and the Urban Residents Medical Insurance Scheme, 
have been introduced in order to target the rural population and the urban poor 
(Eggleston et al., 2008, Gu, 2008, Yip and Hsiao, 2008a, Yip and Mahal, 2008). The 
government is moving in the right direction to combat inequality, but how well these 
policies have been implemented and how effective they will be is yet to be shown. 
 
This study has its own limitations, although it is among the first to provide evidence 
from China on urban/rural disparity in income-related adult health. The first 
concerns the dataset. The dataset used is probably by far the most comprehensive 
ever used in studying health inequality in the Chinese context; however, only nine 
provinces were included. Most of these provinces are situated in the eastern and 
coastal part of China, where the levels of economic development are high. Hence, 
any further generalization should be made with caution. Another limitation is the 
variables of interest. Self-assessed health variables can be biased because of 
problems in reporting. If reporting differences have influenced the population 
equally, this will not be a problem. However, it is possible that population groups 
may report the variable in a systematically different way. For instance, under-
reporting may be greater in rural than in urban areas. Old people are likely to 
underestimate their health status compared with young people. If this were the case, 
the results shown here might represent an underestimation of inequality in certain 
population groups (Allin et al., 2010). Furthermore, the decomposition analysis of 
health inequality calls for further investigation. Income had a greater contribution in 
self -reported health in urban areas but not in rural areas, and the opposite applied for 
health limitations. Health and income can be recursively determined, and 
instrumental variable can be used to solve the problem. This would require finding a 
good instrument, which has proved to be difficult for the CHNS dataset. 
  
90 
 
4 Horizontal inequity in health service use 
 
China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme and equity in 
access to healthcare6  
 
 
Abstract 
The NCMS was brought to life in 2003 in response to the deterioration in access to 
health services in rural areas. Despite its fast expansion, the scheme’s impacts on 
access to healthcare raises growing concern, in particular regarding whether and to 
what extent the scheme is able to reduce inequity in access to healthcare in rural 
China. This study examines the magnitude and direction of income-related inequity 
in access to healthcare from 2004 (before the national rollout of NCMS) to 2009 
(after the expansion of NCMS across the rural China) by estimating Concentration 
Indices over both formal healthcare (outpatient care, prevention care) and informal 
healthcare use (folk doctor7 care). Data are drawn from a longitudinal household 
survey dataset – the CHNS. The study suggests that the level of inequity remains the 
same for outpatient care, and a widening gap favouring the poor between the poor 
and the rich in terms of folk doctor use is observed. In terms of preventive care, a 
pro-rich inequity was observed both in 2004 and 2009, and the level of inequity 
remained the same throughout the study period. The NCMS demonstrates positive 
effects on reducing income-related health inequity in folk doctor care and preventive 
care, but the contribution is rather small. The study concludes that without a more 
comprehensive insurance package that effectively targets the rural poor, the intended 
equity goals of the scheme will be difficult to realise.  
                                                 
6 This chapter is based upon a published paper at International Journal for Equity in Health (Yang, 
2013) 
7 Folk doctor in the survey refers to health practitioner who has no valid health practitioner license. 
The Chinese version of the term is “Min Jian Yi Sheng”. 
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4.1 Introduction  
Countries across the world are looking to health insurance as a means of ensuring 
access to healthcare and protecting patients from financial risks. Health insurance 
has the potential to lower financial barriers of access to healthcare, since the 
financial risk of healthcare is shared among insurance participants and health cost 
will be reduced at the point of healthcare use (Yip and Berman, 2001). One common 
way to organise insurance is to target its funds to either a group of the population, 
such as the vulnerable/disadvantaged socioeconomic population, or specific services 
that are most cost-effective and/or preferentially benefit the target population, such 
as primary care or outpatient care (Yip and Berman, 2001). 
 
In China, a focus on healthcare for the rural population is gaining increased 
governmental attention in recent years. The government targets its public funds for 
health insurance by focusing on the rural population through the NCMS. Since 
“equitable access” has been officially declared by the State Council to be the 
principal aim of the rural health insurance reform (You and Kobayashi, 2009), the 
main objective of the NCMS is to provide universal coverage and to improve equity 
and access to healthcare to the rural population regardless of individual 
characteristics such as job status, education, pre-existing condition, and level of 
wealth. For the past few decades, the state and enterprise funded health insurance 
only covered well-off urban employees, leaving the majority of the rural residents 
unprotected from health risks (Liu et al., 2012c),  the launch of the NCMS is 
considered as a crucial step in closing the insurance gap and reducing inequity in 
access to healthcare for the rural population.  
 
However, the real world experience actually tells us little about how far public health 
insurance can improve access to healthcare. One major concern is whether the 
insurance is able to reach vulnerable/disadvantaged socioeconomic groups (Liu et al., 
2012c, Watanabe and Hashimoto, 2012, Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). Evidence from 
the developing countries suggest that public voluntary insurance programmes, 
especially the ones that require substantial premiums and patient cost-sharing, may 
have little effects in improving  use of public financed health services of the poor. In 
Iran, despite of the decent development of a few government health insurance 
schemes targeting the poor and catastrophic inpatient care in the last decades, co-
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payments still count for 58% of the health expenditures, and the proportion of people 
facing catastrophic health payment remained high even after the insurance reform 
(Kavosi et al., 2012). In India, the newly developed insurance—Rashtriya Swasthya 
Beema Yojna (RSBY) which aims to target the poor only allowed a limited rate of 
reimbursement for inpatient care. Studies found that expenditures on drugs claims 
which constituted around 75% of OOP payments and 80% of the spending on 
outpatient visits were not covered, and the impacts of the RSBY on  protecting the 
poor against health payment-induced impoverishment were limited (Shahrawat and 
Rao, 2012). 
 
The launch of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) in 2003 
represents a major step of the Chinese government to move towards a more equitable 
and efficient rural health financing system, but it is not clear that the participation in 
the NCMS is sufficient enough to deliver equitable access in different types of 
healthcare. One major concern is that, under the NCMS, healthcare is provided in 
public health facilities through a FFS system, and the reimbursement rates vary by 
different types of care and at different health facilities. Although the NCMS has 
extended its coverage to outpatient care since 2007, its emphasis is mainly on 
“catastrophic outpatient cost", and reimbursement is made either through 
participants' Medical Saving Account or pooled funds which requires substantial 
cost-sharing (Barber and Yao, 2011). Further, the scheme only reimburses drugs 
listed on the National Essential Drug Reimbursement List, services covered by the 
insurance package, and care sought at state-owned public health facilities. Most 
imported and new drugs and high-technology diagnoses procedures are not eligible 
for reimbursement. The claimed reimbursement rates are the highest for care 
delivered at village/township health centres and  the lowest at city/provincial 
hospitals, while care sought at the high level health facilities is usually associated 
with  severe illness and high medical expenditures (Babiarz et al., 2012, Babiarz et 
al., 2010). Consequently, as argued by many scholars, despite the broad coverage, 
co-payments for the NCMS participants in general remained high even after the 
insurance claims were made, and this may impede a subpopulation of the rural poor 
from seeking care (Liu et al., 2012a, Wang et al., 2012b, Wang et al., 2012c, Zhou et 
al., 2011). In terms of outpatient care, scholars argued that the NCMS increased the 
use of outpatient care among the poor at village clinics, whereas the increased use in  
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inpatient care overall and at the higher level health facilities was concentrated 
disproportionately among the rich (Wang et al., 2012a). Liu et al.(2012c) and  Yu et 
al.(2010) also found that the NCMS only increased the use of inpatient care for the 
better-off, whereas it had no significant impact on outpatient use.  
 
While this previous work is important, the investigation on how the NCMS impacts 
the inequity in health use is subjected to very little updated empirical research, which 
is the setting for this paper. Previous studies either limit their investigations to a 
given point in time (Mou et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2012c, Wang et al., 2012a), or a 
specific health service (Zhou et al., 2011). Little information is available on how the 
NCMS impacts the use of preventive care and folk doctor care in different 
socioeconomic groups, although the impact of the NCMS on inpatient use has 
discussed in a number of studies(Babiarz et al., 2012). Further, the NCMS was 
implemented one decade ago, but it is still not clear whether the scheme has any 
impact on utilisation. If it were, as the reimbursement rates of the NCMS are set at 
different levels for different services, it is worth investigating how it affects the 
patterns of utilisation for different socioeconomic groups, and whether differential 
pattern in use for different socioeconomic groups is a generalised phenomenon, or is 
only for some services.  
 
I hypothesize that the expansion of the NCMS does not necessarily lead to equitable 
access to care. The launch of the NCMS is a means of improving the equitable 
access to formal care and discouraging the use of informal care/folk doctor care. 
Folk doctor care is not covered by the insurance scheme, whereas outpatient and 
inpatient care are included in the insurance package. Since the reimbursement rate 
set for formal care is relatively low, co-payments is likely to become one of the 
barriers to impede access to formal care among the poor. The NCMS may have 
positive impacts on reducing the use of informal care; however, these impacts may 
be limited since unmet health need may still lead to use of informal care, which is 
less costly and widely accessible compared with formal care. Second, the NCMS 
may also exert some positive influences on use of preventive care, which historically 
requires more cost-sharing and is now partially covered by the NCMS (e.g. general 
physical examination, blood pressure screening, and prenatal examination). As the 
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co-payments are still high, preventive care use may still appear to be concentrated 
among the rich, but the level of inequity may become less pronounced. 
 
This paper measures the extent to which the NCMS affects healthcare utilisation on 
the rural population in China, considering two types of formal healthcare (outpatient 
care and prevention care), and one type of informal healthcare (folk doctor care). 
This paper first compares the magnitude of inequities in health use in 2004 (before 
the national rollout of NCMS) and 2009 (after the expansion of NCMS across the 
rural China). The Concentration Indices for utilisation, which compares the 
cumulative distribution of health use with the cumulative distribution of the 
population ranked by individual wealth, is used (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Kakwani et 
al., 1997). It then investigates the determinants of patterns of healthcare use and the 
characteristics of the users for different services, taking into account the contribution 
of the NCMS to equity in health use. Data are drawn from China Health and 
Nutrition Survey 2004 and 2009.  
 
The subsequent sections discuss methods, study results, policy implications and 
conclusions. 
 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Data source and variable specifications 
This chapter uses the CHNS. Please refer to Chapter 1 Section 1.5.1 for a detailed 
description of the dataset. The waves used in this study are 2004 and 2009. CHNS is 
a representative sample for population dwelling in the surveyed provinces. The rural 
sample totals 5,361 observations in 2004 and 5,232 observations in 2009. The 
analysis included 4,351 observations in 2004 and 3,919 observations in 2009 after 
dropping observations under 18 and with missing data.  
 
Dependent variables 
Formal (outpatient care, prevention care) and informal healthcare use (folk doctor 
care) are analysed for the likelihood of a visit (no visits versus one or more visits). 
Specific questions are as follows: for outpatient care variable, respondents were 
asked: “Have you sought outpatient care during the past 4 weeks? 0 No, 1 Yes, and 9 
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Unknown”.  For the prevention care variable, respondents were asked: “During the 
past 4 weeks, did you receive any preventive health service, such as health 
examination, eye examination, blood test, blood pressure screening, tumour 
screening? 0 No, 1 Yes, and 9 Unknown”.  For the folk doctor care variable, 
respondents were asked: “Did you visit a folk doctor last year? 0 No, 1 Yes, and 9 
Unknown”.  In terms of missing variables for health variables, there is no missing 
value for outpatient use and preventive care use (binary variable). There were 33 
missing values in 2004 and 1 missing value in 2009 with regard to the question of 
folk doctor use. This missingness is a tiny fraction (0.0046%) of the total sample (N 
= 8720), which can be considered as in the error term.  
 
Independent variables 
Per capita income data are used as the measurement of living standard. Please refer 
to Section 3.2 for how per capita income is calculated. Need variables are age, split 
into four categories (18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 and above), gender, and 
morbidity types split into two categories (major illness, minor illness and others) 
(Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez Rubio, 2009, Gravelle et al., 2006). Need 
variables are also measured by asking whether the respondent has been ill or injured 
during the past 4 weeks.  
 
Non-need/socioeconomic variables included are education, occupations, marital 
status, insurance types, urban/rural residency, and provinces of residency. Education 
is categorized into four groups: no education, primary and secondary education, high 
school and technical school education, and university education and above. 
University education and above is used as the reference group. Occupations are 
categorized into four groups: white collars/professionals, unskilled 
workers/agricultures, unemployed, and other. For the province variable, province 
Guizhou is set as the reference group. Whether the respondent is classed as urban or 
rural is based on his/her registration status (Hukou). Finally, insurance coverage is 
included as a non-need/socioeconomic variable.  
 
The CHNS did not distinguish between old CMS and the current NCMS before wave 
2009, although the NCMS was initiated in 2003. It initially creates difficulties for the 
analysis because it is difficult to know whether the person is enrolled in the new 
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scheme (the NCMS) or the old one (the CMS). Luckily, confidential data from the 
community level from the CHNS is available. In the community level questionnaire, 
government officials from each community was asked whether the CMS had been 
implemented in their community, and if so, starting date was asked. Knowing that 
NCMS was first implemented in 2003, it was clear that the communities joined the 
rural cooperative scheme after 2003 were actually covered by the NCMS. After 
distinguishing between the old CMS and the current NCMS at the community level, 
it is easy to make the same distinction at the individual level. If an individual reports 
participating in the CMS and is at the same time living in a community that has 
participated in the NCMS, we define this individual as having participated in the 
NCMS. Similarly, if an individual reports participating in the CMS and is at the 
same time living in a community that has participated in the CMS, we define this 
individual as having participated in the old CMS. The same strategy for identifying 
the NCMS participants from the CHNS data was adopted by Lei and Lin (Lei and 
Lin, 2009).   
 
A summary of dependent and independent variables are listed in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard 
deviation) 
    2004 
(N = 4351) 
2009 
(N = 3919) 
Variable Definition Mea
n 
S.D. Mea
n 
S.D. 
Health use 
variables 
          
Outpatient use Dummy variable: 1, outpatient use ; 0 
otherwise 
0.111 0.314 0.116 0.320 
Folk doctor use Dummy variable: 1, folk doctor use ; 0 
otherwise 
0.033 0.179 0.050 0.218 
Preventive care 
use 
Dummy variable: 1, Preventive  care use ; 0 
otherwise 
0.030 0.170 0.035 0.184 
Health needs 
variables 
          
18-29 (Ref) Dummy variable: 1, aged between 18-29; 0 
otherwise. 
0.122 0.328 0.098 0.297 
30-44 Dummy variable: 1, aged between 30-44; 0 
otherwise. 
0.333 0.471 0.310 0.462 
45-64 Dummy variable: 1, aged between 45-64; 0 
otherwise. 
0.447 0.497 0.469 0.499 
65 and above Dummy variable: 1, aged between 65 and 
above; 0 otherwise. 
0.097 0.296 0.124 0.329 
Gender (Ref = 
male) 
Dummy variable: 1, male; 0 female 0.499 0.500 0.506 0.500 
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No symptoms Dummy variable: 1, no symtons ; 0 otherwise 0.784 0.412 0.801 0.400 
Minor Illness Dummy variable: 1, minor illness ; 0 otherwise 0.152 0.359 0.137 0.344 
Major illness 
(Ref) 
Dummy variable: 1, major illness ; 0 otherwise 0.064 0.245 0.062 0.242 
4 week illness Dummy variable: 1, having been illness for the 
past 4 weeks  ; 0 otherwise 
0.153 0.360 0.148 0.355 
Socioeconomic 
variables 
          
Per capita 
income 
Per capita household income inflated to 2009 4787.
057 
5004.
990 
9996.
772 
11817
.190 
No insurance 
(Ref) 
Dummy variable: 1, no insurance ; 0 otherwise 0.888 0.315 0.067 0.250 
NCMS Dummy variable: 1, NCMS ; 0 otherwise 0.041 0.197 0.875 0.331 
Marital Status  Dummy variable: 1 married, 0 otherwise 0.874 0.332 0.883 0.321 
White 
collar/skilled 
(Ref) 
Dummy variable: 1 white collar or skilled 
worker, 0 otherwise 
0.065 0.246 0.072 0.258 
Unskilled/farme
r 
Dummy variable: 1 unskilled worker or farmer, 
0 otherwise 
0.617 0.486 0.691 0.462 
Other job Dummy variable: 1 other jobs, 0 otherwise 0.021 0.143 0.029 0.169 
Unemployed Dummy variable: 1 Unemployed, 0 otherwise 0.225 0.418 0.207 0.405 
No edu Dummy variable: 1 no education; 0 otherwise 0.216 0.412 0.240 0.427 
Pri and sec edu Dummy variable: 1 primary and secondary 
education; 0 otherwise 
0.628 0.483 0.604 0.489 
High school Dummy variable: 1 high school and technical 
school education; 0 otherwise 
0.139 0.346 0.128 0.334 
Uni and above 
(Ref) 
Dummy variable: 1 university education and 
above; 0 otherwise 
0.017 0.129 0.028 0.164 
Province 
Liaoning 
Dummy variable: 1 Liaoning, 0 otherwise 0.123 0.329 0.119 0.323 
Province 
Heilongjiang 
Dummy variable: 1 Heilongjiang, 0 otherwise 0.099 0.299 0.110 0.312 
Province 
Jiangsu 
Dummy variable: 1 Jiangsu, 0 otherwise 0.126 0.332 0.121 0.326 
Province 
Shandong 
Dummy variable: 1 Shandong, 0 otherwise 0.108 0.310 0.111 0.315 
Province Henan Dummy variable: 1 Henan, 0 otherwise 0.099 0.298 0.100 0.300 
Province Hubei Dummy variable: 1 Hubei, 0 otherwise 0.103 0.304 0.107 0.310 
Province Hunan Dummy variable: 1 Hunan, 0 otherwise 0.085 0.279 0.090 0.286 
Province 
Guangxi 
Dummy variable: 1 Guangxi, 0 otherwise 0.124 0.330 0.133 0.339 
Province 
Guizhou  (Ref) 
Dummy variable: 1 Guizhou, 0 otherwise 0.132 0.339 0.110 0.312 
Note: Ref = reference groups. Per capita household income is inflated to year 2009 using consumer 
price index. 
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4.3.2 Statistical analysis 
Income-related inequity in health is estimated by pooled Probit Model and well-
established methods based on the Concentration Indices (Hernandez Quevedo and 
Jimenez Rubio, 2009, O'Donnell et al., 2008b). The methods used in this chapter are 
similar with the ones used in the previous chapter. The methods involve three basic 
steps: (1) estimate pooled Probit Models on the determinants of health use, and  
predict need (indirectly) standardized health for each health variable, and for each 
year separately; the computation of variance inflation factors (VIF) indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a problem. Ramsy RESET tests are performed, and results 
show the models have no specification problems; (2) calculate the Concentration 
Indices for actual use EI (the inequity driven by the actual healthcare utilisation), the 
horizontal equity indices HI (the inequity driven by socioeconomic factors); (3) 
decompose the socioeconomic factors that contribute to the inequities for the each 
year to see whether contributions have changed over time.  
 
Again, the nature of the health use variables (binary variables) formally calls for a 
non-linear estimation, but for the purpose of convenience and consistency, this study 
uses Linear Probability Model (LPM) to calculate the Concentration Indices and 
Decomposition Analysis (please refer to Section 3.2 for the detailed explanation of 
why LPM is chosen instead of using Probit Modelling for the analysis). Erreygers’s 
Concentration Index will be used to calculate the inequity in health use (Erreygers, 
2009, Wagstaff, 2009a, Costa-Font and Gil, 2008, Van de Poel et al., 2007).  
 
Need standardisation, Concentration Indices, and Decomposition Analysis 
Equitable distribution of health is a principle used in many legislation or official 
policy documents in many countries. Attention has been given to the horizontal 
equity principle, which is defined as “equal treatment for equal medical needs, 
irrespective of other characteristics such as income, race, place of residence, etc” 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008b). In practice, in order to examine the extent to which the 
horizontal equity principle is violated, we need to observe differential utilization 
patterns across individual with different states of need. This can be done in much the 
same way as the standardization methods used in Paper 1, Section 3.2.2. Specifically, 
if we are interested in establishing whether there is differential utilization by income 
after standardizing for health need in relation to income, we can use expected 
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utilization, given characteristics such as age, gender, and measures of health status, 
as a proxy for health need. Using equation (1) in Section 3.2.2,  
(1) izi
k
kji
j
ji zxy     
 
we assume that
jx are the health need variables, i.e., age, sex and other health status 
variables, kz are non-need/socioeconomic variables, i.e., (the logarithm of) income, 
education, job status, provinces of residence, urban/rural, ,marital status, ,, and
are the parameter vectors, and is the error term.  
 
The coefficients from OLS estimations are obtained from actual values of the
jx
variables, which are to be standardized for, and from the sample mean for kz
variables, which are not to be standardized, but to be controlled for. The predicted 
values of health indicator X
iyˆ  are then obtained.  
(2) 
zi
k
kji
j
j
X
i zxy    ˆˆˆˆ  
 
Assuming a linear model, estimates of indirectly standardized health ŷi IS can be 
obtained by calculating the difference between actual health ( iy ) and standardized 
health (ŷiX), plus the sample mean ( y ) 
(3) yyyy
X
ii
IS
i  ˆˆ  
Rearranging the equation (3),  
(4)  )(ˆˆ jji
j
ji
IS
i xxyy    
 
 
The results generated by Equation (4) shows the standardization that subtracts the 
variation of health use driven by health need factors from actual health use. 
Therefore, the distribution of health use across income can be interpreted as the 
health use that an individual would expect to be observed, irrespective of differences 
in the distribution of the characteristics associated with health needs. Erregyers’s 
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Concentration Indices and Decomposition Analysis are carried out following the 
standardization.  
 
4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics  
Some differences in healthcare use are observed across years. Table 4.1 compares 
the share of healthcare use by years. Results show that the use of outpatient care 
remained the same between 2004 and 2009, while the use of folk doctor care had 
increased and the use of preventive care had decreased from 2004 to 2009.  
 
A significant increase in insurance coverage is observed. In 2004, 88.8% of the rural 
Chinese were not covered by any insurance; the percentage decreased to 6.7% in 
2009. In the meantime, a significant increase in terms of the coverage of NCMS was 
observed from 2004 to 2009. In 2004, only 4.0% of the rural Chinese were covered 
by NCMS, the percentage increased to 87.5% in 2009.  
 
4.3.2 Determinats of individual healthcare use 
Table 4.2 presents the the estimations of the determinants: the maximum-liklihood 
marginal effects of Probit Model.  
 
Results of the Probit regiression (Table 4.2) suggest that, ceteris paribus, the use of 
outpatient care is found to be associated with need factors and place of residence. 
Female, those who are with major illness or have been ill or injuried for the past 4 
weeks are more likely to use outpatient care.  Folk doctor care is associated with 
people aged 30 and above, as well as people with major illness. It is also worth 
pointing out that those who are covered by the NCMS and other insurance are less 
likely to use folk doctor care compared with the unsured.  
 
In terms of preventive care, income is significantly associated with the use of 
preventive care. Unskilled and agricultural workers are less likely to use preventive 
care compared with white collars and skill workers. People with no education, 
primary and secondary education, and high school education are less likely to use 
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preventive care compared with people with university education or above. No 
siginificant assocation is observed in terms of the NCMS and preventive care use. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Determinants of health service use (Random effect probit and pooled 
probit models) 
  Outpatient care Folk doctor care Preventive care 
  
Random 
effect 
Probit 
Pooled 
probit 
Random 
effect 
Probit 
Pooled 
probit 
Random 
effect 
Probit 
Pooled 
probit 
30-44 0.014 0.011 0.371*** 0.36*** -0.124 -0.124 
45-64 0.068 0.064 0.332*** 0.323*** -0.239** -0.239** 
65 and above 0.138 0.129 0.422*** 0.409*** -0.179 -0.179 
Gender (1 = male) -0.151** -0.14** -0.018 -0.016 -0.134** -0.134* 
No symptoms -2.538*** -2.409*** -0.493*** -0.479*** -0.565*** -0.565*** 
Minor Illness 0.005 -0.002 -0.118 -0.116 -0.3** -0.3** 
4 week illness 0.76*** 0.719*** 0.213** 0.207* 0.276** 0.276** 
Per capita income 
(lg) 0.048 0.045 -0.004 -0.005 0.073 0.073* 
NCMS -0.003 0.004 -0.228* -0.22** 0.134 0.134 
Marital Status (1 = 
married) 0.012 0.015 0.09 0.087 0.129 0.129 
Unskilled and 
agriculture -0.157 -0.145 0.108 0.106 -0.258* -0.258** 
Other job -0.129 -0.112 -0.085 -0.082 -0.192 -0.192 
Unemployed -0.217 -0.201 0.209 0.205 -0.044 -0.044 
No edu -0.145 -0.14 0.248 0.242 -0.428 -0.428 
Pri and sec edu -0.104 -0.101 0.157 0.153 -0.348 -0.348 
High school -0.319 -0.303 0.165 0.163 -0.334 -0.334 
Province Liaoning -0.268* -0.252* -0.449*** -0.436*** 0.027 0.027 
Province 
Heilongjiang -0.222 -0.212 -0.937*** -0.908*** -0.332 -0.332 
Province Jiangsu 0.072 0.069 -0.471*** -0.455*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 
Province Shandong 0.115 0.107 -0.056 -0.054 0.5*** 0.5*** 
Province Henan 0.343** 0.326*** 0.079 0.077 0.157 0.157 
Province Hubei 0.092 0.086 -0.521*** -0.504*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
Province Hunan -0.134 -0.13 -0.145 -0.14 0.017 0.017 
Province Guangxi 0.255** 0.243** 0.135 0.131 0.279* 0.279* 
2009 0.161 0.147 0.413*** 0.4*** -0.033 -0.033 
Constant -0.684 -0.639 -2.027*** -1.962*** -1.946*** -1.947*** 
              
N 8270 8270 8270 8270 8270 8270 
Wald Chi2 155.93 1596.86 141.48 216.84 154.27 191.75 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0   
Pseudo R2   0.5929   0.0987   0.101 
 
Note: Reference groups are indicated in Table 4.2. Per capita household income is inflated to year 
2009 using consumer price index. 
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4.4.3 Equity in healthcare use 
Table 4.3 provides need-adjusted and unadjusted health use by income quintiles. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the Erreygers’s Concentration Index (EI). For each 
healthcare type, the table provides an index of socioeconomic inequity in use (EI), 
indicating the level of inequity of actual health use, and horizontal inequity (HI), 
indicating the level of inequity driven only by individual’s socioeconomic status. 
Confidence intervals are calculated using bootstrapping methods.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the prevalence of healthcare use by income quintiles with adjusted 
and unadjusted needs by years. Outpatient care is equally distributed among all 
income groups in 2004 and 2009. However, the use of folk doctor is more 
concentrated among the low income groups, and the use of preventive care is more 
concentrated among the high income groups, even after controlling for needs. 
 
Table 4.3 Health service use by income quintiles (Linear Probability Model) 
      Poorest 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 
Outpatient use 2004 Unadjusted 11.85% 10.58% 9.62% 10.78% 12.09% 
    Need-adjusted 11.33% 10.98% 10.10% 11.74% 12.05% 
  2009 Unadjusted 12.42% 10.73% 10.98% 10.63% 12.46% 
    Need-adjusted 11.24% 11.14% 11.61% 10.81% 10.81% 
Folk doctor use 2004 Unadjusted 3.96% 4.16% 4.19% 2.78% 1.93% 
    Need-adjusted 3.59% 3.91% 3.95% 2.62% 1.70% 
  2009 Unadjusted 5.86% 7.43% 3.87% 4.51% 3.77% 
    Need-adjusted 5.32% 7.12% 3.65% 4.38% 3.31% 
Preventive care use 2004 Unadjusted 1.50% 2.21% 2.30% 3.22% 5.72% 
    Need-adjusted 1.48% 2.39% 2.51% 3.36% 5.69% 
  2009 Unadjusted 1.99% 2.69% 3.69% 3.79% 5.29% 
    Need-adjusted 2.03% 2.88% 3.90% 4.11% 5.25% 
 
In terms of the inequity indices, a favouring-poor inequity is observed for outpatient 
care; however, both indices are not significant at 0.05 significant level. This means 
that there is not any inequity in term of outpatient use across income groups because 
the indices are not different from 0.  
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However, favouring-poor inequities are seen across income groups for folk doctor 
use. Both the EI and HI indices show that the level of inequities has increased from 
2004 to 2009. All indices are significant at 0.05 significant level. This means that the 
poor are more likely to visit folk doctor compared with the better-off, and the 
inequity effects have increased.  
 
In terms of preventive care, a favouring-rich inequity is observed for both 2004 and 
2009. However, it is worth pointing out that EI for preventive care was 0.032 in 
2004 and 0.025 in 2009; HI were 0.032 in 2004 and 0.025 in 2009. However, the 
indices for HI are similar to EI, meaning that most of the inequities were driven by 
socioeconomic factors.  However, by looking at the confidence interval, there is 
almost no significant difference between the index of 2004 and that of 2009. Hence, 
it should be concluded that the inequity level of preventive care use remain the same 
across the reform period.  
 
Table 4.4 Socioeconomic Concentration Indices by Linear Probability Model 
(Erreygers’s Concentration Index) 
 
    2004 2009 
Outpatient care EI 0.001 -0.001 
  Confidence Interval (-0.022, 0.024) (-0.025, 0.023) 
  HI  0.006 -0.004 
  Confidence Interval (-0.011, 0.022) (-0.02, 0.012) 
Folk doctor care EI -0.018 -0.024 
  Confidence Interval (-0.031, -0.006) (-0.041, -0.006) 
  HI  -0.017 -0.022 
  Confidence Interval (-0.029, -0.004) (-0.04, -0.005) 
Preventive care EI 0.032 0.025 
  Confidence Interval (0.019, 0.044) (0.013, 0.038) 
  HI  0.032 0.025 
  Confidence Interval (0.019, 0.044) (0.013, 0.038) 
 
Note: EI represents Inequity Indices for actual use, HI represents Horizontal Inequity. Confidence 
interval is set at 0.05 significance level. 
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4.4.4 Decomposition analysis 
Figure 4.1 presents the results of the decomposition analysis, depicting the 
contribution of income-related health inequity from both need and socioeconomic 
factors. 
Results from decomposition analysis confirm with the previous findings. In general, 
inequities in health use, i.e. folk doctor care and preventive care, were mostly driven 
by non-need or socioeconomic factors. For folk doctor care, those with lower 
socioeconomic status were more likely to seek folk doctor care compared with the 
rich. For preventive care, those with higher socioeconomic status were more likely to 
seek folk doctor care compared with the rich. The contribution of NCMS to reduce 
the inequities in health care use was limited.  
Figure 4.1 Components of Erreygers’s Concentration Indices in the probability 
of health service use (Linear Probability Model) 
 
 
 
Note: LPM is used as the regression model in the decomposition analysis. Results from Probit 
modelling does not differ much from LPM.  
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4.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The study reveals a mixed picture in terms of the variation of healthcare utilisation 
and how the NCMS has influenced the level of inequity. Although the data used in 
this study represent only two points in time, it covers the whole period of the 
expansion of the NCMS from 2004 (before the national rollout of NCMS) and 2009 
(after the expansion of NCMS across the rural China). The study finds that the level 
of inequity remains the same for outpatient care. In terms of preventive care, a pro-
rich inequity was observed both in 2004 and 2009, and the level of inequity had 
remained the same throughout the study period. However, a widening gap between 
the poor and the rich in terms of folk doctor use is observed, with the poor being 
more likely to use these services.  
 
Decomposition analysis shows that the NCMS reduces income-related health 
inequity in folk doctor care and preventive care, but the contribution is rather limited. 
Other socioeconomic factors including income have contributed positively to 
inequity in health use.  
 
The findings are consistent with some of the previous research. Zhou et al.(2011) 
suggested that inpatient care use was concentrated among the better-off, but the 
inequity indices decreased from 0.224 in 2003 to 0.115 in 2008. In terms of 
outpatient care use for mid-aged and elderly people, Wang et al. (2012c) found that 
in more affluent provinces like Zhejiang, outpatient use was concentrated among the 
better-off, while in provinces with low economic development, such as Gansu, use of 
healthcare was equally distributed across income groups. The study also suggested 
that this may be because of the difference in terms of healthcare provision and 
coverage of insurance between these two provinces. In terms of folk doctor care, the 
growing inequity between the rich and the poor is troubling, and such a problem is 
particularly severe for low income groups. Similar findings were demonstrated in 
studies conducted in other developing countries. These studies suggested that 
demand of lower social classes for care was highly price-elastic and usually 
exceeded that of the rich (James et al., 2006, Pokhrel et al., 2005, Sauerborn et al., 
1994). Hence, the poor were more likely to use more informal and less qualified 
providers, or resorted to self-treatment when they were ill (Okeke and Okeibunor, 
2010).  
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To compare the level of inequity in health use of China with other countries, Van de 
Poel et al.(2012b) showed that the Erregyers’ Concentration Indices of all healthcare 
use was 0.1 in India, 0.018 in Malaysia and 0.018 in Bangladesh, which seemed 
comparable with the indices from China. This suggested that, in a comparative sense, 
China was in a similar level of equity in health utilisation as other low- and middle-
income countries.  
 
The study has a few policy implications. The extension of the NCMS coverage 
reduces inequitable access in formal care, but does not eliminate them. One 
important constraint of the NCMS is the low reimbursement rate and the high co-
payment at visit. Reported average reimbursement rate for outpatient care under the 
NCMS was only approximately 10% (Barber and Yao, 2011); it is argued that even 
though OOP payments for outpatient care may be easy to cope with in a short term, a 
large amount of outpatient costs in aggregate may still be excessively high from a 
social standpoint and may have substantial effects on household (Shahrawat and Rao, 
2012). Similarly, the use of preventive care is unequally distributed and related to the 
unequal distribution of income level. A more comprehensive coverage in terms of 
outpatient care and preventive care is needed because outpatient care is the most 
commonly used for effective and efficient treatment for many health problems, 
especially chronic diseases, and preventive care is equally important in terms of 
allowing for early detection of diseases.  
 
The NCMS aimed to achieve equity in the contribution through co-payments 
regardless of income levels of the participants; however, among the NCMS 
participants, there existed a wide gap in financial status. Low income participants are 
already burdened with a premium, while substantial co-payments due to the limited 
coverage further aggravate HI in healthcare access (Zhang et al., 2010a). A possible 
solution is to implement well-designed and regulated health insurance with 
comprehensive coverage to provide the low income participants with better financial 
protection. Successful examples include Universal Coverage Scheme of Thailand 
and Seguro Popular of Mexico for the poor and uninsured (Somkotra and Lagrada, 
2008, Li et al., 2011, Knaul and Frenk, 2005).  
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The study has a few limitations. The first concern is the dataset. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, only nine provinces are included; hence, any further generalization should 
be made with caution. As all the survey information is self-reported, this can be 
biased because of problems in reporting (e.g. inaccurate recall, misreporting). 
Second, the difference between what is officially called informal care and what 
happens in practice needs further refinement in future studies. In this dataset, all 
informal care providers are evaluated at the same standard, and are specified as “folk 
doctor care”; however, it is possible that folk doctor use may relate to the use of 
traditional Chinese medicines and healer, which are widely accepted and even 
recommended in some medical settings (Harmsworth and Lewith, 2001, Howes and 
Houghton, 2003, Xu et al., 2006). Therefore, the dataset needs further refinement in 
the definition of folk doctor care in order to make inference on equity of use.  
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5 Catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced 
poverty 
 
Catastrophic outpatient health payments and health 
payment-induced poverty under China's New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme8 
 
 
Abstract 
The Chinese government initiated a government-subsidised voluntary insurance 
programme for its rural population in 2003—the NCMS. The main objective of the 
programme is to provide the rural Chinese population with financial protection 
against health risks and to improve equity and access to healthcare in rural China. 
The NCMS started to partly reimburse catastrophic outpatient care in 2007 but rural 
Chinese households still incur substantial OOP payments. These payments are likely 
to disrupt the material living standards of the household, and in extreme cases, lead 
to health payment-induced poverty. This paper seeks to examine the impacts of the 
NCMS on catastrophic health payment and health payment-induced poverty in 
outpatient care by comparing the differences of health payments before and after the 
NCMS reimbursement. Using an individual level dataset of 1,846 rural Chinese 
households—China Health and Nutrition Survey of 2009, this paper measures OOP 
payments by using two threshold approaches, one requiring that payments do not 
exceed a pre-specified proportion of income, the other requiring that payments do 
not drive households into poverty. Concentration Indices are adapted to measure the 
extent to which health payments are distributed across income groups. The study 
finds that the NCMS has limited effects on reducing the likelihood of catastrophic 
payments or health payment-induced poverty. The economic burden of OOP 
payments for healthcare is concentrated disproportionately among the less wealthy 
households. The study concludes  that a heavy burden of OOP payment has become 
a poverty trap for poor households; hence calling for a more comprehensive and 
effective insurance package.   
                                                 
8 This chapter is based upon a paper that is under review by Applied Economic Perspectives & Policy. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In most low- and middle-income countries with relatively limited healthcare cost 
prepayment mechanisms, e.g. health insurance, healthcare financing still largely 
relies on direct payments, often known as OOP payments. OOP payments have a few 
main economic consequences. They may impede people from receiving the care they 
need or encourage them to postpone the use of care; when the payments increase to a 
particular level, they may become a source of financial hardship that forces 
individuals or households to cut back their daily expenses and consumption, sell 
assets, or, worst of all, trap them in long-term debt (Kavosi et al., 2012, Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2007). Such direct costs are defined as “catastrophic” if they 
“exceed some fraction of household income or total expenditure in a given period” 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008, Kavosi et al., 2012, Pradhan 
and Prescott, 2002, Xu et al., 2007a, Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). 
 
Catastrophic payment is a global problem—150 million people face financial 
catastrophe each year because of OOP payments, among whom approximately 90% 
live in low-income countries (Xu et al., 2007a, Shahrawat and Rao, 2012). China, 
just like its Southeast Asian counterparts—India and Vietnam, has a high burden of 
OOP payments. OOP payments for healthcare increased from 21.65% in 1982 to 
39.81% in 1992, and to 57.72% in 2002. In a 2008 National Health Survey, average 
per episode cost for an inpatient visit involved OOP payments equivalent to 
approximately 52.69% of annual per capita household expenditure (Centre for health 
and information, 2008). Consequently, an increasing number of the Chinese 
population cannot afford healthcare services. In 1993, around 5.2% of the Chinese 
people reported that they could not afford outpatient care when they were sick. This 
percentage increased to 13.8% in 1998 and to 18.7% in 2008 (Gu, 2008).  
 
As argued by many health economists, OOP payments are the most inequitable 
source of health financing. One concept of fairness in health financing is that 
households should be protected from economic burdens of illness, and the risks of 
such burdens should be shared by the society (Wagstaff, 2007b, Somkotra and 
Lagrada, 2008). Several developing countries, such as Thailand, Iran and India, have 
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introduced government-subsidised social health insurance programmes to ensure 
equitable healthcare financing. While in some countries, insurance yields compelling 
results (Somkotra and Lagrada, 2008, Tangcharoensathien et al., 2007), in others,  
the effectiveness of these programmes in achieving equitable financing is unclear 
(Shahrawat and Rao, 2012).   
 
In China in 2003, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was 
launched in response to the dismantling of the old Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(CMS) in the 1980s and the dire health needs of the rural population. The launch of 
the programme represents a major step of the Chinese government to move towards 
a more equitable and efficient rural health financing system. The NCMS is a 
voluntary health insurance program subsidised by the central government and 
administered by county-level governments. The main objective of NCMS is to 
provide financial protection and to improve equity and access to healthcare to the 
rural population regardless of individual characteristics such as gender, job status, 
education, pre-existing conditions, and level of wealth.  According to the 2012 
Report on the work of the Chinese Government, the scheme had covered 832 million 
rural residents, or 97.5% of Chinese farmers by 2012; government contributions to 
insurance premiums increased from 10RMB (US$1.21) in 2003 to 
240RMB(US$30.02) in 2012; and insurance packages expanded from covering 
mainly catastrophic illness to outpatient and preventive care (Xinhua, 2012b).  
 
Despite its rapid expansion, studies thus far have yielded mixed reviews of the 
performance of the NCMS around a number of key criteria. Scholars have argued 
that the NCMS was not able to provide adequate financial protections for rural 
households, and thus called for a more generous package . A 2004 WHO report 
suggested that the NCMS overly emphasized medical catastrophe at the expense of 
the health needs of the majority of the rural population because the number of 
farmers falling into poverty due to medical expenses was likely to be small (World 
Health Organization, 2004b).  The NCMS may also inflate medical costs at lower 
levels of health services hierarchy that tend to over-prescribe for patients covered by 
NCMS (Sun et al., 2009a, Sun et al., 2009b).  
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However, findings are not always consistent; other scholars praised the achievements 
of the scheme. Wagstaff et al. (2009a) reported a decrease in medical expenditure 
after the introduction of the NCMS for those covered by the NCMS. Tan and Zhong 
(2010) and Babiarz et al.(2012) found that the NCMS successfully lowered OOP 
payment levels and protected households against financial risks by reducing the 
spending by patients with catastrophic illness. Zhang et al.(2010a) also suggested 
that in terms of inpatient care, the NCMS helped relieve the financial burden on the 
household, especially those who were in low income groups.  
 
Although previous work has started to build a picture of the effectiveness of the 
NCMS in reducing OOP payments, current understanding of the true effects of 
NCMS on the costs of healthcare in rural areas remains limited. For instance, the 
NCMS was originally designed to cover catastrophic inpatient care, but by 2007, 
most counties had expanded the benefit package beyond inpatient care to outpatient 
services (Babiarz et al., 2010). However, almost none of the existing studies have 
empirically assessed the impacts of NCMS on outpatient care, which is considered 
the most frequently used and accessible healthcare source in rural China. Second, 
although under the current rural health system, patients are able to seek care in any 
health facility, many counties encourage local spending by lowering minimum 
spending levels or by offering higher reimbursement rates at local facilities, such as 
village clinics and township health centres (Babiarz et al., 2012, Brown and 
Theoharides, 2009). Previous studies tend not to perform analysis on aggregated 
costs at different levels of health facilities, even though reimbursement rates are set 
differently at different health facilities, and this may lead to inaccurate estimations 
(Sun et al., 2009a, Ma et al., 2012).  
 
In terms of methodology, existing studies mainly focus their investigations on 
absolute reduction of OOP payments, whereas the investigation of payments-to-
income ratio is largely limited (Babiarz et al., 2012, Babiarz et al., 2010, Lei and Lin, 
2009). Consider two households with the same level of OOP payments. If one 
household has a high household income, whereas the other is below the poverty line, 
the impact of OOP payments on these two households cannot be sufficiently 
reflected in the actual amount of OOP payments, which is the same for the both 
households. Paying for healthcare has for too long been taken as synonymous with 
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willingness and ATP, but little is known on how much the OOP payments for 
healthcare have placed a burden on less wealthy households, and how well the 
NCMS is able to protect severely economically constrained households. The 
investigation of the effectiveness of insurance in reducing health payment-induced 
poverty should have a more prominent place in policy evaluations. OOP payments 
for healthcare may drive households into poverty, or deepen the poverty gap for 
those who are already poor (Whitehead et al., 2001, Kavosi et al., 2012, Shahrawat 
and Rao, 2012, Werner, 2009). Such an investigation is of significant importance in 
the context of China where ill health has already become one of the leading causes of 
household impoverishment (Whitehead et al., 2001).  
 
This study seeks to answer a few salient research questions related to the 
effectiveness of the NCMS on reducing catastrophic outpatient costs. Using an 
individual level dataset – China Health and Nutrition Survey 2009, this paper 
measures outpatient payments by using two threshold approaches, one requiring that 
the payments do not exceed a pre-specified proportion of income, the other requiring 
that the payments do not drive households into poverty. Specifically, this paper 
compares the differences in the incidence and severity of catastrophic health 
payments and health payment-induced poverty in outpatient care before and after the 
introduction of NCMS reimbursements. Concentration Indices are used to measure 
the distribution sensitivity of catastrophic payments (O'Donnell et al., 2008b). This 
study assesses households having at least one member with a chronic condition, and 
care being sought at village and township level heath facilities.  
 
The empirical results derived from this study are expected to provide valuable 
insights for policy makers. In particular, I am concerned that the actual outcomes of 
the NCMS may be contrary to the stated objectives of the insurance scheme. 
Although the NCMS has extended its package to outpatient care, its benefit package 
is far from comprehensive. The NCMS still requires substantial contributions 
through private financing from individuals, via OOP payments. Given that outpatient 
care has proven to be expensive, with low reimbursement rates, such costs may pose 
obvious threats to households. The empirical results show that the incidence and 
severity of catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced poverty remain 
almost constant after the insurance reimbursements were made. Second, while there 
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exists a wide gap in health needs as well as financial status among the NCMS 
participants, the scheme requires  the  same premium to be paid, and offers the same 
benefit package to all participants. The effects of the NCMS on reducing inequity in 
catastrophic payments and health payment-induced poverty will therefore be limited. 
Empirical results confirm that OOP payments are concentrated disproportionately 
among the poor and those with greater health needs because their abilities to secure 
health services are weaker compared with the rich, and they are not entitled to 
additional insurance benefits.  
 
In the subsequent sections, a background of the NCMS and outpatient care is 
provided, followed by methods, results, and a discussion of the results and policy 
implications. 
 
5.2 NCMS and catastrophic outpatient service 
With a low level of government subsidization, the NCMS initially was primarily a 
high-deductible insurance plan that covered catastrophic illness; rural residents with 
low risks had little incentive to subscribe (World Health Organization, 2004b). The 
program has since become more comprehensive: since 2007 coverage has expanded 
from mainly catastrophic illnesses to outpatient care (Xinhua, 2012b). Two main 
categories of catastrophic outpatient care are eligible for reimbursement. These 
include general chronic conditions and severe chronic conditions that require 
specialist care (Table 5.1). Although the reimbursement rate varies in different 
provinces, the central government set 30% as the minimum threshold that should be 
reimbursed by the NCMS for chronic outpatient care. Further, from 2007 onwards, 
many provinces have started to reimburse general outpatient care (Hao and Yuan, 
2009, Hu et al., 2008). Table 5.1 shows a list of diseases that are eligible for 
outpatient reimbursement, general reimbursement procedures, and average 
reimbursement rate. 
 
Table 5.1 Catastrophic outpatient care under the NCMS after 2007 
  
Outpatient care for chronic disease 
conditions 
General outpatient care 
Types of disease 
covered 
Common chronic diseases: Hypertension 
(phrase I and II), heart disease complicated by 
heart failure, coronary heart disease 
All the drugs and services in 
National Drug 
Reimbursement List. 
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(myocardial infarction), cerebral haemorrhage 
and cerebral infarction convalescence, etc.  
Imported drugs and some 
high-technology diagnosis 
procedures are not covered.  
 
Severe chronic diseases: Aplastic anaemia, 
leukaemia, haemophilia, severe mental illness, 
cancer chemotherapy, chronic renal 
insufficiency, dialysis, organ transplant anti-
row treatment for valvular heart surgery, 
vascular stent implantation, etc. 
  
Reimbursement 
procedure 
Patients will first need to obtain diagnoses 
from a county/district level hospital to be 
eligible for chronic disease outpatient 
reimbursement. They also need to renew their 
diagnoses on an annual basis. Only outpatient 
costs incurred in designated secondary/tertiary 
hospitals can be reimbursed.  
Patients can receive 
immediate outpatient care at 
any state-owned public 
hospitals. 
 
They will need to pay the 
costs upfront, and those costs 
can be partially reimbursed 
through the NCMS fund.  
Reimbursement 
rate 
Average reimbursement rate as claimed by the 
government is around 70% at village clinics 
and township health centres, and 40% at 
township hospitals and above. However, actual 
reimbursement rates are much lower than 
claimed rates. 
Average outpatient care 
reimbursement rate is around 
40% according to the 
government, but actual rates 
are much lower.  
Source: (Hao and Yuan, 2009), (Hu et al., 2008), (Ministry of Health of Shandong Province, 2008), 
(Ministry of Health of Guangxi Province, 2007), (Ministry of Health of Hei Long Jiang Province, 
2009), and various sources from local government websites.  
 
5.3 Methods   
5.3.1 Data source and variable specifications 
This paper uses the 2009 CHNS, which is the most recent available survey wave. 
The objective of the paper is to estimate the impact of the NCMS on OOP payments 
for healthcare. We include a total of 1,846 households in the study after dropping 
observations in urban areas and those are not insured the NCMS. This dataset is ideal 
for the purpose of this paper because all the surveyed provinces had included 
catastrophic healthcare and general outpatient services in the NCMS benefit package 
by 2008 (Ministry of Health of Hei Long Jiang Province, 2009, People's Daily, 2009, 
Ministry of Health of Guangxi Province, 2007, Ministry of Health of Shandong 
Province, 2008, Hao and Yuan, 2009, Hu et al., 2008).  
 
Dependent and independent variables 
Table 5.2 shows the variable specification. Health payment is for a 4-week window 
in the CHNS. Individuals are asked to report their health payments, the percentage of 
these health payments that can be reimbursed by the NCMS. I exclude the outliers on 
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health costs distribution: the top and bottom one per cent of cases are dropped from 
the analysis (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008).  
 
The impacts of the NCMS on catastrophic health payments are measured separately 
for the total sample and households that have at least one member with a chronic 
disease. Chronic disease conditions include any of the following: hypertension, 
diabetes, myocardial infarction and apoplexy. Care sought at village clinics and 
township health centres are measured separately, conditional on at least one visit in 
the past 4 weeks. Per capita income data are used as a measurement of living 
standards. Please refer to Section 3.2 for how per capita income is calculated. 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard 
deviation) 
    
Total sample  
(N = 1,846) 
Chronic 
conditions 
(N=351) 
Variable Definition Mean Mean 
Household monthly health 
expenditures 
Health expenditure during the past month 
(before the NCMS reimbursement) 
41.697 
(228.908) 
69.073 
(314.433) 
Per episode 
reimbursement rate for the 
NCMS participants 
Per episode reimbursement rate  for 
household that have health expenditures 
during the past month 
13.012 
(26.163) 
11.300 
(26.202) 
Household monthly OOP 
health expenditures 
OOP health expenditure during the past 
month (after the NCMS reimbursement) 
35.936 
(207.609) 
59.641 
(292.586) 
Chronic conditions 
member in household 
Dummy variable: 1, the household has at 
least a member with chronic conditions; 0 
otherwise 
0.171 
(0.376) 
--  
Village clinics and 
township health centres  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has 
sought care at village clinics or township 
health centres in the past 4 weeks; 0 
otherwise 
0.065 
(0.247) 
0.092 
(0.290) 
County and city hospitals  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has 
sought care at county or city hospitals in the 
past 4 weeks; 0 otherwise 
0.016 
(0.124) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
Private clinics and others  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has 
sought care at private clinics and other 
facilities in the past 4 weeks; 0 otherwise 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
Per capita household 
income 
Per capita household income inflated to 2009 
(adjusted to household size using 
Equivalence Scale) 
24775.810 
(38044.530) 
23415.970 
(26941.940) 
Household size Number of people live in the household 
2.045 
(0.901) 
2.190 
(0.918) 
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Definition of catastrophic payments 
Using household income as the denominator, catastrophic payments are defined as 
occurring when health payments exceed a given fraction of household per capita 
income (Xu et al., 2003, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). There are two 
approaches in the literature. The first is ATP, defined as the household’s per capita 
expenditure/disposable income net of spending on basic necessities; and this is used 
as the denominator to define catastrophic thresholds. The difficulty of adopting the 
first approach lies in the definition of basic necessities. The most common strategy is 
to use household expenditure/income net of food expenditure as a denominator; 
however, not all food expenditures are nondiscretionary, and it is possible that richer 
families may spend substantially more on food consumption than their poorer 
counterparts. Another approach to define catastrophic payments thresholds is to 
consider given thresholds. Since the CHNS data lack relevant information on food 
consumption, and therefore spending on basic necessities cannot be accurately 
calculated, this paper uses the second approach which considers catastrophic 
thresholds levels at 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008, 
O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Xu et al., 2003, Xu et al., 2007a).  
 
Measuring the impact of the NCMS on catastrophic headcounts and catastrophic 
payment gaps 
This study uses the methods introduced by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) to 
measure catastrophic payment. Specifically, this study looks at the incidence and 
severity of catastrophic payments before and after the deduction of the NCMS. 
Incidence of catastrophic payments is measured by the number of people who fall 
below the catastrophic thresholds (headcount); and the intensity of the payment is 
measured by the average amount exceeding the catastrophic threshold (gap).   
 
Catastrophic payment headcount estimates the proportion of households with 
catastrophic health payments in the sample. Catastrophic headcounts are calculated 
before and after the NCMS reimbursement by Equations (8) and (9), respectively. 
The impact of the NCMS on the absolute difference in headcount is estimated by 
Equation (10). Let Tbefore be health payments before the NCMS reimbursement, Tafter 
be health payments after the NCMS reimbursement, and x be total household income. 
A household is considered as falling below the catastrophic threshold z if Tbefore /x or 
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Tafter /x exceeds a specific threshold. Let CH be the indicator, CHbefore equals 1 if  
Tbefore /x > z, and  CHafter equals 1 if Tafter /x > z, and zero otherwise. N is the total 
number of households. 
 
Catastrophic payment before the NCMS reimbursement Hbefore is, 
(8) 


N
i
before
i
before CH
N
H
1
1
 
Catastrophic payment after the NCMS reimbursement Hafter is, 
(9) 


N
i
after
i
after CH
N
H
1
1
 
Absolute difference in the headcount, DH, before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement is, 
(10) afterbefore HHDH   
 
The severity of the catastrophic payments is measured by the average sum of the 
amount by which the health payment exceeds the threshold from all households 
experiencing catastrophic payments.  The difference of the severity can be calculated 
before and after the NCMS reimbursement by Equations (11) and (12), respectively. 
The impact of the NCMS on the absolute difference on gap was estimated by 
Equation (13). 
 
Catastrophic gap before the NCMS reimbursement CGbefore is, 
(11)
N
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x
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Catastrophic gap after the NCMS reimbursement CGafter is, 
(12) 
N
z
x
T
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N
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iafter
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



1
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Absolute difference in the catastrophic gap before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement is, 
(13) afterbefore CGCGDCG   
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 Measuring the distribution sensitivity of catastrophic payments 
The study also takes into account of the distribution sensitivity of the measures of 
catastrophic headcount and gap, the study uses the well-established methods of the 
Inequity Indices introduced by O’Donnell et al. (2008b) and Erreygers (2009) to 
measure the distribution. For catastrophic headcount measures, Erregyers’s 
Concentration Indices will be used since the binary nature of the variable calls 
formally a non-linear measure. The distribution of catastrophic gaps – a continuous 
variable – will be measured by Concentration Indices introduced by O’Donnell et al. 
(2008b).The study calculates the Concentration Indices for the distribution of the 
catastrophic headcount (Ch) and gap (Cg) relative to the household income. A 
positive index indicates that richer households are more likely to incur catastrophic 
payments, and a negative index indicates that poorer households are more likely to 
incur catastrophic payments.  
 
As suggested by O’ Donnell, van Doorsaler and others (O'Donnell et al., 2008b, van 
Doorslaer et al., 2006, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003, Somkotra and Lagrada, 
2008), it is important to give some weight to poorer households when assessing the 
incidence and severity of catastrophic payments.  The justification behind this 
approach is that, if the catastrophic headcount and gap are not adjusted, then 
households exceeding the thresholds, and all spending exceeding the thresholds will 
count equally. This is usually not the case since the opportunity costs of such 
expenditure by the poor households are usually greater than the rich households if 
we assume a decreasing marginal utility of income. Therefore, measures on weighted 
catastrophic headcount and gap are proposed in Equations (14) and (15), respectively 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008b): 
(14) )1( hw CHH   
(15) )1( gw CGG   
Where Hw represents the weighted headcount, and Ch represents the Erregyers’s 
Concentration Index for the catastrophic headcount, Gw represents the weighted gap, 
and Cg represents the Concentration Index for weighted gap. This statistic is 
equivalent to a weighted sum of a catastrophic payment indicator variable, in this 
case, either H or G, by multiplying weights declining linearly from 2 to 0 as the 
household ranks from the poorest to the richest. The weights produced by Equations 
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(14) and (15) impose the assumption that that poor household receive more weight, 
while the rich households receive less—if those who exceed the catastrophic 
threshold tend to be poor, the indices Ch and Cg tend to be negative, which will then 
make Hw greater than H.  
 
Definition of health payment-induced poverty 
Standard poverty measures do not take into account health payments. It is highly 
likely that a household at a time of illness will be forced to divert some of its usual 
spending on daily necessities to healthcare, and this may lead households to fall 
below the poverty line. For households already below the poverty line, the spending 
from borrowing or selling assets may further increase the poverty gap, and 
consequently push them into deeper poverty. It is estimated that, in Asia, 78 million 
people may fall into extreme poverty (US$1 per day) if their health spending were 
taken out of their per capita household expenditures (O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
 
Health payment-induced poverty measures the difference between poverty before 
and after health spending is subtracted from household income (Sun et al., 2010, 
O'Donnell et al., 2008b). As introduced by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003), 
incidence and severity of health payment-induced poverty are compared before and 
after the deduction of the NCMS. Incidence is measured by the number of people 
who fall below the poverty line because of health payments (headcount); and the 
intensity is measured by the amount by which the household falls below the poverty 
line because of health payments (gap).   
 
This paper uses three poverty thresholds. They are the international poverty line of 
US$1.08 per person per day, US$2.15 per person per day, and the Chinese National 
Poverty Line (NPL), which is a net per capita income of RMB1,196 per year 
(US$175.08 per year) in 2009. If a poverty line allows health costs, then the line 
should be adjusted downwards. However, in this study, none of these poverty lines 
are adjusted when assessing health payment-induced poverty. The US$1.08 per day 
poverty line is not adjusted because it is used in the Millennium Development Goal 
as the extreme poverty line. The Chinese National Poverty Line is lower than the 
extreme poverty line; it is not defined as to cover expected health expenditures so it 
not adjusted. The US$2.15 per day line is not adjusted in order to make a comparison 
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(O'Donnell et al., 2008b, Wagstaff et al., 2001a). The exchange rate use for US 
dollars to RMB was US$1 equals RMB6.83 in 2009.  
 
Measuring the impact of the NCMS on the reduction of health payment-induced 
poverty 
Estimating of health payment-induced poverty headcount and gap is similar to what 
has been presented for estimating catastrophic payments. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
impact of the NCMS on health payment-induced poverty using a stylized version of 
the Jan Pen’s Parade (Cowell, 2011, O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  The x-axis shows the 
cumulative proportion of households ranked by income, and y-axis shows the 
household per capita income. The solid black curve represents household per capita 
income gross of health payment; the solid blue curve and the dotted blue curve 
represent household per capita income net of the health payment before and after the 
NCMS reimbursement respectively. The points from the starts of the curves to the 
intersections with the poverty line (PL) represent the numbers of people living in 
poverty (PH0, PH2, and PH1) under three conditions. The impact of the NCMS on 
health payment-induced poverty headcount can be calculated by the difference 
between PH1 and PH2. The areas (A, B and C) between the two blue curves capture 
the poverty gaps reduced by the NCMS.   
 
Figure 5.1 Stylise Pen’s Parade for household per capita income gross and net 
of outpatient costs under the NCMS 
 
(Note: PH0 is the poverty headcount gross of health payments; PH1 and PH2 are the poverty 
headcounts net of health payments before and after the NCMS reimbursement). 
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Specifically, the standard poverty headcount, health payment-induced headcount can 
be calculated by Equation (16). Let Tbefore be health payments before the NCMS 
reimbursement, Tafter be health payments after the NCMS reimbursement, and yi be 
per capita household income in household i. A household is considered as falling 
below the poverty thresholds PL if yi < PL. The poverty head count ratio gross of 
health payment can be obtained as follows (O'Donnell et al., 2008b),  
(16)
N
p
PH
N
i
gross
i
 10  
Where 1grossip if yi < PL, and 0 otherwise, N is the total number of households in 
the sample. 
 
In terms of measuring the poverty gap, defining the poverty gap gross of health 
payments, the individual-level poverty gap can be obtained by Equation (17), 
(17) 
N
g
PG
N
i
gross
i
gross

 1  
Where )( i
gross
i
gross
i yPLpg  . 
 
The severity of poverty for each household is measured by the mean poverty gap,  
(18) 
0PH
PG
MPG
gross
gross   
 
Similarly, to estimate the health payment-induced poverty before the NCMS 
reimbursement, this paper defines yi  as the per capita household income estimated by 
subtracting the health payment from total household income. Replacing health 
payments before the NCMS reimbursement with those after the reimbursement gives 
the analogous post-reimbursement measures.   
 
Following other studies, the effect of OOP payments on poverty which is often 
termed as “Poverty Impact”, can be obtained by the absolute difference between pre-
reimbursement and post-reimbursement measures.  
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5.4 Empirical results 
Table 5.3 shows that for the total sample, average monthly health expenditures 
before insurance reimbursement are 41.70RMB, while for households with members 
with chronic conditions, the expenditures are 69.07RMB. However, the per episode 
reimbursement rate for people with chronic conditions is 11.3%, which is lower than 
the total sample. Average OOP payments for households with chronic disease 
members are 59.64RMB, which are 23.70RMB higher compared with the payments 
for the total sample.  
 
Table 5.3 illustrates health payment for healthcare as a share of household income 
before and after the NCMS reimbursement. The results show that health payments 
account for 3.45% of the household income as a share of household income before 
the reimbursement, and 3.13% after the reimbursement for the total sample. The 
difference is only 0.33% (p < 0.01). For households with chronic disease members, 
health payments share is10.43% before the reimbursement, but there is no significant 
change after the reimbursement.  
 
Table 5.3 Health payments for healthcare as a share of household income before 
and after the NCMS reimbursement 
 Total sample 
(N = 1,846) 
Chronic conditions 
(N = 351) 
Before reimbursement (a) 3.45%*** 10.43%* 
 (0.010) (0.058) 
After reimbursement (b) 3.13%*** 9.92%* 
 (0.010) (0.058) 
Difference (a) – (b) 0.33%*** 0.51% 
(Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)  
 
5.4.1 Catastrophic payments under the NCMS 
Table 5.4 presents measures of the incidence and distribution of catastrophic 
payments before and after the NCMS reimbursement in 2009. The total household 
income is used as the proxy to define catastrophic payment thresholds for healthcare, 
and the catastrophic thresholds are presented at the 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% 
level.  
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The estimate of the catastrophic headcount is 6.61% (p < 0.01) for the total sample 
and 8.57% (p < 0.01) for households with chronic disease members at the 5% 
threshold level. Health payments are more likely to become catastrophic for 
households with chronic disease members compared to the total sample at all 
threshold levels.  
 
For households that have at least one outpatient visit to health facilities in the past 4 
weeks, 41.67% (p < 0.01) of the households fall below the 5% threshold level. Table 
5.4 also presents the rank-weighted headcount. The rank-weighted catastrophic 
headcount is 64.14% for care sought at village and township health facilities at the 5% 
level. The difference between the rank-weighted and the un-weighted headcount is 
22.47%; this is not surprising given the relatively high concentration of catastrophic 
payment among the poor households.  
 
The impacts of the NCMS in reducing catastrophic head are reported under absolute 
difference in Table 5.4. The Concentration Index of catastrophic headcount for 
households with chronic disease members is -0.095 (p < 0.01) at the 5% threshold 
level, whereas the index is -0.075 (p < 0.01) for the total sample. This also implies 
that catastrophe is more likely to be concentrated among the poor and for households 
with chronic disease members. The results show that for households with chronic 
members and care sought at village and township health facilities, the NCMS has no 
significant effects on reducing the incidence or the favouring-poor distribution of 
catastrophe. The NCMS has some effects in reducing the favouring-poor distribution 
of catastrophe at the 15%, 20% and 25% threshold levels for the total sample, but no 
effects are observed in terms of reduction of headcount and rank-weighted headcount. 
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Table 5.4 Incidence of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
    OOP payments as share of total household income 
      Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) Village clinics and township health centres (N = 120) 
    Threshold level Threshold level Threshold level 
    5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Pre-insurance 
Headcount (Hbefore) 
6.61% 4.82% 3.79% 2.76% 2.38% 8.57% 6.67% 5.08% 3.49% 2.86% 41.67% 29.17% 20.83% 14.17% 12.50% 
  Concentration Indices (Ch before) -0.075 -0.066 -0.060 -0.048 -0.047 -0.095 -0.091 -0.085 -0.066 -0.072 -0.539 -0.424 -0.420 -0.314 -0.279 
  Rank-weighted headcount (Hw before) 7.10% 5.14% 4.02% 2.90% 2.50% 9.38% 7.27% 5.51% 3.72% 3.06% 64.14% 41.54% 29.58% 18.62% 15.98% 
Post-insurance Headcount (Hafter) 5.85% 4.17% 3.14% 2.33% 2.06% 7.62% 5.71% 4.44% 3.17% 2.86% 35.83% 24.17% 16.67% 10.00% 9.17% 
  Concentration Indices (Ch after) -0.065 -0.055 -0.049 -0.039 -0.037 -0.092 -0.083 -0.072 -0.063 -0.072 -0.439 -0.350 -0.319 -0.192 -0.167 
  
Rank-weighted headcount (Hw after) 
6.23% 4.40% 3.30% 2.42% 2.13% 8.32% 6.19% 4.76% 3.38% 3.06% 51.57% 32.63% 21.99% 11.92% 10.70% 
Absolute difference Headcount (Hafter - Hbefore) 
-0.76% -0.65% -0.65% -0.43% -0.33% -0.95% -0.95% -0.63% -0.32% 0.00% -5.83% -5.00% -4.17% -4.17% -3.33% 
  
Concentration Indices (Ch after - Ch before) 0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.009** 0.011** 0.002 0.008 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.100 0.074 0.100 0.123 0.112 
  
Rank-weighted headcount (Hw after- Hw before) -0.87% -0.73% -0.72% -0.48% -0.36% -1.06% -1.08% -0.75% -0.35% 0.00% -12.57% -8.91% -7.59% -6.70% -5.29% 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, bold indicates p < 0.01) 
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Table 5.5 shows measures for the severity of catastrophic payments before and after 
the NCMS reimbursement. The catastrophic gap is 3.0% (p < 0.01), and 7.30% (p < 
0.01) for the total sample and households that sought care at village and township 
health facilities, respectively. The catastrophic gap is 9.77% (p < 0.01) for 
households with chronic diseases. The results also show a modest decline in terms of 
catastrophic gap after the NCMS reimbursement for the total sample and sample that 
includes households that sought care at village and township health facilities. 
However, the NCMS has no significant impacts on the severity of catastrophe for 
households with chronic disease members.  
 
In terms of the distribution of catastrophic gaps, most of the Concentration Indices 
(Cg) are negative, indicating that the catastrophic gaps are more concentrated among 
the poor households. It is noted that the indices for catastrophic gap are -0.851(p < 
0.01) for households with chronic disease members, -0.666 (p < 0.01) for the total 
sample, and -0.510 (p < 0.01) for households that sought care at village and township 
health facilities. The indices indicate a favouring-poor concentration of catastrophic 
gap among the population. The level of inequity is more pronounced for households 
with chronic disease members.  
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Table 5.5 Severity of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
  OOP payments as share of total household income 
   Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) Village clinics and township health centres (N = 120) 
  Threshold level Threshold level Threshold level 
  5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Pre-insurance Gap (CGbefore) 3.00% 2.72% 2.51% 2.34% 2.21% 9.77% 9.41% 9.10% 8.89% 8.72% 7.30% 5.55% 4.30% 3.45% 2.77% 
 Concentration Indices (Cgbefore) -0.666 -0.707 -0.730 -0.752 -0.769 -0.851 -0.872 -0.889 -0.899 -0.908 -0.510** -0.519** -0.530 -0.511 -0.470 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gwbefore) 5.00% 4.65% 4.34% 4.10% 3.91% 18.08% 17.61% 17.19% 16.88% 16.63% 11.03% 8.44% 6.59% 5.21% 4.08% 
Post-insurance Gap(CGafter) 2.70% 2.46% 2.28% 2.14% 2.03% 9.30% 8.99% 8.73% 8.54% 8.38% 5.82% 4.33% 3.33% 2.68% 2.21% 
 Concentration Indices (Cgafter) -0.695 -0.734 -0.762 -0.784 -0.804 -0.872 -0.891 -0.906 -0.916 -0.924 -0.607** -0.582** -0.572** -0.539 -0.486 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gwafter) 4.58% 4.26% 4.02% 3.83% 3.67% 17.41% 17.00% 16.63% 16.36% 16.12% 9.35% 6.85% 5.24% 4.13% 3.28% 
Absolute difference Gap (CGafter- CGbefore) -0.30% -0.26% -0.23% -0.20% -0.18%** -0.47% -0.42% -0.37% -0.35% -0.34% -1.48% -1.22% -0.97%** -0.76%** -0.57%** 
 Concentration Indices (Cgbefore- Cgafter) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gwafter -Gwbefore) -0.42% -0.38% -0.32% -0.28% -0.24%** -0.67% -0.61% -0.55% -0.52% -0.51% -1.67% -1.58% -1.35%** -1.08%** -0.80%* 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  bold p < 0.01) 
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5.4.2 The NCMS and the poverty impact 
Figure 5.2 shows health payment-induced poverty headcount before and after the 
NCMS reimbursement.  Before the health payment, 134 households, or 7.26% of the 
sample, fell below the US$2.15 poverty line. A total of 18 households were pushed 
below the poverty line because of the health payments. No significant reduction in 
terms of poverty headcount was observed.   
 
Using US$1.08 per day as the poverty threshold, poverty headcount gross of health 
payments was 37 (2%). The number increased to 55 (2.98%) before the NCMS 
reimbursement, and decreased to 51 (2.76%) after the NCMS reimbursement.  
At the Chinese NPL, fewer households were classified as poor before taking into 
account of health payment. The difference before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement on poverty headcount reduction were not statistically significant at 
any poverty thresholds.  
 
Figure 5.2 OOP share before and after the NCMS 
 
(Note: Before: before the NCMS reimbursement; After:  after the NCMS reimbursement. Chinese 
NPL = Chinese National Poverty Line)  
 
 
Table 5.6 shows the health payment-induced poverty gap before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement. For households falling below the US$2.15 per day poverty line, the 
estimate of poverty gap gross of health payment is11.60RMB. The mean positive 
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poverty gap is 159.79RMB. However, if OOP payment for healthcare is netted out of 
the household income, the average poverty gap increases to 19.48RMB, and the 
mean positive gap increases to 236.60RMB. After the NCMS reimbursement, the 
average poverty gap reduces by 7.88RMB (p<0.1). No significant reduction is 
observed in terms of mean positive gap.  
 
If we take a look at the households with chronic disease members, the poverty gap 
and mean positive poverty gap are larger for all poverty lines compared with the total 
sample. However, the NCMS has no significant impact in reducing either the 
average gap or the mean positive poverty gap for households with chronic disease 
members.  
 
Table 5.6 OOP payments and the poverty gap before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement 
  
Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) 
  
US$2.1
5/day 
US$1.0
8/day 
NPL 
US$2.1
5/day 
US$1.0
8/day 
NPL 
Poverty gap (RMB)             
Gross of health payment gap (PH0) 
11.60 1.61 0.14 15.87 2.17 0.02 
Pre-reimbursement gap (PHbefore) 
19.48 7.35 4.96 36.85 20.03 16.21 
Post-reimbursement gap (PHafter) 
18.37 6.65 4.48 34.16 17.94 14.50 
Health payment -induced gap before reimbursement 
(PHbefore - PH0) 
7.88 5.74 4.83 20.98 17.86 16.19 
Absolute reduction by the NCMS (PHbefore - PHafter) 
1.11* 0.70 0.48 2.69 2.10 1.71 
Mean positive gap (RMB) 
            
Gross of health payment mean positive gap 
(MPGgross) 
159.79 80.48 31.58 166.64 62.17 7.83 
Pre-reimbursement mean positive gap(MPGbefore) 
236.60 246.78** 436.34** 351.77 420.68 851.13 
Post-reimbursement mean positive gap(MPGafter) 
226.09 240.76** 435.39** 326.11 403.55 913.59 
Health payment -induced mean positive gap before 
reimbursement (MPGbefore- MPGgross) 
76.81 166.29 404.75 185.13 358.51 843.30 
Absolute reduction by the NCMS (MPGbefore- 
MPGafter) 
10.51 6.01 0.95 25.66 17.13 -62.46 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  p < 0.01) 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Using data from CHNS 2009, this study provides new evidence of the impacts of the 
NCMS on the magnitude, distribution and economic consequences of OOP payments 
for outpatient care in rural China. The study suggests that outpatient care is not a low 
cost event, and indeed can be catastrophic. The NCMS has limited impacts on 
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reducing incidence or severity of catastrophic payments, or reducing favouring-poor 
inequity in catastrophic payments. It has no significant effects on reducing health 
payment-induced poverty. For care sought at village and township health facilities, 
outpatient care is likely to become catastrophic, and the NCMS has no significant 
impact on this. For households with chronic disease members, a large catastrophic 
payments gap is observed, and the gaps are disproportionately concentrated among 
the poor. However, the NCMS has no impact on the reduction of gaps or inequities.  
 
The findings are consistent with previous studies. Specifically, this study suggests 
that, using the catastrophic payment threshold at 5%, 6.61% of rural households in 
2009 fell into a catastrophe due to OOP payments. Similar results are demonstrated 
by Sun et al.(2009a). That study investigated the impact of the NCMS in Linyi 
County in Shandong, adopting 50% ATP, and showed that the incidence of 
catastrophic payments was 8.98% before the NCMS reimbursement and 8.25% 
afterwards. The incidence from our study appeared to be larger relative to an earlier 
study conducted by Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008).  Using the earlier waves of the 
CHNS data (1993, 1997 and 2000), Wagstaff and Lindelow suggested that 
catastrophic headcount increased from 2.0% in 1993 to 3.4% in 2000 at a threshold 
level of 5%. The differences may be due to the use of the early waves of the CHNS 
data and the inclusion of the urban sample in the analysis; in the same study, using 
data from Gansu Survey of Children and Family (GSCF) in 2003, the reported 
incidence of catastrophic payments was 6.5%, which was closer to our findings. 
Despite the differences, one common feature as suggested by this study as well as 
others is the positive correlation among catastrophic payment variables, and their 
negative correlation with level of wealth of the household in the rural China– the less 
wealthy rural Chinese households are more likely to experience catastrophic 
payments.  
 
The impacts of the NCMS on the severity of catastrophic payments in rural 
households are reported by the average catastrophic gap. Using a 5% threshold level, 
the average catastrophic gap is reduced by just 0.30 point per cent by the NCMS. 
The severity of the payments could still be disastrous for most rural Chinese 
residents. Similar findings were demonstrated by Sun et al.(2009a). The study also 
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suggested that the effects of the NCMS on reducing the catastrophic gap were 
limited.  
 
This study quantifies the level of inequity in health financing and finds that the 
NCMS reduces the level of inequity of the incidence of catastrophic payments for 
the total sample; however, it has no significant impacts for households with members 
suffering chronic disease, or for households seeking care at village and township 
health facilities. This study also finds that the catastrophic payment gap is 
disproportionately concentrated among the poor for households with chronic disease 
members even after the NCMS reimbursement. However, this may seem less 
surprising if we take a close look at the insurance design. In practice, the 
reimbursement rate does not differ between the rich, the poor, or households with 
potentially greater health needs. If the goal of the NCMS is to have as few poor 
households crossing catastrophic thresholds as possible, the insurance should 
provide the poor and those with high health risks with more generous package. Low 
reimbursement rates and excessively high co-payments are directly responsible for 
catastrophic outpatient payments, and with the poor bearing the brunt of the 
consequences. Furthermore, at the moment, the NCMS emphasises inpatient care 
and catastrophic outpatient care. This study and previous studies have proven that 
outpatient care could also be quite expensive given the income level of the overall 
Chinese rural population (Zhang et al., 2010a), and the share of outpatient costs in 
the aggregate may have a substantial impoverishing effect on households (Shahrawat 
and Rao, 2012).  Households with greater health needs or those already in the lower 
income quintiles may find it difficult to cope with outpatient care or any types of 
care; consequently, they may more easily fall below catastrophic thresholds when 
they seek care.  
 
We may find that the situation of China is even bleaker than that found in other 
countries. It is noted that OOP payments, as perceived as the most regressive 
instrument of health financing (Whitehead et al., 2001), are generally regressive or 
are proportional to ATP in most high-income countries. Even in most of the low-
/middle-income Asian countries, OOP payments still absorb a larger share of 
economic resources of the rich households. However, both our study and existing 
studies showed that  China, unlike that of many other Asian countries, demonstrated 
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a favouring-poor concentration of OOP payments (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). The 
proportion of population that experienced “catastrophe” (as defined as 40% of non-
food consumption) in China was the highest among the rest of Asia except Nepal 
and Sir Lanka, and higher still among the less wealthy (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007, 
Wagstaff et al., 2009c).  
 
The study also measures health payment-induced poverty for healthcare by 
quantifying the extent to which such payments may push households into poverty. 
As demonstrated by the results, the effects of the NCMS on preventing households 
from becoming impoverished are limited—the majority of health payment-
impoverished households remained below the poverty lines after the NCMS 
reimbursement, and the severity of their situations is not  improved. This again is 
consistent with previous research (Sun et al., 2010, van Doorslaer et al., 2006).  
 
Two possible policy solutions have been discussed to improve the design of the 
insurance. One solution is to reduce OOP payments by providing higher 
reimbursements through more generous government subsidises and through an 
increased level of risk-pooling (Yip and Hsiao, 2009b, Zhang et al., 2010b). A less 
costly solution is to provide extra benefits for the less wealthy households or those 
with high risks of incurring catastrophic illness costs, and this was adopted by a few 
low- and middle-income Asian countries, such as Thailand and Vietnam (Somkotra 
and Lagrada, 2008).  However, it is not clear whether these solutions are applicable 
to the Chinese situation.  First, a more generous insurance package may not always 
lead to a reduction of health costs since ample studies in the field of health 
economics have suggested the opposite (Dusansky and Koc, 2010, Feldman and 
Dowd, 1991, Arrow, 2001, Manning et al., 1987). Stensland et al. (2010) found that 
hospitals under more financial pressure –with less market share and less ability to 
charge higher private rates – were likely to generate profits on Medicare patients. In 
the case of China, the current health provision system is still functioning on the basis 
of a FFS system. Healthcare providers, who are largely relying on revenue from 
drugs and services, are also likely to charge more from those who are covered by 
insurance. Anecdotal evidence showed that health providers in China may supply 
high margin high-technology care and expensive medicines to the NCMS patients 
wherever possible, and the insured patients had paid more than was warranted (Hu et 
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al., 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). Examples also included the initiative of merging 
China’s Government Insurance Health Scheme (GIS) and Labour Insurance Health 
Scheme (LIS) into one single insurance with a larger risk pool and more generous 
reimbursement rates in the 1990s. This reform increased the health payments in 
Zhejiang Province among the insured patients, especially the wealthy patients (Liu 
and Zhao, 2006). A more recent case was the launch of the urban employee 
insurance—UEI in 1998. With a relatively generous package, this insurance had 
been proven to be responsible for over-prescribing of drugs and unnecessary use of 
health services (Hu et al., 2009).  
 
The proposal of increasing the level of risk pooling at individual level, at first glance, 
seems feasible—a more comprehensive risk pooling could increase the NCMS funds 
and improve the insurance package for the participants. However, for poor 
households, who already have difficulty in coping with daily living, increasing the 
premium may increase dropout rates and consequently high costs of care. 
Furthermore, if we take a close look at the structure of the NCMS funds, we notice 
that the current NCMS funds have huge surpluses. Mao (2005) found that in the 
affluent East regions, the surplus accounted for 27.58% of the total NCMS funds, 
while in the less affluent Central and West regions, the surplus accounted for 32.51% 
and 55.98% of the total funds respectively. Since risk pooling is currently 
administrated at the county level, keeping a large surplus of funds might be a safe 
way to prepare for a wide disease outbreak. A more efficient use of the insurance 
funds could include a larger pool, in other words, to increase the risk pooling level 
from one county to a few counties or even to provincial level. But this may also 
increase the administrative costs and other related costs.  
 
The second policy solution is to develop a specific sub-insurance to target the poor 
and those with greater health needs. However, establishing a well-functioning 
insurance for fee-waiver or fee reduction for a specific population may be very 
difficult in practice (Whitehead et al., 2001). In countries like China where poverty 
is rife, it is extremely difficult to identify the target population—the poor—
sufficiently and accurately. Further, as suggested above, the current Chinese health 
system is based on a FFS system. Healthcare providers may take advantage of the 
patients who are entitled to extra insurance benefits. Providing fee waiver or 
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reduction to the poor may motivate the health providers to prescribe more. Such 
problems may become more accentuated since the current Chinese health system 
also allows the revenue from fees to be directly linked to incomes and bonuses for 
the health staff (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998).  
 
In interpreting the results we must also bear the limitations in mind. First of all, the 
recall period of the health cost variable is relatively short (4 weeks). It is problematic 
because most surveys use 12 months as the recall period. Outpatient costs used in 
this study are self-reported. Such data can be problematic because self-reporting may 
lead to inaccuracy and bias. Second, the threshold approaches adopted in the study to 
investigate the impacts of insurance on costs may have some limitations. When 
measuring catastrophic payments, it is not possible to identify the households that 
are recommended for treatment, but cannot meet these costs and so forgo treatment. 
Subsequent deterioration of health may lead to indirect costs such as welfare loss, 
and these losses cannot be captured by the measurement of catastrophe (Pradhan and 
Prescott, 2002). Further, the justification of measuring health payment-induced 
poverty is that health costs as responses to basic needs are not adequately reflected in 
the poverty line. Adjusting higher poverty lines downwards is suggested when 
measuring health payment-induced poverty because these lines may make some 
implicit allowance for expected healthcare needs. However, the stochastic nature of 
healthcare needs makes it difficult to capture in a fixed poverty line (O'Donnell et al., 
2008b).  
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6 Health insurance and cost escalation 
 
Cost escalation under China’s New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme9 
 
 
Abstract 
The NCMS, a government subsidized health insurance program, was launched in 
2003 in response to the deterioration in access to health services in rural areas. 
Although the scheme was initially designed to cover inpatient care, it has started to 
expand its benefit package to cover outpatient care since 2007. However, the 
program’s impacts on outpatient care costs have raised growing concern since the 
new initiative was launched, in particular regarding whether it has in fact reduced 
OOP payments for health services among rural participants. This paper examines the 
impacts of the NCMS on outpatient costs by analysing data from an individual level 
longitudinal survey—the CHNS of 2004 and 2009. This study adopted various 
health econometrics strategies, such as Two-Part Model (2PM), Heckman Selection 
Model (HSM) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with Differences-in-
differences (DID) model to estimate the impacts of the NCMS on per episode 
outpatient cost of 2004 and 2009. We find that NCMS has little impact on reducing 
the NCMS patients’ OOP payments for outpatient services and may also have 
contributed to an observed increase in the total per episode of outpatient costs billed 
to the insured patients. This increase is more pronounced among village clinics and 
township health centres—the backbone of the health system for rural residents—than 
at county and municipal hospitals.  
                                                 
9 This chapter is based upon a co-authored paper (with Xun Wu) that is published by Health Policy 
and Planning. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The dismantling of collective farms during the 1980s led to the demise of the 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), which had provided 90% of rural population 
with access to basic healthcare (Liu and Yi, 2004). By the early 2000s, around 95% 
of the rural population lacked any form of coverage for health services (Babiarz et 
al., 2010, Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). According to a national survey on health services, 
three-fourths of rural residents did not seek care when recommended; meanwhile the 
average per episode inpatient cost in rural areas increased from 613 RMB in 1993 to 
2,649 RMB in 2003 (Chen et al., 2011, You and Kobayashi, 2009).  
 
China's New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was launched in 2003 in 
response to the deterioration in access to health services in rural areas. The NCMS is 
a voluntary health insurance program heavily subsidized by the government and 
administered by county-level government agencies. Its main goal is to improve the 
rural population’s access to health services by alleviating the financial burdens of 
paying for healthcare. Its expansion since inception has been truly remarkable: by 
2012, the NCMS covered 97.5% of rural population in China, some 832 million 
people, making it arguably the largest health insurance program in the world (China 
Daily, 2012). 
 
Despite its rapid expansion, the effectiveness of the NCMS in reducing rural 
residents' financial burdens in paying for healthcare should not be taken for granted.  
Some studies have reported that medical expenditures and OOP payments, especially 
for catastrophic illnesses, have indeed decreased since the program was inaugurated 
(Wagstaff et al., 2009a, Wagstaff et al., 2009d, Tan and Zhong, 2010, Babiarz et al., 
2012), but other researchers found  that OOP payment for health services remains a 
severe financial burden for subscribing rural households and that the financial 
protection provided to participants was in fact rather limited (Sun et al., 2010, Zhang 
et al., 2010a). More important, the NCMS may have inflated medical costs at village 
clinics and township health centers, which tended to overprescribe for the NCMS 
covered patients (Sun et al., 2009a, Sun et al., 2009b). 
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From 2007 onwards, the NCMS has started to include outpatient care in the benefit 
package in order to improve utilization of outpatient care—the most frequently used 
and widely accessible care for the rural farmers. Specifically, the NCMS reimburses 
two types of outpatient care: catastrophic outpatient care (chronic diseases and 
severe chronic conditions), and general outpatient care. While previous studies of the 
NCMS focuses mainly on inpatient care, little is known about the impacts of this 
new initiative on outpatient care use in rural areas. As it is evident that social health 
insurance in China may induce unnecessary use of healthcare (Yip et al., 2010, 
Wagstaff et al., 2009c, Tang et al., 2012), whether the expanded benefit package 
may lead to supply induced-demand of outpatient use is an important issue to discuss. 
Further, there is a critical need to trace the patterns of health costs incurred at village 
clinics and township health centers—the backbone of the health system for rural 
residents—thus  far no rigorous evaluations of these costs has been undertaken.  
 
To shed light on these issues, we trace the effects of the NCMS on the costs of 
outpatient care in data from an ongoing longitudinal household survey, the CHNS. 
Data from the survey are ideal for the study for two reasons: the survey covers 
important questions relating to utilization and costs of healthcare; and most recent 
surveys, conducted in 2004 and 2009, cover virtually the entire period from the 
inception of the NCMS in 2003 through its first rapid growth and into the years 
immediately following an important extension in the benefit package to include 
outpatient care in 2007. Three modeling approaches are adopted for our analysis. 
The first approach takes advantage of the panel structure of the dataset, comparing 
average per episode outpatient costs for a sample group of individuals over the 
interval from 2004 (when none participated in the NCMS) through 2009 (when all 
participated in the NCMS).  The second approach is to subject pooled data from the 
most recent two rounds (2004 and 2009) of the CHNS  to an econometric analysis, 
using a Two-Part Model (2PM) and Heckman Selection Model (HSM) (Gravelle et 
al., 2006, Jones, 2007, O'Donnell et al., 2008b) to estimate the impacts of the NCMS 
on  use of outpatient care, outpatient costs before the NCMS reimbursement, and  
OOP payments for outpatient care (after the costs are reimbursed by the NCMS). 
The third approach used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with Difference-in-
differences (DID) model to estimate the effect of the NCMS on outpatient costs from 
2004 to 2009. 
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Our empirical findings from the three approaches are mutually consistent: during the 
interval studied, the NCMS has little impact on reducing participants’ OOP 
payments for health services; it may have contributed to an observed increase in per 
episode outpatient costs billed to participants. This increase appears to have been 
more pronounced among village clinics and township health centers than in county 
and municipal hospitals.  
 
Our findings have several important policy implications in the context of healthcare 
reforms in China and other developing countries. First, although the deterioration of 
access to health services in the 1990s was in part driven by the general escalation of 
healthcare costs, the government's response—the NCMS—may have inadvertently 
induced pressures for new waves of cost escalation, as had happened with China’s 
urban employee-based insurance scheme —the UEI (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). 
Second, the program’s lack of success in reducing its participants’ OOP payments 
for health services, despite massive government subsidization, suggests that 
increased health costs created by implementing the program may have outweighed 
the benefits provided to its participants. Third, despite intense political pressure to 
increase government subsidies to the NCMS in order to offer a more generous 
insurance package to rural residents (Ma et al., 2012), our findings suggest that 
unless effective policy measures can be taken to alleviate the pressures of cost 
escalation upon health service providers, any such increases in subsidization may 
have limited impacts on improving access to health services among the rural 
population. That is, increases in government financing may not forestall the need for 
more difficult reforms directed at modifying the behavior of health service providers. 
From this perspective, funding increases might be better deployed in developing 
incentives for urgent reforms in health cost management in facilities that serve the 
rural population.  
 
6.2 Literature review on supplier-induced demand under insurance 
Although the most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces health costs and 
provides financial protections to the households (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008), it is 
yet not obvious in the real world health insurance always reduces health expenses or 
how far health insurance helps to reduce health expenses. Heath economists argued 
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that when patients were aware of the types and the extent of health services they 
would receive with the coverage of insurance, they may derive utility from health 
status and financial wealth, and additional medicines and interventions that may 
possibly increase the chance of a recovery. In this case, a generous insurance may 
induce the individual’s demand for health services because the price is reduced 
through insurance. As for the providers, health insurance may cause the providers to 
provide more services; OOP payments would increase because of having insurance. 
(Chen, 2006, Latker, 1998, Eggleston et al., 2008, Zhan et al., 1998).  
 
In terms of the NCMS, despite this impressive performance, serious questions 
remain regarding the impacts of the NCMS on the rise of healthcare expenditures 
and in particular on whether the program has actually led to a reduction in patients’ 
out-of- pocket payments.  Participants may in fact have seen a reduction in OOP 
payments for health services used and may have increased their usage of the health 
system as a result; but the availability of reimbursement for costs through insurance 
claims may have induced healthcare facilities and doctors to prescribe more 
expensive drugs or order unnecessary treatments, thus actually increasing overall 
healthcare expenditures. If the first of these two effects dominates, participants may 
see a decline in OOP payments for health services. If the second effect dominates, 
participants could be subjected to an overall increase in their out-of- pocket 
payments, as the increase in healthcare expenditures outweighs the amount of 
reimbursements claimed from their insurance plan.  
 
Although some studies showed that NCMS has reduced OOP payments and 
protected households against financial risks by reducing the costs of catastrophic 
illness, especially among low-income patients (Babiarz et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 
2010a, Wagstaff et al., 2009a), other evidence pointed to the contrary. Scholars 
found that OOP payments post-enrolment remained a severe financial burden for 
rural households and that financial protection through the NCMS was rather 
limited(Sun et al., 2010). It was also pointed out by Zhang et al. (2010b) that 
although the NCMS reached most rural areas, it still failed to cover large medical 
expenses, as deductibles and co-payments were quite high, and OOP payment did 
not appear to be reduced by the NCMS. Some studies even found that the NCMS 
resulted in people getting more unnecessarily expensive care. Such an increase in 
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OOP payments was more pronounced for the disadvantaged groups (Long et al., 
2010).  
 
Moreover, it has been well documented that the current Chinese healthcare system 
encourages providers to supply sophisticated care wherever possible. Scholars 
argued that current provider payment mechanism based on a FFS system gave 
perverse incentives to providers and were not conductive to cost containment (Li et 
al., 2011). Since most healthcare facilities relied heavily on drug revenue and the 
provision of health services to survive (Latker, 1998, Yip and Hanson, 2009, Yip and 
Hsiao, 2008a), insurance such as the NCMS may further exacerbate the situation. 
For instance, an alarming increase in Cesarean delivery rates and costs occurred in 
rural areas after the NCMS was launched (Bogg et al., 2010). Studies likewise found 
that over-prescription of antibiotics in village clinics was common for patients 
covered by the NCMS (Sun et al., 2009b, Bogg et al., 2010). Village clinics and 
township health centres in counties covered by the NCMS tended to generate more 
revenues than similar facilities in counties not participating in the program (Babiarz 
et al., 2012), and the care delivered at participating facilities was also found to be 
more costly and more sophisticated than medically necessary (Wagstaff and 
Lindelow, 2008). 
 
Although studies to date have enabled a better understanding of the impact of the 
NCMS on medical costs, several critical gaps remain in information that would 
guide policy decisions on the issues. First, since the expansion of the NCMS in 2007 
to include coverage of expenses for outpatient care, no study has yet focused on the 
program’s impact on the costs of outpatient care. Second, although cost escalation at 
village clinics and township centres has been studied (Babiarz et al., 2012, Brown 
and Theoharides, 2009), no systematic comparison has been conducted of costs 
incurred at different types of health facilities. Third, the attempt to establish a causal 
relationship between the insurance and health costs is not as strong as it could be. 
Even though numerous studies has contributed to the rich array of provider payment 
incentives, very few has indicated what more rigorous evaluation might reveal; thus 
findings are by far still anecdotal. More rigorous methods are need, such as 
modelling on multivariate regression analysis of individual-level data, to isolate or 
control other factors which might influence health costs, or to pinpoint how much 
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health costs or inappropriate use is driven by supplier-induced demand because of 
the existence of insurance. Our study aims at addressing these gaps by focusing on 
three research questions: 
1) What effects has the NCMS had on the overall costs of outpatients care?  
2) Does the NCMS help to reduce OOP payments for outpatient participants?  
3) How do patterns of costs for outpatient care differ among different types of 
healthcare facilities?  
 
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Data source  
The survey data are ideal for our purposes because the survey (from 2004 to 2009) 
covered virtually the entire period from the inception of the NCMS in 2003 through 
the early years after its expansion in outpatient coverage in 2007. Table 6.1 shows 
the rapid expansion of the NCMS from 2004 to 2009: fewer than 5% the rural 
residents surveyed were covered by the NCMS in 2004, but by 2009 more than 90% 
subscribed. Among the nine provinces surveyed by the NCMS, four provinces 
(Henan, Hubei, Liaoning, and Guangxi) started to reimburse catastrophic outpatient 
care since 2007. By 2008, all the surveyed provinces included catastrophic 
healthcare in the NCMS benefit package, and general outpatient services in the 
NCMS benefit package (Ministry of Health of Hei Long Jiang Province, 2009, 
People's Daily, 2009, Ministry of Health of Guangxi Province, 2007, Ministry of 
Health of Shandong Province, 2008, Hao and Yuan, 2009, Hu et al., 2008) 
 
Table 6.1 Sample NCMS participants/non-participants covered by CHNS 
Survey years 
Year Uninsured (%)   Insured (%) Total 
2004 4,139 (95.79) 182 (4.22) 4,321 
2009 280(6.86) 3,804 (93.14) 4,084 
 
 
We identify two potential limitations for deriving policy implications from an 
analysis based on the CHNS survey. First, as mentioned in previous papers, only 
nine provinces are included in the survey, most of these situated in the eastern and 
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coastal part of China; hence, generalizations from the CHNS data to national 
conditions should be made with caution. Second, outpatient costs are influenced by 
supply as well as demand. Because the CHNS survey does not include specific data 
on some potentially important factors influencing the supply side, such as number of 
doctors in a health facility, ownership structure of health facilities, and number of 
health facilities in specific localities, the effects of these factors on the costs of 
outpatient care could not be assessed in our analysis. Third, the recall period of 
healthcare use is only 4 weeks. This is problematic because the stochastic nature of 
healthcare needs means that they cannot be sufficiently captured by a 4 weeks 
window. Most surveys would allow for 12 months for recall period. 
 
6.3.2 Variable specifications 
The dependent variables are the occurrence of outpatient costs, and the pre-insurance 
and post-insurance outpatient costs. Health payment is for a 4-week window in the 
CHNS. Individuals are asked to report their health payment, the percentage that can 
be reimbursed by the NCMS. We use these two variables to construct pre- and post-
reimbursement health payments. Because the inflation rate is quite high in China, 
costs were adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for health services. 
According to China Statistical Yearbook 2005 and 2010, using 2009 as the base year 
CPIs for 2004 is 0.927 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005, National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007) . 
 
Knowing that NCMS was first implemented in 2003, it is clear that the communities 
joined the rural cooperative scheme after 2003 are actually covered by the NCMS 
(Lei and Lin, 2009). Aside from participation in the NCMS, the model also considers 
a set of potential determinants of the use of outpatient care and of costs of outpatient 
care. This includes health need and non-need variables of the sample population, as 
commonly suggested and used in the literatures (Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez 
Rubio, 2009, Gravelle et al., 2006, Jones, 2007). For health need variables, the 
model controls for age, gender, and morbidity type. Morbidity is categorized into 
four types: Type 1 for fever, sore throat, cough, diarrhoea, stomach ache, headache, 
and dizziness; Type 2 for joint pain, muscle pain, rash, dermatitis, and eye/ear 
disease; Type 3 for infectious diseases; and Type 4 for non-communicable diseases. 
For non-need factors, it controls for household per capita income, education, job 
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status, and province of residency, and season. Per capita income is constructed by 
using Equivalence Scales (Citro et al., 1995). Education is categorized into four 
groups: no education, primary and secondary education, high school and technical 
school education, and university education and above. University education and 
above are used as the reference group. Health facilities are categorized into five 
groups: village clinics, township hospitals, county and city hospitals, private clinics, 
and other health facilities. Village clinics are the reference category. For the province 
variable, province Guizhou is set as the reference group. Season is categorized into 
two groups, September to December, and January to March. January to March is the 
reference group. Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics of the data set used in the 
analysis.  
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard 
deviation) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Need variables    
    
    Age   46.481 14.571 
    Gender  Dummy variable: 1, Male; 0 Female 0.503 0.500 
    Morbidity type 1* 
Dummy variable: 1, fever, sore throat, cough, 
diarrhea, stomachache, headache, and dizziness; 0 
otherwise 
0.821 0.384 
    Morbidity type 2 
Dummy variable: 1, joint pain, muscle pain,  rash, 
dermatitis, and eye/ear disease; 0 otherwise 
0.088 0.284 
    Morbidity type 3 Dummy variable: 1, infectious disease; 0 otherwise 0.045 0.208 
    Morbidity type 4 
Dummy variable: 1, non-communicable diseases; 0 
otherwise 
0.046 0.209 
Non-need variables        
    Per capita income  Per capita household income is inflated to year 2009 9.527 0.869 
    Job status Dummy variable: 1, Employed; 0 otherwise 0.784 0.411 
    No edu Dummy variable: 1, No education; 0 otherwise 0.222 0.415 
    Pri/sec edu 
Dummy variable: 1, Primary and secondary 
education; 0 otherwise 
0.620 0.485 
    High school/tech edu 
Dummy variable: 1, High school and technical 
school education; 0 otherwise 
0.129 0.336 
    Uni and above edu* 
Dummy variable: 1, University and above 
education; 0 otherwise 
0.021 0.144 
    Province Liaoning Dummy variable: 1 Liaoning, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 
    Province Heilongjiang Dummy variable: 1 Heilongjiang, 0 otherwise 0.102 0.302 
    Province Jiangsu Dummy variable: 1 Jiangsu, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 
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    Province Shandong Dummy variable: 1 Shandong, 0 otherwise 0.109 0.312 
    Province Henan Dummy variable: 1 Henan, 0 otherwise 0.098 0.297 
    Province Hubei Dummy variable: 1 Hubei, 0 otherwise 0.108 0.310 
    Province Hunan Dummy variable: 1 Hunan, 0 otherwise 0.086 0.280 
    Province Guangxi Dummy variable: 1 Guangxi, 0 otherwise 0.136 0.342 
    Province Guizhou* Dummy variable: 1 Guizhou, 0 otherwise 0.125 0.331 
    Season Dummy variable: 1 Sep. to Dec., 0 Jan. to Mar. 0.546 0.498 
Note: *reference groups.  
 
6.3.3 Empirical strategies 
Mean comparison using longitudinal features of the data 
Three modelling approaches were used to estimate the impacts of NCMS on the cost 
of outpatient care. First, we use the panel structure of the CHNS survey to conduct a 
comparison of average per episode outpatient costs for a single group of individuals 
over time, between 2004 (when none participated in NCMS) and 2009 (when all 
participated in NCMS). A total of 96% of the respondents were not covered by 
NCMS in the 2004 CHNS survey, whereas 93% were covered in the 2009 survey. 
Using the whole sample for mean comparison may cause selection bias, because it 
studies aggregate data, and individuals are not compared with themselves. 
Traditionally, scholars may use matching methods, such as Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) to match sample with similar characteristics to correct selection 
bias. However, methods such as PSM are only able to correct selection bias caused 
by observable factors. The difficulty lies in accounting for a set of unobservable 
individual characteristics that were consistent throughout the years and might 
influence the use of health services and costs of outpatient care.  
 
In this analysis, it was noted that a total of the 1,954 individuals surveyed in 2004, 
when none participated in NCMS, were re-interviewed in 2009, when all were 
covered by NCMS (Table 6.3). Among these individuals, 186 of them reported 
outpatient cost data in 2004 and 2009. We conduct a mean comparison based on the 
same individuals who had outpatient costs data in both survey periods, and who were 
uninsured in 2004 and insured in 2009. By using the methods, we are able to control 
for unobservable individual factors of the sample that are consistent through time. 
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Table 6.4 presents the descriptive analysis of the sample characteristics. Two 
samples are identical in most of the key variables.  
 
Table 6.3 Sample distribution by NCMS participation for 2004 and 2009 
  
2009 (N = 4,084) 
Insured with 
NCMS 
Uninsured with 
NCMS 
Not surveyed in 
2009 
2004 
(N = 
4,321) 
Insured with NCMS 81 1 100 
Uninsured with 
NCMS 
1,954 120 2,065 
Not surveyed in 
2004 
1,769 159 0 
 
 
Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for the study population for empirical strategy 1 
(mean/standard deviation) 
  2004 (N =182) 2009 (N = 182) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 49.555 11.547 55.141 11.575 
Gender 1.548 0.499 1.566 0.497 
Household expenditures 4346.565 5132.607 4828.061 7003.482 
4 week illness 0.785 0.412 0.786 0.411 
Village clinices 0.355 0.480 0.379 0.487 
Township hospitals 0.231 0.423 0.225 0.419 
County/city hospitals 0.188 0.392 0.198 0.399 
Private clinics 0.177 0.383 0.154 0.362 
Other health facilities 0.048 0.215 0.044 0.206 
Job status 0.780 0.415 0.780 0.415 
No edu 0.269 0.445 0.352 0.479 
Pri and sec edu 0.608 0.490 0.604 0.490 
High school 0.118 0.324 0.044 0.206 
Uni and above 0.005 0.073 0.000 0.000 
Province Liaoning 0.129 0.336 0.088 0.284 
Province Heilongjiang 0.059 0.237 0.049 0.217 
Province Jiangsu 0.005 0.073 0.000 0.000 
Province Shandong 0.032 0.177 0.049 0.217 
Province Henan 0.183 0.388 0.187 0.391 
Province Hubei 0.220 0.416 0.104 0.307 
Province Hunan 0.027 0.162 0.033 0.179 
Province Guangxi 0.177 0.383 0.335 0.473 
Province Guizhou 0.167 0.374 0.154 0.362 
season 0.559 0.498 0.258 0.439 
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2PM and HSM 
Secondly, to estimate the determinants of the use, total costs, and OOP payments for 
outpatient care, pooled data from two rounds of CHNS to date (2004 and 2009) are 
subjected to a regression analysis with a 2PM that has been used extensively in the 
health economics literature (Gravelle et al., 2006, Jones, 2007, O'Donnell et al., 
2008b). The regression analysis draws data from CHNS 2004 and 2009 and includes 
all NCMS participants in our sample and all nonparticipants in any insurance 
coverage, excluding only individuals in the sample who are participants in other 
insurance programs. 
 
The model comprises a Probit Model for the probability that an individual makes any 
expenditure on healthcare and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, applied only 
to the population with nonzero expenditures. Invariably the log of expenditure is 
modelled in the OLS because the distribution of medical expenditures is often right-
skewed. Assume that the probability that outpatient cost  iy  is positive is 
determined by observable  iX1  and unobservable  i1  factors. Let  iyln  be the log 
of positive outpatient costs, with a set of control variables iX 2 , and unobservable 
factors i2 . The model can be written as follows (Jones, 2007): 
(19)     22221122 ,0|)ln(,0|)ln(  iiiiiiiii XXXyEXyyE   
 
While the 2PM assumes that two independent decisions are behind medical 
expenditures, HSM allows the decision that seeking medical care and the actual 
expenditures can be influenced by distinct but correlated observable and 
unobservable factors (Gravelle et al., 2006, Jones, 2007, O'Donnell et al., 2008b).  
The model can be written in the latent variable form by the following: 
(20) 2,1
*  jXy jijjiji   
(21) 


 
otherwise
yify
y ii
0
0*1
*
2  
Assuming the two error terms are jointly normally distributed, the model can be 
estimated either by the Heckman two-step procedure. The former involves first 
estimating a Probit Model for the probability of nonzero expenditures, and then uses 
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the results to estimate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to correct for selection bias. In 
the second part of the regression, the following is estimated (Gravelle et al., 2006, 
Jones, 2007, O'Donnell et al., 2008b): 
(22) 
i
i
i
ii e
X
X
Xy 2
11
11
22
)ˆ(
)ˆ(





  
Where    and   are the standard normal probability density and cumulative density 
functions, respectively,   is the correlation coefficient between the errors, and 
2   
is the standard deviation of i2 ( 1 = 1). The performance of the HSM depends on the 
collinearity between the IMR and the explanatory variables in the regression 
equitation, and this can be tested using a t-ratio test. 
 
PSM with DID estimation 
DID is also used to measure the effect of the change of health costs induced by the 
NCMS. DID represents the difference between the pre-post, within-subject 
differences of the treatment group and control group (Stock and Watson, 2011). In 
order to identify treatment and control groups, we would need data on the same 
individual in both 2004 and 2009, or we would be able to identify the surrogate 
treatment group if we treat the dataset as repeated cross-sectional data. Given the 
difficulty in identifying surrogate treatment group, DID is conducted on the same 
individual who were both surveyed in 2004 and 2009. Treatment group is defined as 
those who were not covered by the NCMS in 2004, but were covered by the NCMS 
in 2009. Control group was defined as those who were not covered by any insurance 
in either 2004 or 2009. Let t = 0 represents 2004 and t =1 represent 2009. The model 
can be written as follows,  
(23) ittitii TXTXy   *)ln( 3210  
Where iX is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual was in the 
treatment group and 0 if they were in the control group, and tT  was a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 in 2009 and 0 in 2004.  
 
The premise of using DID is that the treatment is randomly assigned in the 
population. PSM is frequently used in policy analysis to avoid selection bias and to 
ensure that observations are randomly selected for receiving a treatment (Rosenbaum 
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and Rubin, 1983).  We use PSM to predict participating in the NCMS by 
constructing counterfactuals on an assumption that the participation is based on a set 
of observed characteristics. The method includes two steps: (i) predict a conditional 
probability of participating in the NCMS conditional on a set of observable 
variables; (ii) match each participant to one or more nonparticipants on the given 
propensity score using Kernel Function. Balancing properties of the matching was 
reported in Appendix 4. It shows that the estimated propensity score balance the 
observed characteristics well. One concern with regard to PSM is that it only takes 
into account the selection biases based on observed characteristics. Combing PSM 
with DID, we will be able to remove the selection bias resulting from unobserved 
characteristics are constant over time.  
 
For all analyses, the computation of VIF was performed, and results indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a problem. Ramsy RESET tests were also performed, and 
results showed the models had no specification problems. 
 
6.4 Empirical results 
Results based on the first analytical method, the comparison of per episode 
outpatient costs for the same group of individuals in 2004 (pre-enrolment) and 2009 
(as participants to NCMS), are presented in Table 6.5.   
 
The average gross per episode outpatient costs (total billings per episode before 
insurance claims were filed) is 308.14 RMB in 2009, much higher than in 2004, 
when the individuals studied were not covered by NCMS, a statistically significant 
difference. After participants in 2009 filed claims, the average per episode outpatient 
cost for the insured is reduced to 253.81 RMB. A t-test showed that this is not 
significantly different than costs for the uninsured.  
 
Table 6.5 per episode outpatient costs for the insured and uninsured 
 
Uninsured (2004)   
(n = 186) 
Insured (2009)  
(n = 182) 
Difference t-stat 
Gross billed 205.43 308.14 –102.71 –1.86* 
Net after claim paid 205.43 253.81 –48.38 –0.93 
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Note:  p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1 
 
Table 6.6 shows how per episode costs for outpatient care at different levels of 
health facilities differed for the insured and the uninsured. Gross per episode 
outpatient costs, before insurance claims were filed, are significantly higher for the 
insured patients if care is sought at village clinics, township health centres, and 
private clinics rather than larger facilities. For care sought at village clinics, gross per 
episode costs before insurance claims are filed is 116.68 RMB, which is 44.47 RMB 
higher than gross costs billed to the uninsured (t = –1.92). Similarly, gross per 
episode costs for the insured at village clinics is 349.39 RMB, which is 201.09 RMB 
higher than gross billings to the uninsured (t = –2.05). However, after claims are paid, 
no significant difference is observed in the net costs to the insured and the uninsured. 
For care sought at the higher-level health facilities (county and city hospitals), no 
significant difference is observed in costs to the insured and costs to the uninsured. 
 
Table 6.6 Medical costs per treatment episode, for the insured and uninsured, at 
different levels of health facilities 
 
 
Uninsured  
(2004)  
( N = 186) 
Insured  
(2009)   
(N = 182) 
Difference t-stat 
Village clinics 66 69   
 Gross billed 72.21 116.68 –44.47 –1.92* 
 Net after claim 72.21 97.77 –25.56 –1.14 
Township  health centres 43 41   
 Gross billed 139.30 349.39 –210.09 –2.05** 
 Net after claim 139.30 244.20 –104.90 –1.24 
City/county hospitals 35 36   
 Gross billed 618.12 683.89 –65.77 –0.34 
 Net after claim 618.12 569.72   48.40   0.26 
Private clinics 33 28   
 Gross billed 52.31 289.29 –236.98 –2.04** 
 Net after claim 52.31 289.29 –236.98 –2.04 
Other 9 8   
Gross billed 454.91 123.13   331.78   1 .00 
Net after claim 454.91 103.11   351.80   1.06 
Note:  p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1 
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Table 6.7 shows the results for 2PM and HSM. The models estimates the impacts of 
NCMS on outpatient costs by comparing gross costs before insurance claims are 
filed with net costs after insurance claims are filed and reimbursement was paid. 
Occurrence of outpatient costs is analysed in relation to insurance, type of illness, 
job status, and place of residence, etc. Results from this second method are 
consistent with the regression results presented above. One salient finding is that the 
NCMS had no significant impacts on outpatient care utilization. Even more 
importantly, results of the regression show that, ceteris paribus, NCMS has no effect 
in reducing participants’ OOP payments (indicated under the after reimbursement 
column in Table 6.7) for outpatient care, and meanwhile it significantly increases the 
pre-insurance costs of outpatient care (indicated under the before reimbursement 
column in Table 6.7). Both 2PM and Heckman Selection Model show that pre-
insurance cost of outpatient care for rural residents covered by NCMS to be more 
than 40% higher than for those not covered. Further, it is also noted that comparing 
to minor illness (Morbidity type 1), people who are with major illness are more 
likely to seek outpatient care. 
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Table 6.7 Regression results for outpatient medical costs for 2004 and 2009 
  2PM HSM 
  Before reimbursement After reimbursement Before reimbursement After reimbursement 
  Participation Continuous Participation Continuous Participation Continuous Participation Continuous 
  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
  
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Coefficien
t Coefficient 
Coefficien
t 
Insurance 0.065 0.343*** 0.052 0.098 0.046 0.415*** 0.052 0.098 
Age 0.02 0.008 0.02 0.008 0.024* 0.017 0.02 0.008 
Age2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gender -0.133** 0.085 -0.107* 0.117 -0.131** -0.044 -0.107* 0.115 
Morbidity type 2 2.558*** -0.534** 2.538*** -0.428* 2.534*** 2.245*** 2.538*** -0.377 
Morbidity type 3 2.15*** 0.106 2.17*** 0.214 2.154*** 2.503*** 2.17*** 0.259 
Morbidity type 4 2.62*** 0.957*** 2.621*** 1.039*** 2.63*** 3.77*** 2.621*** 1.091 
Per capita income 
(lg) 
0.031 -0.044 0.017 -0.023 0.037 -0.024 0.017 -0.022 
Job status 0.083 0.006 0.091 -0.044 0.073 0.106 0.091 -0.042 
No edu -0.345 -0.75 -0.367 -0.756 -0.383 -1.017 -0.368 -0.762 
Pri and sec edu -0.261 -0.668 -0.297 -0.724 -0.291 -0.872 -0.297 -0.729 
High school -0.46 -0.616 -0.495 -0.597 -0.487 -0.996 -0.496 -0.605 
Province Liaoning -0.279** 0.944*** -0.285** 1.077*** -0.289** 0.709*** -0.285** 1.072*** 
Province 
Heilongjiang 
-0.379** 0.619** -0.375** 0.504 -0.386*** 0.273 -0.375** 0.497 
Province Jiangsu 0.184 0.483** 0.203 0.668*** 0.154 0.675** 0.203 0.671** 
Province Shandong 0.003 0.41 0.025 0.139 -0.023 0.464 0.025 0.14 
Province Henan 0.37*** 0.027 0.384*** 0.181 0.371*** 0.346 0.384*** 0.187 
Province Hubei 0.092 0.409* 0.017 0.447* 0.064 0.537** 0.017 0.448* 
Province Hunan -0.074 0.778*** -0.134 0.906*** -0.092 0.723** -0.134 0.903*** 
Province Guangxi 0.459*** 0.096 0.425*** 0.266 0.424*** 0.534** 0.425*** 0.273 
Season -0.272*** 0.114 -0.328*** 0.046 -0.272*** -0.118 -0.328*** 0.041 
Constant -3.063*** 4.758*** -2.883*** 4.488*** -3.159*** 0.594 -2.882*** 4.41* 
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  N = 7717 N = 730 N = 7717 N = 711 N = 7717 N = 730 N = 7717 N = 711 
  
LR chi2(21) = 
2547.26 
F( 21, 708) = 
9.65 
LR chi2(21) 
=2487.31 
F( 21, 689) = 
7.5 
Rho = 
0.7696349   
Rho = 
0.0174707   
  Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 LR test of Rho = 0:  p = 
0.0133 
LR test of Rho = 0:   p  = 
0.9706           
  Pseudo R2 = 0.5272 R2 = 0.2042 Pseudo R2 = 0.5242 R2 = 0.186 Wald chi2(21) = 175.23 Wald chi2(21) = 161.65 
          Prob > chi2 = 0   Prob > chi2 = 0   
(Note:  p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1) 
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Table 6.8 shows the PSM with DID estimates for outpatient costs before the NCMS 
deduction and after the NCMS deduction. The results show a trend of an observed 
increase in the difference of pre-reimbursement outpatient costs between the 
treatment and control group (p =0.1). The results also show that there is no 
significant difference for post-reimbursement outpatient costs between the control 
and treatment groups after the launch of the NCMS.  
 
Table 6.8 DID results with PSM for outpatient costs before the NCMS 
deduction and after the NCMS deduction 
  Before reimbursement (N = 351) 
  Control Treated Diff(2004) Control Treated Diff(2009) Diff-in-diff  
Outpatient cost (lg) 5.108 4.146 -0.962 3.854 4.668 0.814 1.777* 
S.E. 0.567 0.124 0.581 0.926 0.122 0.934 1.1 
R2             0.238 
  After Reimbursement (N = 344) 
  Control Treated Diff(2004) Control Treated Diff(2009) Diff-in-diff  
Outpatient cost (lg) 3.976 4.141 0.165 4.390 4.402 0.012 -0.153 
S.E. 0.547 0.128 0.561 0.669 0.126 0.681 0.883 
R2             0.233 
(Note:  p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1.  DID model used include age, gender, morbidity types, per capita 
income, job status, province and season variables. ) 
 
Robustness test 
We perform two main sets of robustness tests for the analysis. The first set uses both 
2PM and HSM to estimate the probability of using outpatient care and the main 
factors that influence outpatient costs. These two models show similar results. The 
second set of robustness tests is performed on the continuous part of the regression 
model. The positive association between education and health is well established 
(Ross and Wu, 1995, Costa-Font and Gil, 2008, Costa-Font et al., 2010). In the main 
analysis, education is categorised into four groups. For the robustness checks, these 
groups are re-categorised into five groups: no education, primary education, 
secondary education, high school or technical school, university education and 
above—that is, primary and secondary education have treated separately, not in 
combination as before. The regression model is then re-estimated. Robustness tests 
confirm the results from the 2PM and HSM models that outpatient costs are higher 
for the NCMS insured group compared with the uninsured group before insurance 
153 
 
claims are filed. No significant difference is observed for these two groups in terms 
of costs after insurance claims are filed.  
 
6.5 Discussion and conclusion  
The study has yielded some compelling new findings regarding the impact of NCMS 
on the costs of outpatient care in rural China. Evidence as recent as 2009 indicates 
that outpatient treatments for the program’s participants incurred significantly higher 
per episode costs than outpatient treatments for the uninsured after the new initiative 
was implemented. This pre-reimbursement inflation in costs of service is most 
noticeably observed at village clinics, township hospitals, and private clinics. Cost 
inflation for health insurance is not new and has been observed in countries other 
than China. In Chile, the availability of private health insurance led to increased use 
of high-technology obstetric practices and consequently to higher Cesarean delivery 
rates (Murray and Elston, 2005). Prescription drug insurance likewise had positive 
effects in encouraging the use of specialist care (Allin and Hurley, 2009).  In China, 
cost escalation was observed in the urban health insurance scheme adopted in the 
late 1990s before NCMS was inaugurated for the rural population. All these 
programs created strong incentives for health providers to prescribe expensive drugs 
and high-tech diagnosis procedures, on which the profit margins were higher 
(Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008).  
 
Our analysis shows that during the interval covered by our study (2004 and 2009), 
one possible explanation for the observed increase in outpatient costs is that the 
availability of funds through patients’ insurance claims from NCMS may similarly 
have induced participating health facilities and doctors to prescribe more expensive 
drugs or order unnecessary treatments—one phenomenon that has been recognised in 
the literature (Yip et al., 2010, Yip and Mahal, 2008, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). 
Comparison of average per episode costs for outpatient care before and after rural 
residents subscribed to the NCMS yielded similar findings. From this evidence it 
appears that during the interval analysed, the NCMS is associated with an escalation 
in pre-reimbursement per episode outpatient health costs (gross billings, before 
claims are filed) for its participants, even if after claims were filed, OOP payments 
are reduced to a level similar to that for nonparticipants. The regression analysis and 
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DID analysis also reveal that pre-reimbursement costs for outpatient care for rural 
participants to NCMS are 40% higher than those for no subscribing, uninsured 
patients. Thus in terms of OOP payments for outpatient services, the NCMS has 
limited impacts on reducing outpatient costs, while costs billed to the NCMS for 
outpatient services may continue to rise. 
 
One policy implication to be drawn from this scenario is that further infusions of 
government subsidies aimed at covering rising NCMS expenditures may simply 
induce further waves of cost escalation, unless the program can use its leverage as 
purchaser and third-party payer to introduce cost-saving measures in participating 
health services facilities.  
 
More crucially, pressures for cost inflation appear to be stronger in village clinics 
and township health centres, where rural residents are most likely to seek outpatient 
care, than at larger facilities. Per episode costs for outpatient care at village clinics 
and township health centres are significantly higher for patients covered by the 
NCMS than for those not covered. Because it is widely believed that cost-effective 
care can best be delivered at low-level health facilities that are most accessible to 
rural residents, The NCMS create incentives for its participants to seek care in those 
venues; the claims reimbursement rates for care delivered in these, small local health 
facilities are the highest offered by the program. Yet during the interval studied, 
these same venues received less government subsidization through the NCMS than 
others did, usually larger health facilities. The resulting financial vulnerability, 
coupled with the local availability of at least some NCMS funding, may have led to 
higher charges for participants as local facilities struggled to make ends meet. Much 
of the government support intended to subsidize participants’ payments for 
healthcare may instead have been absorbed by the insatiable quest for revenues and 
cost coverage at these smaller health facilities that are most frequently visited by 
rural residents. 
 
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that the rapid expansion of NCMS 
through massive injection of government subsidies has so far had limited impacts on 
either improving access or reducing OOP payments for outpatient care at 
participating health facilities. In fact, our analyses indicate that rural residents 
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covered by NCMS are less likely to seek outpatient care than are uninsured residents 
who do not subscribe to the program. There is no evidence from our analysis that 
NCMS reduces OOP payment for outpatient care. Providers, seeking to offer 
improved care, ultimately increased total costs of outpatient care, such that financial 
benefits to patients in the form of claims reimbursements through NCMS are largely 
dissipated by the costs of this enhanced service, providing no overall cost savings to 
outpatient participants.  
 
More research is needed to understand how and to what extent NCMS created and 
may continue to create this cost escalation at lower-level health providers, who are 
the front line of care for rural residents. Caught between a mandate for improved 
services to their rural clientele, and lagging funds to accomplish the job, these small 
facilities may be forced to drive up reimbursable costs to make ends meet.  
Participants to the program are then left no worse off than nonparticipants in terms of 
OOP payments per episode of service, but they are not seeing the hoped-for savings, 
against prior, uninsured levels of expense, that the program was intended to provide.  
 
Without a careful examination of medical costs at different levels of health facilities, 
policy makers will not be able to identify the root causes of this problem. Without a 
clear understanding of the governance framework that support it, the intended 
benefits of the health insurance program for China’s large rural population will be 
difficult to realize (Ramesh et al., 2012). New measures in improving NCMS should 
be directed not only at offsetting rising costs, but also at designing and implementing 
reforms in cost management in participating health service facilities, in an effort to 
make best use of the public financing in the long term.  If costs can be reined in, 
rural participants stand a better chance at realizing actual cost savings in medical 
care under NCMS, one of the program’s core goals. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis was to investigate issues of inequities and 
inefficiencies in healthcare in China. The research questions that this thesis followed 
are: Do health inequities and inefficiencies exist in China’s healthcare system? To 
what extent does the rural insurance scheme address issues of inequities and 
inefficiencies in healthcare in rural China? This thesis examines the emergence of 
income-related health inequalities in rural and urban China, and the impacts of the 
NCMS on equity in access and finance in healthcare. Specifically, it looks into the 
distribution of health outcomes for urban and rural populations in order to 
understand which socioeconomic or income groups are affected by which health 
issues, and why. The bulk of the thesis focuses on the discussion of the rural health 
insurance reform and its impacts on inequity in health. This thesis argues that, the 
NCMS has met some of its principal goals of expanding coverage and increasing 
utilization of some services, but equity is still an issue with the NCMS. Outpatient 
care, which usually covers the “basic” cost-effective interventions, is not emphasized 
in the benefit package. It is evident that even for households covered by the NCMS, 
costs incurred from outpatient care might still considered catastrophic, and may even 
become a poverty trap for some households. This thesis pays particular attention to 
the issue of inefficiency in health provision by investigating the relationship between 
the NCMS and cost escalation. This thesis suggests that the NCMS may respond to a 
certain amount of cost escalation because doctors and hospitals may increase 
demand for those who are covered by health insurance.   
 
This chapter starts by summarising results of the empirical chapters. It sets out some 
policy implications for addressing issues of inequities and inefficiencies in China’s 
healthcare system, focusing on changes that build on recent government initiatives, 
notably the NCMS. Limitations and future research agenda are also presented in the 
concluding section. 
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7.1 Summary of the findings 
The main research question of this thesis is whether inequity and inefficiency exist in 
China’s healthcare system in the 2000s, how the NCMS responses to these issues. 
This thesis investigates health inequities by looking at specific health inequities, i.e., 
socioeconomic related inequities in health outcomes, horizontal inequities in health 
access, catastrophic health payment and health payment-induced poverty in health 
finance. By analysing the data from CHNS of 2004, 2006 and 2009, this thesis raises 
equity concerns about the affordability of health costs for the poor, the worry being 
that the poor, even covered by the NCMS, are more likely to use folk doctor care 
than the rich, and less likely to use preventive care. They may also have difficulty in 
meeting the costs of care that they need, or may have to pay a substantial share of 
income on healthcare. This thesis investigates the problem of inefficiency in China’s 
healthcare system. The findings suggest that the NCMS may exacerbate the problem 
of inefficiency in healthcare provision because the scheme may lead to healthcare 
cost escalation. It argues that without removing the distortions in provider incentives 
inherited in China’s healthcare system, the best intentions of the NCMS to provide 
financial protection to the rural Chinese will be difficult to realise. The following 
section summarises the findings of each paper: 
 Chapter 3 (Paper 1) argues that urban respondents have similar self-assessed 
health, but more physical limitations compared with rural respondents. 
Income-related health inequalities are more pronounced for urban 
populations than for rural populations. The most striking result from this 
chapter is that for the urban population, more than two-thirds of inequalities 
are driven by socioeconomic related factors, among which income, job status 
and educational level are the most important. The contributions from 
socioeconomic related factors of the rural population are much less 
pronounced compared with the urban population. 
 Chapter 4 (Paper 2) shows a mixed picture in terms of the variation of 
healthcare utilisation and how the NCMS has influenced the level of inequity. 
It investigates the whole period of the expansion of the NCMS from 2004 
(before the expansion of the NCMS) and 2009 (after the expansion of NCMS 
across rural China). It finds that the level of inequity remains the same for 
outpatient care. In terms of preventive care, the pro-rich inequity has 
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decreased. A widening gap between the poor and rich in terms of folk doctor 
use is observed. The NCMS demonstrates positive effects on reducing 
income-related health inequity in folk doctor care and preventive care, but the 
contribution is rather small. 
 Chapter 5 (Paper 3) provides evidence of the impacts of the NCMS on the 
magnitude, distribution and economic consequences of OOP payments for 
outpatient care in rural China. The NCMS has limited impact on reducing the 
incidence or severity of catastrophic payments, or reducing favouring-poor 
inequity in catastrophic payments. It has had no significant effects on 
reducing health payment-induced poverty. The costs are likely to become 
catastrophic when care is sought at village and township health facilities, and 
the NCMS has no significant impact on reducing the likelihood of this 
occurring. For households with chronic disease members, catastrophe is 
disproportionately concentrated among the poor.  
 Chapter 6 (Paper 4) investigates the relationship between the NCMS and cost 
escalation. The study shows that during the interval covered by our study 
(2004 to 2009), the availability of funds through patients’ insurance claims 
from the NCMS may have induced participating health facilities and doctors 
to prescribe more expensive drugs or induce unnecessary treatments. 
Outpatient treatments for the program’s participants incurred significantly 
higher pre-reimbursement per episode costs than outpatient treatments for the 
uninsured. This pre-reimbursement inflation in costs of service is most 
noticeably observed at village clinics, township hospitals, and private clinics.  
 
This thesis makes a contribution to the methodology in healthcare research. 
Although the health equity methods used in this thesis are built upon the 
Concentration Indices and Decomposition Analysis, this thesis transforms these 
methods into tools for policy evaluation in China’s healthcare system. Specifically, 
this thesis assesses health inequities by looking at socioeconomic related inequities 
in health outcomes, horizontal inequities in health access, catastrophic health 
payments and health payment-induced poverty in health finance. This thesis also 
develops a set of analytical tools to investigate one potential type of inefficiency—
cost escalation under the NCMS. It does so by using three empirical strategies to 
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investigate the relationship between insurance and cost escalation. The specific 
empirical strategies include conditional mean testing, Two-part Model and Heckman 
Selection Model and Propensity Score Matching with Difference-in-differences 
analysis. This study is also among the first to offer suggestive empirical evidence of 
supplier-inducement under the insurance. The findings of this thesis should be 
understood within their contexts, but these tools of measurement are transferrable for 
analysing health inequities in other countries with similar political structures and 
levels of socioeconomic development.  
 
7.2 Policy implications 
The thesis suggests that inequities and inefficiencies are urgent issues in China's 
healthcare sector. Drawing from the empirical results from the papers presented here, 
a number of policy recommendations are made.  Policy recommendations for the 
rural healthcare system are drawn specifically from Papers 2, 3 and 4, policy 
recommendations for the urban healthcare system are drawn specifically form Paper 
1, while the overarching recommendations are policy recommendations for the 
Chinese health system more generally.  
 
7.2.1 Policy recommendations for the rural healthcare system (Papers 2, 3 and 4) 
A major topic of this thesis is to discuss the rural health insurance reform, i.e. the 
NCMS. This thesis has shown that despite the impressive expansion of the health 
insurance system, there are growing concerns about the impacts of the insurance on 
health equity, and in particular on whether it has improved equitable access and led 
to the reduction in OOP payment for patients (see Paper 2, Paper 3 and Paper 4). A 
few specific policy recommendations on how to improve the design of the insurance 
to achieve its goal in improving equitable access, fairness in financing, and reducing 
health cost are presented as follows.  
 
Improving the NCMS benefit package  
 Outpatient care 
Outpatient care is one of the most frequently used and widely accessible forms of 
care for rural Chinese farmers (Hu et al., 2011). However, it is not a cheap event, 
and costs can become catastrophic for poor households (Kavosi et al., 2012, 
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Szwarcwald et al., 2010, Wagstaff et al., 2005).  Paper 3 suggested that the NCMS 
had little impact on reducing catastrophic outpatient payments, and the scheme still 
required substantial cost sharing for outpatient care. Although the NCMS claimed to 
reimburse catastrophic outpatient care associated with chronic conditions, Paper 3 
found that patients with chronic disease conditions were more likely to suffer from 
catastrophic health payments, and such a trend was more pronounced among the 
poor. It is not surprising because the NCMS mainly reimburses two types 
catastrophic outpatient care: general chronic conditions and severe chronic 
conditions that require specialist care (see Table 5.1 in Paper 3). A list of 28 chronic 
conditions are eligible for catastrophic outpatient care reimbursement (Ministry of 
Health P.R.China et al., 2007). These chronic conditions are either associated with 
severe post-surgical conditions, such as conditions requiring chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy, etc., or other severe chronic conditions that are in need of long-term 
specialist care. Many common chronic conditions, such as conditions related to 
neurological dysfunction, are not eligible for catastrophic outpatient reimbursement. 
Patients who are diagnosed with these common chronic diseases would need to pay a 
large share of their medical bills out of pocket. More common chronic diseases 
should be included in the NCMS's outpatient reimbursement list in order to reduce 
access barriers and improve the affordability of care.  
 
Aside from a limited reimbursement list, the reimbursement rate for outpatient care 
is low in general. The government claimed that between 40% to 79%of medical bills 
will be reimbursed by the NCMS, but the actual reimbursement rates, as evidenced 
in the literature, are between 10% and 20%, and a substantial fraction of costs has to 
be financed out of pocket (Barber and Yao, 2011). Even though outpatient care is 
generally believed to be cheap and affordable, it is not always true for the poor 
because demand for outpatient care for this group is usually price sensitive (Werner, 
2009, Shahrawat and Rao, 2012, Chen and Meltzer, 2008), and OOP payments can 
lead to a substantial burden for poor patients, and may even induce poverty as 
evident from this thesis. Moreover, limiting the insurance benefit package may 
actually increase the risk that the poor may delay seeking care until their condition 
becomes sufficiently serious to require inpatient care. Delayed care may then lead to 
higher medical costs, which may again create affordability issues for patients. 
 
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 Inpatient care 
Problems with inpatient care are similar to those with outpatient care. Two policy 
recommendations are given in order to address problems related to access to and 
finance of inpatient care. First, the NCMS needs a more comprehensive benefit 
package for inpatient care. Although coverage of treatments for catastrophic illness 
remains the primary objective of the NCMS, at the time of writing, the NCMS has 
only included eight severe diseases in its inpatient reimbursement list, which 
includes childhood leukaemia, congenital heart disease, end-stage renal disease, 
breast cancer, cervical cancer, etc. The scheme is running a pilot program to include 
12 more severe diseases in the benefit package (Liu et al., 2012a, Wang et al., 2012b, 
Wang et al., 2012c, Zhou et al., 2011, Xinhua, 2012a), but the list is still far from 
comprehensive. Some common life-threatening diseases, such as lung cancer, are not 
included in the list, and co-payments for inpatient care of these remain high even 
after claims for reimbursable costs are paid (Liu et al., 2012a, Wang et al., 2012b, 
Wang et al., 2012c, Zhou et al., 2011).  
 
Similar to outpatient care, reimbursement rates for inpatient care are low in general. 
As mentioned in the earlier papers in the thesis, the reimbursement rate depends on 
where the care is sought. The claimed reimbursement of inpatient care as suggested 
by the government is no less than 75% for village clinics/township health centres, 55% 
for county/district hospitals and 45% for city/province hospitals (Centre for Health 
Statistics and Information, 2008). The intention in giving higher reimbursement rates 
for care sought at village and township level health facilities is to improve efficient 
use of medical resources and to avoid patients seeking unnecessary care at secondary 
and tertiary hospitals; however, patients seeking care at county/district hospitals and 
city/province hospitals tend to incur higher costs because they may suffer from 
severe illness and would require complex treatment procedures. Low reimbursement 
rates at these health facilities may lead to higher co-payments, and this may in turn 
lead to affordability issues when the NCMS participants seek care at these health 
facilities.  
 
Provide additional benefits to the poor 
Papers 2 and 3 find that the NCMS has limited impacts on improving equitable 
access and fairness in finance among the poor. The poor are often less likely to use 
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preventive care, and have a higher risk of suffering from catastrophic health shocks 
than the rich. Nearly half of the outpatient care episode costs incurred at village 
clinics and township health centres are catastrophic; and the catastrophe is more 
concentrated among the poor. One policy implication drawn from the findings is to 
link co-payments to household income, and to offer better financial protection to the 
poor.  
 
It is unfair to say that the Chinese government has done nothing to help the poor 
with medical expenses. In fact, a separate social security scheme, the Medical 
Assistance Safety Net (MASN), was initiated in 2003 to provide financial support 
with medical expenses and insurance contributions to the extremely poor and 
vulnerable groups, in rural and urban areas. However, studies showed that the 
impacts of the scheme were rather limited, and this was mainly because of the 
limited budget of the MASN (Wagstaff et al., 2009c). In 2006, the MASN budget 
was approximately RMB18 (US$2.26) per person. Even if all this budget had been 
used on paying healthcare, the program would have had been just enough to cover 
the contribution to the NCMS premium, which was RMB10 (US$1.25) per person. 
This would leave only RMB8 (US$ 1.003) for health payments, whereas the average 
payments for healthcare for the bottom quintile of the rural population were around 
RMB200 (US$ 25.08) (Wagstaff et al., 2009c). Moreover, the aim of the MASN is 
only to provide financial protection for the extremely poor, and this excludes a large 
share of the rural farmers who are not eligible MASN beneficiaries but might still be 
considered poor.  
 
The current rural health system in China needs to pay more attention to the poor, 
either by designing a separate SHI programme or by offering additional benefits 
from existing insurance packages. One possible solution is to link insurance 
contributions to household income; this means that households would need to devote 
a fixed percentage of their income to insurance contributions. At the moment, the 
poor are paying the same flat-rate of insurance contributions and receiving the same 
benefit package as the rich. For most SHIs, insurance contributions can either be 
made through a payroll tax or through any government pension programme, and the 
contribution can be deducted before the individual receives the pension (Mossialos, 
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2002). However, in rural China, it is potentially difficult to gain access to income 
level data because farmers are usually self-employed or working in informal sectors, 
where national level data of declarations for income tax are often unavailable or 
unreliable (Wagstaff et al., 2009c). A number of alternative strategies for linking the 
NCMS contributions to living standards of individual households might be worth 
considering. Examples can be drawn from other low-and middle-income countries. 
For instance, Colombia has adopted a proxy-means testing instrument, which is 
known as the System for Selecting Beneficiaries of Social Spending (SISBEN) for 
targeting health spending since the mid-1990s (Castañeda, 2005). The approach was 
based on the evaluation of household living standard to determine targeting 
beneficiaries—the poor and the vulnerable. The objects of the SISBEN were to 
select target population for the program, and to provide these people with a 
determined health insurance package by contracting and paying their private health 
insurance agencies. This health insurance package usually includes primary and 
basic inpatient care, as well as a list of catastrophic illness. By 2002, 60% of the 
Colombian population (27 million people) were enrolled in the SISBEN, and about 
half of them (13 million) received benefits. The proxy-means testing instrument has 
also been extensively used to target subsidies for a variety of government 
programmes including health insurance and subsidies for the poor and the vulnerable 
by national and local governments (Castañeda, 2005, Escobar et al., 2010). 
 
In theory, a similar strategy as the SISBEN can be applied to the Chinese context so 
that the NCMS contributions can be linked to household income. In practice, this 
approach will obviously be costly unless the data can be used for other purposes, as 
is the case for Colombia. Alternatively, China can use other available data sources, 
such as property tax data, to capture and identify the vulnerable population and to 
link insurance contributions to household income.  
 
Enhancing effective purchasing for the NCMS 
Although purchasing is still in its infancy in China, the SHI schemes need to 
consider it an important element, and change the ways schemes interact with 
providers. In China, the government agencies, as purchasers and third-party payers, 
undertake limited bargaining with health providers for low prices, and provide 
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limited oversight role over service quality and provider behaviour (Wagstaff et al., 
2009c, Yip and Hsiao, 2009a, Li et al., 2011). In fact, most policy documents 
mentioning strategic purchasing usually lack information on how such policies 
would be formed and implemented. It is important that the NCMS should become a 
proactive purchaser of healthcare to lead health providers to provide effective and 
appropriate care.  
 
Despite the fact that the NCMS thus far has shown limited capability in utilizing its 
purchasing power, some experimental efforts have brought promising results. In 
Shanghai, purchasing decisions can only be made based on the most cost-effective 
choices for each treatment plan. For example, a hospital is allowed to offer and use a 
maximum of two pharmaceutical products that share the same formula, selected 
according to their cost-effectiveness (Yang, 2009). Some western regions, taking 
into account evidence of provider performance as well as village-level ratings of 
services provided, have created “fund boards” (comprised of village representatives, 
government officials, township health centre directors, and auditors) to act as a 
single purchaser and to make purchasing decisions (Wang et al., 2009a). Clearly, 
insurers have started to exercise some influence over purchasing decisions in some 
areas, but it is too early to tell whether these mechanisms—cost-effective limits set 
on hospital purchases, or locally comprised purchasing boards—can be sustained in 
the long run, and, more importantly, whether they will prove to be applicable in a 
wide range of circumstances. It has to be noted that, to transform NCMS into a 
proactive purchaser of healthcare would require effective coordination of different 
levels of local health authorities and providers, a task that would demand significant 
changes to existing institutional arrangements.  
 
7.2.2 Policy recommendations for the urban healthcare system (Paper 1) 
China is undergoing a rapid transformation from a rural, agricultural based society 
into an urban one (Hussain, 2003). While the urban growth has doubtlessly resulted 
in a rise in the middle classes and in wealth, a large fraction of urban population is 
still poor, and the income gap between the rich and poor is also associated with 
inequalities in other socioeconomic areas, such as health (Chen and Meltzer, 2008).  
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Paper 1 discusses the issue of widening inequalities in urban China, and finds that a 
large percentage of inequalities in health outcomes are associated with 
socioeconomic related socioeconomic factors. The striking findings urge Chinese 
policy makers to pay attention to the health of those who belong to the lower 
socioeconomic groups, especially those who live in urban areas.  
 
The discussion of inequities in health outcomes in Paper 1 underlines the nature and 
scope of the problems that the Chinese government faced in the mid-2000s. A 
number of health initiatives were launched to improve equitable access to healthcare 
for the urban poor and to enhance the capacity of health facilities in urban 
communities after 2006. In 2007, the Chinese government launched the URI, a new 
social health insurance scheme targeting the urban unemployed. Prior to 2007, there 
were two primary SHI programs in China: UEI for the urban employed and the 
NCMS for the rural population. Approximately 420 million urban residents without 
formal employment were completely left out of the SHI safety net (Lin et al., 2009). 
As unaffordable access to healthcare and impoverishment due to high health costs is 
one of the great difficulties confronting the urban unemployed, the launch of the URI 
in 2007 offered financial assistance for the urban poor to overcome their health 
dilemma. 
 
This thesis does not include an analysis of existing SHIs in urban China. However, 
as the URI is the only available SHI for the urban vulnerable, it is important to 
discuss some potential problems of the URI. Like the NCMS, the URI focuses 
mainly on catastrophic illness, and its benefit package is limited. The URI 
participants are not entitled to any additional benefits even though they may have 
greater health needs than the urban employed (Lin et al., 2009). A more 
comprehensive disease list for outpatient and inpatient services, along with more 
generous reimbursement rates should be applied to the URI benefit package. Further, 
the government should also reduce or waive the insurance contribution from the URI 
participants, or allocate aggressive subsidies to help the urban poor pay for the 
premium in order to ensure equity of enrolment. Currently, the participation in the 
URI is on a voluntary basis, and a premium is required for enrolment. This may 
impede the urban poor because they are already struggling with meeting their living 
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expenses (Chen and Yan, 2012).  
 
The second main policy initiative for improving access of care for the urban poor is 
the establishment of community-based health system in the urban areas. In 2006, the 
government allocated a total of 850 billion RMB (US$136 billion) to establish a 
community-based health system, which required communities with a population of 
between 30,000 and 100,000 to have a health centre (Li and Yu, 2011). The aim of 
the programme was to improve equity in access and to provide basic healthcare for 
the urban population generally and the urban poor specifically (Li and Yu, 2011). 
These health centres provide low costs basic services including primary medical care, 
preventive care, health management, rehabilitation, and family planning, and they 
offer short waiting times and a short travel distance, and the services are open for all 
residents living in cities, including migrant workers from rural areas (Li and Yu, 
2011). The community-based health system acts as a complement to the URI by 
filling the gap for low-cost preventive and primary care which is not covered by the 
URI.  
 
However, whether the centre is able to offer effective treatments at a low price 
largely depends on the financing capability of local governments (Li and Yu, 2011). 
Where per capita GDP in the most affluent province can be much higher than the 
least affluent one, the services that can be offered by community centres vary 
significantly among provinces and cities. It is common to see community health 
centres survive on medicine sales and revenues generated from clinic services since 
many local governments are not able to allocate sufficient funding for health centres. 
Drugs can account for about 75% of the total revenue in a community health centre, 
and profit margins were as high as 50% (Li and Yu, 2009). Such a financing 
mechanism creates strong incentives for health facilities to prescribe more expensive 
medicines and provide more costly health services than is necessary. This is 
problematic because if the goal of the community-based health centres is to improve 
access to basic care for the urban population, then care provided at these health 
centres should be based on the most cost-effective, rather than the most profitable 
options (Wang et al., 2005).  
 
It might be useful to look into possible strategies to regulate provider behaviours and 
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to reform provider payment mechanisms for primary care providers. For primary 
care, the most commonly used alternative to a FFS mechanism is capitation, linking 
provider payment arrangement to number of patients the providers are expected to 
serve, or having a fixed salary payment for the physicians. As there might be a risk 
of under provision, it is suggested to use capitation and salary payment for reducing 
unnecessary use for primary care but also use FFS to create incentives for priority 
preventive services (Figueras et al., 2005).  Further, the government should 
incorporate other methods to make the most efficient use of scarce resources, for 
instance, to include more cost-effective choices for care provided through 
community health centres.  
 
7.2.3 Overarching policy recommendations  
Reforming provider payment methods 
The above discussion focuses on improving the existing benefit package of the 
NCMS, the URI and to improve the services provided at the community level. 
However, these policy recommendations may only be effective with a thorough 
reform of provider incentives. The Chinese healthcare providers, who are largely 
relying on revenue from drugs and services, are likely to charge more from those 
who are entitled to insurance benefits. Studies showed that hospitals in China may 
supply high margin high-technology care and drugs to the NCMS patients wherever 
possible, and insured patients usually need to pay more than was strictly necessary 
(Hu et al., 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 2009b).  
 
Paper 4 provides a detailed evaluation on whether the NCMS is effective in 
providing equitable access and fairness in financing.  Policy makers must not only 
focus on the design of the health interventions. It is equally important to look at 
structural problems of the Chinese healthcare system. The findings suggest that the 
effectiveness of NCMS may be undermined by the prevailing FFS payment 
mechanism for healthcare, which allows healthcare providers to earn a profit for 
services rendered and also to profit from related prescription drug sales (Wagstaff, 
2007b, World Bank, 1997). Because most healthcare facilities rely heavily on direct 
health services and prescription drug revenues to survive (Latker, 1998, Yip and 
Hanson, 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 2008a), the availability of insurance funds such as 
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NCMS reimbursements for claims may create incentives for price hikes, which 
insured patients (and the uninsured as well) are helpless to combat.  
 
A number of policies and regulations are available to alter the perverse incentive 
embedded in the FFS payment system. Prospective payment methods are suggested 
and have already been used to make providers bear the financial risk of 
overprescribing and to provide incentives for providers to reduce inefficient use of 
services. Evidence has begun to emerge, pointing to positive effects from using 
prospective payment methods to regulate provider behaviours in China (Luo, 2011, 
Jiao et al., 2013). Particular examples of prospective payment methods that might be 
suitable for application in China include diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment for 
hospitals, and capitation for primary care doctors (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a). However, 
the success of these initiatives will necessarily depend on the capacity of local 
government agencies in insured areas, and how effective they are in monitoring 
provider behaviours. 
 
It has to be noted, for these prospective payments methods to be effective, China 
must change the FFS financing mechanism. Evidence from Thailand shows that the 
DRG, capitation, and other payment methods were effective in cost control under its 
Universal Coverage Healthcare Scheme (UC scheme), while the Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) using FFS payments continued to experience 
cost escalation despite  numerous efforts made to rein in the costs 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2007). Government agencies, as the insurers, must not 
limit their attention to establish appropriate service-specific standards with regard to 
the package of services to be delivered, but also closely monitor providers’ 
performance and enforce those standards. 
 
Reducing regional inequalities in health finance 
There appears to be significant regional disparities in economic development in 
China. In the case of the NCMS and the URI, individual participants and local 
governments are required to contribute to the individual’s insurance premium in 
addition to the contribution made by central government. Participants and localities 
in less wealthy areas are often unable to contribute as much to this total premium as 
are their counterparts in more affluent areas. In western and central China, where the 
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level of economic development remains low, local governments as well as rural 
residents have a limited capacity to finance the overall program adequately; in the 
more prosperous eastern and coastal regions, the insurance benefit package is usually 
much more comprehensive, as local governments and residents, even rural 
households, are better able to contribute resources to finance treatments that the 
basic package does not cover. It is important to establish a fiscal redistribution 
mechanism to reduce inequities arising from different regions of the country. Using 
the NCMS as an example, wealthy provinces should be encouraged to improve the 
NCMS benefit package using their own resources, but central government should 
ensure a minimum package for the NCMS in all provinces, and that should be 
financed entirely by central government from existing central government revenue 
streams, or by transferring through the fiscal transfer system, that is to require richer 
provinces to pay proportionally more.  It is also suggested that rich provinces with 
high economic development and large income inequalities within the provinces 
should use surplus revenues from the richer counties to finance the poorer ones 
(Wagstaff et al., 2009c). This will also allow the central government to concentrate 
its limited economic resources on poor provinces that have low incomes, flatter 
income distributions, and limited scope for redistribution even with full pooling 
(Wagstaff et al., 2009c). The same strategy can apply to other SHI schemes in China. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
In thinking about the results and policy implications of this thesis, it is important to 
bear the limitations in mind. This section provides an outline of limitations common 
to all of the papers (topic specific descriptions are found within each empirical 
chapter/paper). Limitations fall under two broader categories: data source and 
measurement. 
 
7.3.1 Data source  
Weights 
The first limitation concerns the data source used in this paper. The CHNS data are 
probably by far the most comprehensive ever amassed in studying health-related 
topics in a Chinese context; however, this survey only includes nine provinces, most 
of these are situated in the eastern and coastal part of China, where economic 
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development is high compared with other areas of the country. Thus the sample may 
limit the generalisation of the study results to other settings.  
 
Many international datasets provide weights in order to allow researchers to make 
data representative of the general population. The CHNS used extant census data for 
a multi-level random sample. As suggested by CHNS research team, it was not 
possible to create cross-sectional sampling weights or longitudinal ones based on the 
sampling methods used. The data are considered as representative of the nine 
provinces surveyed, but any further generalisation of the study findings should be 
made with caution.  
 
Newly-collected data 
Longitudinal data sets are being used more and more in applied work, especially for 
policy analysis. At the point of writing, CHNS has finished collecting the data for 
2011. In this thesis, Papers 2 and 4 take into account a time dimension, but analyses 
mainly capture the cross-sectional features of the data rather than longitudinal ones 
since only two periods of data are available for analysing the NCMS. At the time of 
writing, updating the longitudinal data was still underway. Therefore, findings 
should be interpreted as associations rather than causal as it was not possible to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Attempts have been made to include 
longitudinal analysis in the thesis, but short panel data (Two-Period Panel Data) 
tends not to be ideal for panel data analysis because for the estimators to work in 
practice, there must be sufficient within-individual variability in the model, or most 
ideally a long panel (Wooldridge, 2012, Stock and Watson, 2011, Jones, 2007).  
 
In the beginning of 2013, the CHNS released the biomarker data for the 2009 survey 
wave. Owing to time and cost constraints, I am not able to re-estimate some of the 
results in this thesis using biomarker data which are considered as objective 
measures of health status. As a number of policy interventions were implemented 
after 2006, it would be ideal to re-analyse the results using data collected after 2006, 
especially for Paper 1.  
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Updating questionnaires with recent policy changes 
Some survey questions need to be updated along with current policy changes. The 
CHNS does not distinguish between the old CMS and the current NCMS until the 
2009 wave, even though the NCMS was initiated in 2003. This initially creates 
difficulties for the analysis because it is not clear whether the respondents are 
enrolled in the new scheme (the NCMS) or the old one (the CMS).  Although I am 
able to distinguish between the CMS participant and the NCMS participant by 
linking the individual level data with the community level ones (see Paper 2 for 
detailed explanations), it would be preferable if the questionnaires had been 
consistent with policy changes. The same problem applies to other policy variables 
in this dataset, such as UEI and URI.  
 
7.3.2 Measurements 
The second category of limitations concerns measurements. First, there has not been 
a broad agreement on a working definition of ‘need’ in healthcare. Empirical work 
tends to measure need in terms of health status. Such a measurement is accepted 
mainly because of data availability and convenience of measurement. Self-assessed 
health (SAH) has been adopted in many studies as a measure of health status. This 
measurement is practical, inexpensive, quick, and easy to obtain, but there is also 
good evidence that individuals tend to underestimate or overestimate some of the 
information. The analyses represented in this thesis rely mainly on self-reported 
subjective measures. This is not a problem if reporting differences have influenced 
the population equally. However, in some case, it will cause bias in the analyses if 
population groups report the variable in a systematically different way. For instance, 
under-reporting may be greater in rural people and young people, whereas urban 
people and old people are likely to underestimate their health status (Allin et al., 
2010, Masseria et al., 2010).  
 
Despite of ample empirical evidence of using CI and Decomposition Analysis to 
estimate socioeconomic related inequity, some limitations with regard to the use of 
this method need to acknowledge. First of all, although decomposition analysis 
captures the association between the distribution of health and socioeconomic 
factors, the analysis only provides suggestive evidence on correlation rather than 
causal relationship. It is noted that the inequity in health and health care may 
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correlate with education, income and job status, etc. The nature of such correlation 
has been found as widely complex and controversial. Socioeconomic status may 
influence health through various ways, such as ensuring nutritious diet, healthy life 
style and improving access to care. Yet health may also influence socioeconomic 
status through the impact of health shocks on employment and earnings. Hence, a 
causal relationship between these two is difficult to disentangle. (Costa-Font and 
Hernandez-Quevedo, 2012). Secondly, as mentioned in empirical chapters, regarding 
the sensitivity of CI to living standard measures, differences have also been found 
when CIs are computed using income, expenditures or assets. For instance, using 
data from Mozambique, Lindelow (2006) found that the choice of welfare indicator 
can have a large and significant impact on measured inequality in utilization of 
health services. Different conclusions had been reached depending on how 
socioeconomic status were defined. Similar problems were discussed in Ljungvall 
and Gerdtham (2010). The study found that inequality in obesity based on short-run 
income differred substantially from inequality based on long-run income.  
 
It would also be worth thinking how the results generated from the general 
application of CI can be transferred to policy makers. In a 2001 Lancet article, 
Almeida et al. (2010) suggested that in order to relate the method of measurement of 
health inequity to policy implication, the assessment of distributional difference in 
terms of health and health care should be related to identifiable subpopulation 
characteristics. This is considered as prerequisite for policy and intervention to target 
subpopulation at greatest risk because of underlying disadvantages. The thesis 
considers socio-economic factors.  However, it is important to note that equity is not 
the absence of all disparities; it is the absence of systematic disparities between 
social groups that have greater and lesser degrees of underlying social advantage 
because of such factors as wealth, sex, race and ethnicity, or urban and rural 
residence. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, for countries like China, where poverty 
is rife, it is difficult to identify the target population—the poor—sufficiently and 
accurately. Further research is needed to link the method of Concentration Index to 
identify disparities in health across social groups, hence to informing policy makers. 
 
173 
 
Papers 2 and 3 examine health service utilization and financing under the NCMS. 
Inpatient care was not included in the analyses. One reason for not including 
inpatient care is because of the small sample size for inpatient care use. Those in 
hospital at the time of the interview are presumably excluded from the sample. 
Although family members might be able to provide information in the interview, it is 
likely that some of them may need to attend to the patients in a daily basis, and may 
not be available at the time of interview. Therefore, the CHNS is likely to capture 
only a part of household inpatient-related use and expenses, and these data may be 
subject to large variances. Therefore, this study does not investigate inpatient care 
use. 
This thesis does not take into account the population of migrant workers (min gong) 
because the CHNS does not systematically sample migrants. According to National 
Statistical Office, China has 260 million migrant workers in 2012, which accounts 
for 19.69% of the total Chinese population (People's Daily, 2012). China has 
increased spending on healthcare reform, with last year's overall expenditure at 
RMB568.86 billion (US$ 90.12) (around 1.43% of GDP) (Ministry of Health China, 
2012). Yet according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, only 
about 20% of migrant workers have health insurance (Li and Blanchard, 2013). 
These migrant workers cannot formally register in urban areas because of their 
household registration status (Hukou). Neither are they eligible for enrolling in any 
urban social health insurance scheme or employee-based insurance. There is a clear 
need to investigate issues related to access to healthcare and health insurance 
coverage among migrant workers. Qualitative research methods such as interviews 
and focus groups can be adopted as it is difficult to systematically survey migrant 
worker population in practice. 
 
7.4 Future research agenda 
China will doubtless continue to explore its own way in its healthcare reforms. The 
implementation of the insurance reforms was a crucial step in closing the insurance 
coverage gap and moving the current health insurance system towards realization of 
universal insurance coverage. At the moment, the country still adopts an insurance 
system which separates the rural and urban population. This might have been 
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justifiable in the 1990s when migration into and between cities was strictly 
controlled (Wong et al., 1998), and access to care through place of residence or 
employment worked adequately and healthcare was broadly available (Jin, 2012). 
Starting from the mid-1990s, a large flow of rural migrants has come to urban areas 
to seek employment opportunities, whereas the social health insurance system, based 
on household registration and a large number of local pools from those migrants’ 
place of residence, discriminates against migrants because of their mobility and not 
being able to transfer benefits between regions (Gu and Li, 2012). The NCMS offers 
financial protection to people with rural household registration status, but it is noted 
that reimbursement rates of medical bills are usually set low if a person seeks care 
outside his/her home province; furthermore, medical bills can only be claimed after 
the migrant workers returns to his/her hometown (Gu and Li, 2012). These 
restrictions may create barriers to access to healthcare and financial burdens to rural 
migrant workers. It is documented that only 72.9% of the migrant workers in 
Shanghai were covered by the NCMS, and approximately 16.7% were completely 
uninsured. The coverage rate was much lower than the nationwide coverage rate for 
the NCMS (Zhao et al., 2011).  
 
One potential research agenda would be to investigate the impacts of the NCMS on 
access (outpatient, inpatient and preventive services) and finance (OOP payments 
and insurance claims) in healthcare among migrant workers in urban cities. Migrant 
workers are a highly mobile and growing population. As these workers are usually 
breadwinners in their households, their health status directly affects the income and 
living standard of their respective households. Qualitative methods such as 
interviews and focus group methods can be used to explore this topic in depth.  
 
While the findings of this thesis are for specific policy contexts, the health equity 
method used here can be applied to other insurance schemes in China, for instance, 
the URI.  It would be interesting to analyse the impacts of the URI on equity in 
access and fairness in finance. Inequalities can be compared between the population 
enrolled in the scheme and the population not enrolled in it.  Like the NCMS, the 
URI also aims to improve service use for inpatient care. Analyses can then focus on 
inpatient care for different income groups. Concentration Indices and Decomposition 
Analysis can be applied accordingly.  
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Whether the availability of insurance may be associated with cost escalation is an 
interesting topic. This thesis offers tentative findings on supplier-inducement under 
the NCMS. However, it is noted that, by the end of 2009, almost 95% of the rural 
Chinese population were covered by the NCMS. This makes it technically difficult 
to identify a sufficient control group that remains uninsured throughout the time to 
capture the impacts of the NCMS on supplier-inducement. The URI provides a better 
context to investigate the association between insurance and supplier-inducement 
because the URI is still in its trial period, and a substantial fraction of urban 
unemployed remains uncovered by any SHI or private insurance. This population 
could form a control group for us to monitor their health costs. The CHNS only has 
data from 2009 for URI and comparison across time is therefore rather difficult. 
Other datasets, for instance, China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey 
(CHARLS) (Peking University, 2012), which has recently been made publicly 
available, would be a suitable choice for the purpose of such a study.  
Finally, while this thesis used China as a case study, the experience of China can 
shed some light on other countries with similar health system and economic 
development. For instance, Vietnam also aims to achieve full coverage of health 
insurance in 2015 (Wagstaff, 2005c, Wagstaff, 2009b, Wagstaff, 2007a). It has a 
compulsory SHI system which covers mainly formal sector employees, civil servants, 
and some social protection groups. Along with its compulsory SHI, Vietnam has a 
voluntary SHI system covering specific occupational and age groups such as school 
children, farmers, and professional groups. Both countries have rural SHI designated 
for the rural population; and FFS is the most widely used provider payment 
mechanism in both countries (Wagstaff, 2007a, Liu et al., 2012c). Existing studies 
showed that China achieved high SHI coverage compared with Vietnam; however, in 
terms of equity in service utilisation, Vietnam is doing much better than China. The 
poor received more benefits from SHI when using inpatient services than the rich in 
Vietnam, but this relationship was reversed in China (Wagstaff, 2007a, Liu et al., 
2012c).  
Another example of SHI for the poor is the Seguro Popular in Mexico, which was 
implemented almost at the same time as the NCMS in China. The Mexican 
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experience is being used as a reference in international work on quality and in 
designing strategies of universal coverage for countries at all income levels. The 
reform encompasses three dimensions—risk, patient, and finance—embedded in the 
concept of social protection of health. In particular, public health interventions, 
institutions and dedicated financing are providing protection against health risks; 
system-wide initiatives that enhance patient safety, effectiveness, and responsiveness 
are protecting the quality of health care. Evidence indicates that Seguro Popular is 
improving access to health services and reducing the prevalence of catastrophic and 
impoverishing health expenditures, especially for the poor.  
It would be interesting to apply the health equity framework (age and gender 
standardised inequities in health outcomes, horizontal inequities in access, and 
catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced poverty) used in this thesis 
to analyse and compare equity in access and finance in  countries such as Vietnam, 
Mexico, etc. Mutual learning would help China, and perhaps other middle-income 
developing countries with similar healthcare systems to learn from each other, 
address challenges in their systems, promote equitable access and fairness in finance, 
and improve population health. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Probit model results of SAH and physical activity limitation 
  
SAH (1=excellent or good, 
0=fair or poor) 
Physical Limitation(having 
limitation = 1, no limitation = 
0) 
  Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Age and gender (ref = m18-24)         
f18-24 0.2091 0.255 -0.0000429 -0.0276 
f25-34 0.1291 0.2044 -0.0104 -0.0298 
f35-44 0.1273 0.1385 -0.0053 -0.0205 
f45-54 0.0316 0.0161 -0.0107 -0.0111 
f55-64 -0.0748 -0.0978** 0.0083 0.0252 
f65+ -0.2282 -0.1668 0.024 0.0565** 
m25-34 0.1726 0.0716 -0.023 -0.0254 
m35-44 0.0413 0.0721* -0.0134 -0.0225 
m45-54 -0.0389 -0.0503 -0.0007 -0.0387** 
m55-64 -0.2014 -0.1488 0.0156 0.013 
m65+ -0.2633 -0.1971 0.0382** 0.0308 
Income(lg) 0.0152** 0.0407 -0.0066** -0.0048 
Marital Status -0.0178 0.0038 0.0053 -0.0138 
Job status 0.0436 0.0478* -0.0338 -0.0354 
Education level (ref = uni edu and 
above)         
No edu -0.154 -0.0305 0.065** 0.0748 
Pri and sec edu -0.0816* -0.034 0.0328 0.0226 
High school -0.0244 -0.0075 0.0122 0.01 
Regions (ref= Province Guizhou)         
Province Liaoning 0.0609** 0.0077 0.0035 0.0284 
Province Heilongjiang 0.0968 0.0035 -0.0064 0.0588** 
Province Jiangsu 0.0547** 0.1246 0.0036 0.0089 
Province Shandong 0.1076 0.0967** -0.024** -0.0039 
Province Henan -0.0075 0.0069 -0.0133 -0.0028 
Province Hubei 0.0079 0.0191 0.0302** 0.008 
Province Hunan 0.007 0.045 0.0125 0.0363* 
Province Guangxi -0.1345 -0.1156 0.0264** 0.0293 
          
Constant         
          
Number of obs 7062 2923 7062 2923 
LR chi2(25) 963.18 354.01 191.24 174.58 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1009 0.0898 0.0523 0.1077 
Log likelihood -4290.08 -1794.89 -1733.27 -723.05 
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Appendix 2 The Erreygers’s  Concentration Indices of SAH and physical 
activity limitation (Probit) 
 Good Health Physical Limitation 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban 
EI 0.135 0.182 -0.043 -0.060 
SE (EI)  0.017 0.024 0.008 0.013 
Socioeconomic related 
inequality  0.067 0.138 -0.035 -0.049 
Percentage of 
socioeconomic related 
inequality  49.95% 75.84% 81.91% 82.51% 
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Appendix 3 Decomposition results (Probit) 
  
CI 
SAH (1=excellent or good, 0=fair or poor) Physical Activity Limitation 
  Rural   Urban   Rural   Urban   
  Rural Urban Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution Contribution %Contribution 
EI     0.135    0.182    -0.043    -0.060    
Residual     -0.002  -1.35% 0.001  0.33% -0.002  4.23% 0.001  -1.01% 
                      
Age and gender (ref  = m18-24)                     
f18-24 0.198  -0.045  0.005  3.86% -0.001  -0.72% 0.000  0.00% 0.000  -0.17% 
f25-34 0.153  0.155  0.005  3.86% 0.006  3.14% 0.000  0.93% -0.001  1.33% 
f35-44 0.099  0.114  0.006  4.75% 0.007  3.69% 0.000  0.70% -0.001  1.67% 
f45-54 0.035  0.021  0.001  0.37% 0.000  0.06% 0.000  0.46% 0.000  0.17% 
f55-64 -0.053  -0.019  0.001  1.04% 0.001  0.28% 0.000  0.46% 0.000  0.17% 
f65+ -0.286  -0.072  0.016  11.57% 0.005  2.64% -0.002  3.71% -0.002  2.67% 
m25-34 0.109  0.120  0.005  3.71% 0.002  1.10% -0.001  1.62% -0.001  1.17% 
m35-44 0.076  0.064  0.002  1.11% 0.002  1.16% -0.001  1.16% -0.001  1.17% 
m45-54 0.020  0.070  0.000  -0.22% -0.002  -0.83% 0.000  0.00% -0.001  1.83% 
m55-64 -0.114  -0.087  0.008  5.56% 0.004  2.09% -0.001  1.39% 0.000  0.50% 
m65+ -0.309  -0.221  0.023  16.76% 0.022  11.83% -0.003  7.65% -0.003  5.50% 
ln(income) 0.056  0.058  0.033  24.77% 0.093  51.18% -0.014  33.36% -0.011  18.18% 
Marital Status 0.013  0.044  -0.001  -0.59% 0.001  0.28% 0.000  -0.46% -0.002  3.34% 
Job status 0.064  0.161  0.008  5.71% 0.014  7.87% -0.006  13.90% -0.011  17.68% 
Education level (ref = uni edu and 
above)                     
No edu -0.181  -0.356  0.030  22.54% 0.007  3.74% -0.013  29.65% -0.017  27.69% 
Pri and sec edu 0.004  -0.113  -0.001  -0.52% 0.006  3.14% 0.000  -0.70% -0.004  6.34% 
High school 0.229  0.141  -0.003  -2.52% -0.001  -0.77% 0.002  -3.94% 0.002  -3.17% 
Regions (ref= Province Guizhou)                     
Province Liaoning 0.043  0.180  0.001  0.89% 0.001  0.28% 0.000  -0.23% 0.002  -3.17% 
Province Heilongjiang -0.073  0.133  -0.003  -2.08% 0.000  0.11% 0.000  -0.46% 0.003  -5.50% 
Province Jiangsu 0.232  0.240  0.006  4.52% 0.014  7.65% 0.000  -0.93% 0.001  -1.67% 
Province Shandong -0.009  -0.120  0.000  -0.30% -0.005  -2.86% 0.000  -0.23% 0.000  -0.33% 
Province Henan -0.071  -0.071  0.000  0.22% 0.000  -0.11% 0.000  -0.93% 0.000  -0.17% 
Province Hubei -0.030  -0.189  0.000  -0.07% -0.002  -0.88% 0.000  0.70% -0.001  1.17% 
Province Hunan 0.018  -0.023  0.000  0.07% -0.001  -0.28% 0.000  -0.23% 0.000  0.67% 
Province Guangxi -0.011  -0.186  0.001  0.52% 0.009  4.79% 0.000  0.23% -0.002  3.67% 
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Appendix 4 Matching balancing properties between the NCMS participants and the control  
 
Control (mean) Treated (mean) Diff. t Pr(T>t) 
lncost 5.108 4.146 -0.962 1.57 0.1194 
age 52.65 49.54 -3.11 0.8 0.427 
gender 0.5 0.449 -0.051 0.28 0.7796 
Morbidity type 2 0.5 0.515 0.015 0.08 0.9346 
Morbidity type 3 0.5 0.24 -0.26 1.66 0.0992* 
Morbidity type 4 0 0.21 0.21 1.44 0.1506 
Job status 0.75 0.808 0.058 0.4 0.6864 
Per capita income(lg) 8.94 8.943 0.003 0.01 0.9917 
Province Liaoning 0.25 0.144 -0.106 0.82 0.4132 
Province Heilongjiang 0 0.06 0.06 0.71 0.4801 
Province Jiangsu 0 0.006 0.006 0.22 0.828 
Province Shandong 0 0.036 0.036 0.54 0.589 
Province Henan 0 0.18 0.18 1.31 0.1912 
Province Hubei 0.125 0.222 0.097 0.64 0.5216 
Province Hunan 0 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.6229 
Province Guangxi 0.625 0.174 -0.451 3.22 0.0015*** 
season 0.875 0.557 -0.318 1.78 0.0773* 
(Note: *** p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1) 
 
